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The aim of this thesis is to defend T. H. Marshall's conception of social
citizenship. I argue that it can be defended both against the New Rights'
rejection of social democracy and against the Third Way re-formulation
of social democracy, by Anthony Giddens and others, which rejects the
goal of social equality. My defence of social citizenship is conducted at the
level of meta-theoretical argument concerning the nature of justification.
More specifically, I make use of Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics,
which I argue is a conservative meta-theory and which I distinguish from
enlightenment and radical meta-theories. For Gadamer, the rational
capacity required for justification presupposes a shared tradition which it
actively establishes through mutual learning. I distinguish this from
Jurgen Habermas' and Martha Nussbaum's enlightenment positions,
where rational capacity is prior to practice, and from Michel Foucault's
radical position, where rational capacity is established through
subjugation and resistance.
Marshall argues that his proposals for social equality are justified from
within the tradition of citizenship and must therefore be revised in new
situations. I argue that the meta-theoretical position assumed here in
Marshall's social citizenship corresponds to hermeneutics. I also argue
that the revision Marshall calls for can be justified as a hermeneutic
reformulation of social citizenship. It must be pursued as a process of
mutual learning so as to establish social equality in relations of mutual
learning. Further, I argue that in the reformulation of social citizenship
hermeneutics can be revised so as to account for the necessity of social
equality for rational capacity.
I argue that conceptions of citizenship must proceed from assumptions
concerning the nature of justification. However, it is through enabling
the rational capacity of citizens that these meta-theoretical assumptions
will be fully realised. The rational capacity required for justification is
enabled in both the good life and mutual recognition. This capacity is also
called on to legitimate the collective interventions whose goal, in turn, is
to enable the rational capacity of citizens. I argue that the social equality
ensured by a hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship, by limiting
inequality and distributing the resources required for capability, can
enable a practical excellence in relations of mutual recognition which is
also the rational capacity required for the legitimation of citizenship.
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1
Introduction: Meta-Theory and the Defence of Social Citizenship.
1. The theory of social citizenship and its critics.
The aim of this thesis is to defend a specific account of social citizenship.
This is T. H. Marshall's conception of the social rights and duties of
citizenship and of the shared status of social equality they are to enable.1
Marshall's account develops the basic assumptions of social democracy
concerning the nature of social justice and how it is to be attained
through citizenship. For social democracy, the equal treatment of
individuals demanded by social justice can only be attained by limiting
the differences of class, status, and power. The rights and duties of a social
democratic citizenship must therefore foster and protect equality in social
relations. In this thesis I defend Marshall's argument that only the social
rights and duties of citizenship which ensure an equal social status will
legitimately limit the inequalities of class, status, and power. However, I
do not defend this position at the level of a substantive normative and
social theory. For instance, I do not attempt to legitimate the concept of
positive rights that is entailed here.2 Instead, I argue that social
citizenship can be defended through meta-theoretical reflection
concerning the nature of justification. I will argue that the correct meta-
theory not only shows that social citizenship can legitimately be pursued,
but it will have significant consequences for how this can be carried
through.
Social citizenship is defended here with Hans-Georg Gadamer's
hermeneutics, which I argue is a "conservative" meta-theory.3 For
conservative meta-theory, all our rational efforts are sustained by the
shared beliefs and practices of tradition, and so the bases with which we
justify this activity will always be derived from tradition. Those who
1 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 67-127, in Sociology at the
Crossroads and other essays. (London: Heinemann, 1963).
2 For contemporary discussions of the justification of rights on the basis of a "positive"
account of the human capacity they can enable and its value, see: Scanlon, T. M., (1977)
"Rights, Goals, and Fairness", pp. 137-152, in Theories of Rights, ed. Jeremy Waldron
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Sen, A., (1985) "Rights and Capabilities", pp.
131-145, in Morality and Objectivity. A Tribute to J.L. Mackie, ed. Ted Honderich (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul); Raz, J., (1986) The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon).
3 Gadamer outlines his hermeneutic philosophy in: Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and
Method, 2nd revised ed., translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall (London: Sheed & Ward).
defend a social democratic theory of citizenship do not usually appeal to
conservative meta-theory. Rather, it is assumed that conservative
thought can neither render pre-given beliefs and institutions open to
critical assessment nor critically intervene on this basis to ensure equality.
It is more usual for a theory of social democracy to proceed from an
"enlightenment" or a "radical" meta-theory. For the enlightenment,
reason in itself must provide the critical basis to justify citizenship, while
for the radical, this basis can only be established in resisting the power
relations of subjugation. However, I shall argue that the nature of
justification will not be accounted for by the enlightenment and radical
positions, and that this is evident in their inability to legitimate
Marshall's social conception of citizenship. Rather, I argue that
Marshall's social citizenship presupposes a meta-theory which
corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics. Further, hermeneutics can be
distinguished from other conservative approaches for the very reason
that it can account for the critique and intervention required to attain an
equal social status in citizenship.
The defence of social citizenship has a particular relevance now. Social
citizenship was at one time seen as a secure achievement, but it has
recently been rejected even by those committed to social democracy.
Throughout the twentieth century, many European societies set out to
establish comprehensive Welfare States. In Britain, these reforms
expressed many of the proposals put forward by William Beveridge, who
argued that the State has a responsibility to remedy the "great evils" of
want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness, conditions caused by the
absence of essential services and employment. The State was to be given a
significant role in the control and ownership of the economy, so as to
bring about full employment and an equal access to services such as
education, health care, and housing.4 Developments such as these,
Marshall argued, moved citizenship itself beyond the "civil" and
"political" stages to a third, "social", stage. Individuals in the social stage
have, by virtue of their citizenship alone, rights and duties to enjoy and
bring about a status of social equality. For Marshall, social equality can be
4 Beveridge, W., (1943) Social Insurance and Allied Services: the Beveridge report in brief.
(London: H.M.S.O.); (1944) Full Employment in a Free Society. (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd.).
normatively justified, as it ensures that the equal respect owed to
individuals as citizens is not undermined by inequalities of class, status,
and power. At the same time, social equality can be pragmatically
justified, as it safeguards the necessary requirements for socialisation,
economic efficiency, and social cohesion.5
There have been many critiques of this "social" stage of citizenship. It has
been characterised as a bureaucratic threat to liberty and as a means to
perpetuate class and gender domination.6 However, it was on the basis of
the "New Right" critique of social democracy that social citizenship was
rejected from government policy. The New Right restricted both the
scope and nature of State intervention. Only by rejecting social
democratic goals, they argued, could citizenship ensure individual
freedom and responsibility in the family and economic relations.7
However, a more recent critique of social citizenship has emerged within
social democracy itself. This is the position of the New Labour
government in Britain, and of its most influential theorist, Anthony
Giddens, who characterises it as the "Third Way" between the New Right
and social citizenship.8 Unlike the New Right, the Third Way is to guide
the State to pursue a social democratic conception of equality. However,
Giddens also argues that, due to recent social changes, social rights would
now in fact undermine the equal status of citizens. Instead, the resources
5 Marshall, T. H., (1961) "The Welfare State and the Affluent Society", in Sociology at
the Crossroads and other essays (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 276-77.
6 This refers to the social conservative critique of bureaucratic planning and procedural
justice [Oakeshott, M., (1962) "Rationalism in Politics", in Rationalism in Politics: and
other essays (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.), pp. 20-28], the neo-Marxist critique of
bureaucratic processes of reification needed to maintain capitalist exploitation [Offe,
C., (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State, ed. J. Keane (London: Hutchinson), pp. 162-
175], and feminist critiques of the translation of paternalistic domination from the
family to socialised services and gendered public-sector employment [Pateman, C.,
(1989) The Disorder of Women. Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory (Cambridge:
Polity Press), pp. 184-5].
7 For opposing social democratic and New Right perspectives on these developments,
see: Plant, R., & Barry, N., (1990) Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher's Britain: Tzuo
Views. (London: IEA).
8 Giddens, A., (1998) The Third Way. The Reneival of Social Democracy. (Cambridge:
Polity Press). While Giddens has formulated the term the "third way", his arguments
are part of a wider project both within the British Labour party and among social
democratic thinkers to formulate a viable alternative to the New-Right. Labour's
reformulated social democracy is set out by: The Commission on Social Justice (1994)
Social Justice: strategies for national renewal; the report of the Commission on Social Justice.
(London: Vintage). A similar revision of social democracy can be seen in: Pinker, R.,
(1991) "On Rediscovering the Middle Way in Social Welfare", pp. 280-300, in The State
and Social Welfare, ed. Thomas Wilson & Dorothy Wilson (London: Longman).
which individuals can and should be guaranteed are those which ensure
only the civil and political status of equal opportunity. My aim in this
thesis is to defend the social conception of citizenship. In contrast to the
New Right and Giddens, I will argue that it can still be legitimated as the
egalitarian goal of citizenship.
2. A Third Way for social democracy.
Before going on to discuss the Third Way I will say some more about the
two positions it intends to overcome, beginning with Marshall's social
citizenship. Marshall argues that neither the "civil" status of freedom
from interference, nor the "political" status of democratic participation
can, by themselves, bring about citizenship equality. Rather, individuals
can only be equal as citizens when a status of social equality establishes a
medium for all activity. Marshall argues that activities as diverse as
medicine and art develop human qualities of discernment, but in a way
which is always appropriate to the skills they require.9 For Marshall,
when practices such as these are worthwhile they can enable the capacity
which is to be the basic requirement for the shared status of social
equality. They also provide a foundation to ensure the further political
and civil dimensions of citizenship. Contractual relations can be made
compatible with social equality by ensuring that work is equally
worthwhile, but this itself requires greater government intervention.
However, the equal status enjoyed by workers can provide the basis to
justify government intervention, where this equality in the civil sphere
is mirrored in the political representation of functional interests.10
Further, this equal status also provides the means to finance government
intervention in the form of universal social services through social
insurance contributions and income tax revenue.11
Giddens also intends to overcome the New Right position, which rejects
social democracy itself along with Marshall's social citizenship. The
combination of social conservatism and economic liberalism in F. A.
9 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism in relation to Social
Structure and Social Policy", in Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays (London:
Heinemann, 1963), pp. 167-8.
10 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", p. 117.
11 Marshall, T. H., (1961) "The Welfare State and the Affluent Society", p. 277, pp.
280-1.
Hayek's work corresponds to many of the New Right policies in Britain.12
Hayek argues that economic activity is worthwhile only to the extent that
it represents individual choices, and it will be efficient only when the
nature of working conditions can be flexibly adapted to new
requirements. Egalitarian rights and duties must not, therefore, interfere
with relations of production, as this would obstruct the freedom and
efficiency of the market. These policies also lead to an over-extension of
the State, to the point where its functions outstrip its capacity. To secure
freedom, efficiency, and a functioning State, the scope of the State must be
limited, and it must in its limited role give priority to securing the
prerequisites of a free market. This restricted role of the State will also
only be ensured by rejecting corporatist relations, which enable the
working class to expand State intervention so as to secure their own
interests. Another cause of State expansion can be overcome by limiting
the State's provision of essential services which, when free, are the focus
of ever-increasing demand.13 Moreover, with a limited State and free
market, the traditional family can be secured as a requirement for
freedom. Individuals will only be free when they, and not the State, take
responsibility for the needs of their dependants within a family.14
The Third Way proposed by Giddens is presented as a social democratic
conception of citizenship. He therefore rejects the New Right, and argues
that freedom and efficiency can in fact only be secured with egalitarian
interventions.15 However, he also argues that Marshall's social
citizenship is unable to bring about the equality required for freedom,
efficiency, and social justice. He argues that Marshall's position relies on
assumptions about the nature of the world and the ways in which it can
12 The New Right draws on social conservatism (in line with Oakeshott), an
individualistic explanatory account of the economy and a negative conception of
freedom as the absence of infringements, which Hayek combines in his argument that
traditional values are necessary for reason to grow and operate. See: Barry, N., (1990)
Welfare. (Milton Keynes: Open University); Barry, N., (1997) "Conservative Thought
and the Welfare State", Political Studies, vol. 45, no. 2., pp. 331-345; Tomlinson, J., (1995)
"Hayek", in Modern Thinkers on Welfare, ed. Vic George & Robert Page (London:
Prentice Hall).
13 Hayek, F. A., (1960) The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p.
302; (1976) Law, Legality, Liberty (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 68 ff..
14 Murray, C., (1986) The Emerging British Underclass, (London: IEA) p. 23; Mead, L.,
(1989) "The Logic of Welfare: The Underclass and Work Policy", in The Ghetto
Underclass, ed. William Julius Wilson (New York: Sage), pp. 178-9.
15 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge:
Blackwell), pp. 14-15.
be understood which are now both untenable and antithetical to freedom.
According to Giddens' interpretation, Marshall assumes that the social
world is made up of national cultures and economies, and traditionalist
and productivist practices, a world which can be conceptualised primarily
in terms of our material needs, mutual dependency, and shared values.
Giddens argues that, by contrast, our world now is more "reflexive", due
to processes of globalisation and post-traditionalism, and can be
understood only in a reflexive way, with criteria which are primarily
"psychic", individually determined, and irreconcilable. While social
citizenship could only be pursued where reflexivity is under-developed,
he argues, citizenship must now instead ensure an equal opportunity for
reflexivity by distributing "possibilities" as the basis for an equal civil and
political status.16
Giddens argues that the processes of globalisation and post-traditionalism
have created the conditions for an alternative conception of social
democratic citizenship.17 He argues that the conditions of reflexivity
invalidate Marshall's assumption that economic activity could be
directed by social rights. Rather, economic interaction has a global
interdependency now, and so can no longer be controlled by the State,
while greater flexibility is also now necessary, and so citizenship cannot
guarantee certain productive experiences as a right.18 Giddens also argues
that the process of globalisation is compounded by post-traditionalism,
while Marshall's position, instead, necessarily assumes a homogeneous
culture of deferential relations. For Giddens, as cultural diversity
problematises the nature of such basic goods as education and health,
State social services can no longer attempt to satisfy a culturally
substantive conception of human need. Further, the traditionalistic
forms of authority which, he argues, Marshall appeals to, can no longer
be assumed valid. For instance, trade union representatives have now
lost the authority to represent the shared interests of workers. This is due
not only to the economic decline of their industrial power base, but also
16 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, pp. 4-8, pp. 70-77, p. 169; (1998) The Third
Way, pp. 7-10, p. 101.
17 Giddens, A., (1990) The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 51;
Giddens, A., (1994) "Living in a Post-Traditional Society", in Reflexive Modernisation.
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the modern social order, ed. Beck , U., et al.,
(Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 56-7.
18 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, p. 177 ff..
to the displacement of individual fulfilment away from employment
roles structured by pre-given forms of rationality and power relations.19
7
Giddens argues that globalisation and post-traditionalism have
converged in a "post-productivist" society, whose distinctiveness from
"productivism" can be seen most clearly in the nature of its gender
relations. Giddens also argues that Marshall's assumptions apply only to
a period of productivism, where roles are materialist, predictable, and
deferential. Post-productivism is, instead, an environment of reflexivity,
of post-materialist values, socially constituted risks, and increasing self-
determination. Reflexive roles foster a diversity of what are regarded as
valuable characteristics, in the reflexive confrontation of risks as
opportunities, and in the individual's determination of the nature and
direction of roles.20 While reflexivity is increasingly sought in life-style
choices, it is also now a potential of employment.21 Giddens also argues
that post-productivism emerges alongside greater gender equality. As
only male employment has significance for productivism it confers value
alone on the production and distribution of material resources. Greater
competition from women entails that full male employment can no
longer be a goal. It also reflects the fact that, due to the combination of
employment and domestic work in new ways, roles are more plural and
flexible now and, therefore, that the production and distribution of
resources can no longer be predicted and controlled as a right.22
Giddens argues that social citizenship is tied to the untenable assumption
that, as roles are productivist, valued experiences can be assessed with
materialist criteria of need, and their occurrence predicted and then
ensured by State regulation. Not only, he argues, does the world no
longer correspond with this productivist ideal, our understanding of the
world has also had to adapt accordingly. Giddens argues that the
"autotelic self" characterises the reflexive understanding required now.
19 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, pp. 16-18, pp. 34-37; (1994) "Living in a
Post-Traditional Society", pp. 82-3, pp. 87-90, p. 100.
20 Giddens, A., (1998) The Third Way, pp. 62-4.
21 However, Giddens does not completely endorse Andre Gorz's thesis of post
productivism, that enjoyment and personal fulfilment are dualistically distinguished
from spheres of efficient production and political administration: Gorz, A., (1982)
Farewell to the Working Class. (London: Pluto).
22 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, p. 169, pp. 175-7.
The autotelic self prioritises the psychic, rather than materialist, aspects of
well-being. It also appreciates the need now to actively determine one's
own "risk environment", rather than to accept pre-given solutions to
problems and the power structures which sanction them. This is the self
which views the world not as an external environment of predictable
relations, but as an environment of risks, of opportunities for self-
realisation, which in turn is constituted in our response to risks. As
valuable experiences now are available only through reflexive self-
realisation, egalitarian policies must enable each individual to develop
the characteristics of the autotelic self.23 Giddens argues that the rights of
social citizenship do not respond to the requirements for the autotelic
self. Instead, they will distribute material resources through a social
insurance model of predictable need, and they will perpetuate roles
structured by pre-given power relations and forms of rationality.24
Giddens agrees with the New Right that citizenship equality cannot be
attained by the unconditional and Statist distribution of needed resources.
Rather, those who receive income as "welfare" must also be held duty-
bound to pursue paid employment, while this duty should be enforced by
community-based groups with superior knowledge of local market
opportunities and individual needs.25 However, Giddens rejects the New
Right assumption that citizenship equality will be enabled simply by
holding individuals duty-bound to enter employment. Rather, citizen
equality will only be attained by enabling the characteristics of the
autotelic self. Welfare services must, through counselling and training,
enable individuals to face unemployment as a productive risk
environment, an opportunity for reflexive self-realisation.26 This duty-
led welfare provision must also be supplemented by rights which ensure
that employment itself is a site for the realisation of the autotelic self.
Citizenship must ensure an equality of opportunity. Individuals can be
granted "civil" rights to, for instance, basic employment conditions,
which do not pre-judge and predict the substance of valued roles.
23 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, p. 192 ff.. Giddens' account of the autotelic
self draws on Ulrich Beck's discussion of "risk": Beck, U., (1986) Risk Society. Towards a
New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 1992) p. 143 ff..
24 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, pp. 183-7.
25 Giddens, A., (1998) The Third Way, p. 65-7, pp. 102-7, pp. 113-5, pp. 118-9.
26 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, p. 187
Further, in post-traditionalist conditions, power relations cannot be based
on the assumed authority of elites within roles. Non-authoritarian power
relations will be ensured, instead, only when individuals have the
political rights to reflexively determine the nature of such roles.27
Giddens argues that Marshall's position is no longer tenable. At the same
time, he argues that his own conception of citizenship represents the
appropriate understanding for a changed world. Giddens' claim can be
elaborated on with reference to three contentious situations for modern
social democratic thought: the single unemployed parent in poverty; the
individual who derives valuable experiences from a life of art, and the
ethnic and religious cultural differences in the demand for, and
enjoyment of, essential services. Giddens argues that Marshall's
citizenship cannot account for gender relations of a post-traditionalist
society. Therefore, for Giddens, social citizenship will not enable the
characteristics of the autotelic self for the unemployed single mother, and
so it will not ensure, through the work obligation, her equal opportunity.
Giddens also would argue that Marshall's citizenship cannot account for
the meaningful experiences of a post-productivist society, including the
potential value of the life of the artist. It will not enable a life that lies
outside of the productivist employment structure, and nor will it enable a
life whose requirements and nature are unpredictable. Finally, Giddens
would argue that Marshall's universal social services can only meet the
requirements for a national culture. In their uniformity, these services
will not respond to the diverse requirements of the cultural sub-groups
which make up modern society.
Giddens argues that, in a post-productivist society, even those deprived of
the basic material resource of a home can live a valuable life, and even
unemployment can be experienced as an opportunity rather than as a
stigmatising debilitation.28 The non-poor can learn from this that the
valued life is now determined and experienced reflexively. The non-poor
must overcome their compulsive attachment to pre-given forms of
rationality and power structures in employment so as, instead, to
prioritise the enablement of reflexivity for themselves and others.
27 Giddens, A., (1998) The Third Way, p. 77, p. 79, p. 95.
28 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, p. 181, p. 192.
Therefore, rights should only distribute the resources required for an
equal opportunity for, and in, employment. Further, the unemployed
should be held duty-bound to seek employment, while this duty can be
justified by a "conservative" appeal to traditional beliefs regarding the
responsibilities individuals have to meet their own needs and those of
their family members. However, Giddens also argues that traditional
beliefs can only be appealed to in this way if they help foster the autotelic
self.29 The duties of welfare are justified only as a means to attain
reflexivity, whether in practices such as art or more conventional
occupations. Employment will then also provide a shared experiential
basis for political interaction and the material and psychic means to freely
pursue the valued experiences of one's life-style choices, including the
consumption of services appropriate to diverse cultural needs.
3. Meta-theoretical reflection and conceptions of citizenship.
The defence of Marshall's social citizenship I propose here is conducted
through meta-theoretical argument. In this section I give a schematic
account of the relation of meta-theory to the theory and practice of
citizenship. I then introduce the distinctions between three main forms
of meta-theory: conservative, enlightenment, and radical. Meta-theory is
reflection concerning the nature of justification. It assesses what sort of
basis is required to justify the assumption that a belief or statement is
correct or true. It also analyses the conditions which enable the rational
capacity required for justification. Meta-theoretical reflection can be seen
to be involved in the theory and practice of citizenship. A conception of
citizenship must make the theoretical claim that specific rights can and
should be enjoyed. It must therefore presume how the justification of
theoretical claims is possible. However, it must also presume how the
claims of practice can be justified. This follows as a conception of
citizenship must specify how interaction can and should be altered so that
the rights it prescribes are enjoyed. Finally, a conception of citizenship
will also seek to alter bases for justification in theory and practice in the
interests of progress. It must therefore presume what the conditions of
possibility for justification are, the interactive conditions required for
rational capacity which the rights and duties of citizenship can enable.
29 Ibid., p. 49.
I argue that meta-theoretical reflection is necessary in both Marshall's and
Giddens' accounts of citizenship. Marshall's conception of social
citizenship must account for the nature of justification with regard to:
collective intervention to ensure social equality; and the valued capacity
and interrelations of social equality which this intervention is to enable.
The social conception of citizenship must presume how it is possible to
justify the theoretical prescriptions concerning both the scope and
legitimation of State intervention. It must also presume that practical
bases for justification can account for the enablement of the valued
capacity in productive practices and in relations of social equality. Finally,
it must determine the conditions under which we can arrive at new,
acceptable, bases for justification in the theory and practice of social
citizenship. Correspondingly, Giddens' rejection of social citizenship also
presumes a meta-theoretical account of the nature of justification. For
Giddens, post-productivism alters the bases for justification for our
theoretical analysis of society and for the practical realisation of rational
capacity as the autotelic self. Again, this is the case concerning collective
intervention, the capacity realised in productive roles, and the interactive
relations in which the equal status of citizenship is ensured.
In the coming chapters I offer a conservative meta-theoretical defence of
Marshall's social citizenship so as to respond to Giddens' position. In
Section One, above, I distinguished the conservative meta-theory from
the enlightenment and radical positions. Admittedly, this distinction
represents a simplification of meta-theoretical debate. However, although
there are variations within each of these meta-theoretical positions,
significant consequences follow from each for the pursuit of citizenship.
For instance, Gadamer's conservative position does not deliver a
substantive conception of citizenship, as it does not determine what its
bases for justification are. However, it will determine the nature of such
bases, and so the conceptions of citizenship which could follow from it
will be significantly different from those which could follow from other
meta-theoretical positions. My concern here is with the relation between
Gadamer's conservative meta-theory and Marshall's conception of social
citizenship. Later on I will distinguish Gadamer's hermeneutics from
other conservative positions. Marshall's social citizenship can be
defended, I shall argue, because it presupposes a meta-theory which
corresponds with Gadamer's hermeneutics, while Gadamer's
hermeneutics can provide the meta-theoretical basis for this defence
because of its distinctiveness from other conservative approaches.
I give a brief account here of each of the meta-theretical positions and of
how they relate to conceptions of citizenship. First, the conservative
position has been articulated by writers such as Edmund Burke and, more
recently, John MacMurray, Alasdair Maclntyre, and Philip Selznick.30 For
conservative meta-theory, a shared tradition enables the rational capacity
required to establish bases for justification. The rational capacity required
for justification is the insight of traditional understanding which is
developed through a process of socialisation within tradition. All rational
activity is sustained by a shared tradition but this activity is also the
means by which tradition is itself perpetuated by a socialised insight
through time. For conservative meta-theory, the rights and duties of
citizenship must be justified by an insight into tradition. Further,
citizenship itself must seek to enable the conditions which are required
for the socialisation of individuals in traditional understanding. In this
way, moreover, a normative and rational advance can be ensured as the
continuity of a group's shared tradition. It is in ensuring this continuity
that the valued socialised capacity is itself enabled. This is the capacity
which is rightly valued. As it is also the capacity which determines what
the valid bases for justification are, it therefore also determines what is to
count as a rational and normative advance.
For enlightenment meta-theory, bases for justification must be
established by the power of reason in itself. We can only assume the truth
or correctness of that which has been justified in this way. Therefore, the
beliefs and practices of a particular tradition in which an individual's
rational capacity is developed do not have any necessary precedence as
such. Rather, bases for justification must be established by procedures of
30 Burke, E., (1790) Reflections on the Revolution in France: and on the proceedings in
certain societies in London relative to that event, ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), pp. 100-135; MacMurray, J., (1949) Conditions of
Freedom (London: Faber & Faber), pp. 69-90; Maclntyre, A., (1981) After Virtue. A study
in moral theory, 2nd ed. (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.), pp. 181-221; Selznick,
P., (1992) The Moral Commonwealth. Social Theory and the Promise of Community
(Oxford: University of California Press), pp. 319-351.
reflection which enable us to abstract, or disengage, from that which is
assumed to be true so as, in turn, to justify the claims we make according
to rational criteria alone. This disengagement can be transcendental, as
with Kant's "noumenal" self, or it can be attained as the perspective all
rational beings would share, such as in John Rawls' "original position."31
The enlightenment will seek to establish citizenship through the power
of reason, as only rights which have been justified in this way can have
legitimacy. It will also pursue the political project that best enables the
development of this rational capacity throughout social relations, as in
this way a rational and normative basis for social power relations can
then be pursued. An advance is possible which is measured in terms of
the extended sovereignty of reason, over and against both the unjustified
assumptions of tradition and unjustified acts of power.
For the radical position, rational capacity is constituted in relations of
power and knowledge so as to conceive of justification in specific ways.
Both our ability to reason and the validity of bases for justification express
this mutual relation of power and knowledge. It is not only a matter of
contingency what bases for justification are established. The continued
exertion of power here also undermines the certainty of justification. For
the radical, an enlightenment reflection cannot ensure the requirements
for rationality over and against unjustified relations of power. Rather, as
Nietzsche argues in his critique of Kantian moral reflection, the
enlightenment procedures of justification themselves perpetuate
contingent power struggles.32 The radical also rejects the conservative
argument that tradition gives a normative and rational weight to certain
assumptions. Rather, we will only ascribe this significance to
assumptions when we are subjugated so as to accept them in this way.
The radical argues that resistance is the catalyst of advance. Our freedom
will only be protected by those citizenship rights which we have struggled
to ensure. The awareness that all bases for justification are arbitrary is also
necessary for advance. It enables us to accept that we will only
subordinate those whose freedom we attempt to ensure according to
31 Kant, I., (1785) Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington
(Indianapolis: Hacket, 1981), § 1.; Rawls, J., (1971) A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press) p. 18.
32 Nietzsche, F., (1886) Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973) pp. 108-121.
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enlightenment or conservative accounts of the requirements for rational
capacity.
I argue that Marshall's social citizenship proceeds from meta-theoretical
assumptions which correspond to those outlined by Gadamer. For
Gadamer, like other conservative approaches, our rational capacity is
developed as a socialised insight into a shared tradition. However,
Gadamer also argues that we must give an equal weight both to tradition
and to the demands of the present. It is only the divergent perspectives of
the present situation that can arrive at, or come to share, this sustaining
tradition. For Marshall's part, conceptions of citizenship are part of a
tradition, but one which must be evaluated in light of the demands of the
present. Marshall saw social citizenship as an achievement, but one
which had to be revised and made appropriate again. Marshall therefore
presupposes that the concept of social citizenship itself must be
reformulated in new situations. Therefore, unlike Giddens, I argue that
the passing of time does not necessitate that this conception of citizenship
is no longer valid. Rather, we can assess the extent to which the resources
Marshall has provided for the reformulation of social citizenship are
sufficient. Further, Gadamer's elaboration of the hermeneutic nature of
justification will enable us to identify where Marshall's arguments are
insufficient by themselves to determine whether and how social
citizenship can be justified.
4. Chapter Outline.
In Chapter One I argue that there is a mutual relation between meta-
theoretical positions and conceptions of citizenship. A meta-theoretical
position will determine the nature of justification, but it is only in the
pursuit of rational activities, specifically those of citizenship, that the
rational capacity required for justification is enabled. Moreover, as this is
the capacity which must be distinguished by an awareness of the nature of
justification, then the meta-theoretical position itself is realised and
refined in such activity. Further, normative implications follow from
meta-theoretical positions concerning the relations in which the valued
capacity can be enabled, implications which, again, are realised in the
pursuit of citizenship. This mutual relation will be analysed with regard
to the three meta-theoretical positions. I distinguish Gadamer's
hermeneutics from Romanticism and Heidegger's conservatism, and
then outline how Marshall's social citizenship can be reformulated in
line with hermeneutics, and in so doing extend and refine hermeneutics
itself. I introduce Jurgen Habermas' enlightenment position and look at
Chantal Mouffe's and Ernesto Laclau's attempt to realise Michel
Foucault's radical position in a socialist citizenship. I argue that neither
the enlightenment nor radical positions can be realised in social
citizenship, while the following chapters defend the hermeneutic
reformulation of social citizenship itself.
Chapter Two discusses Marshall's argument that the legitimate collective
intervention must ensure social equality. The practical excellence
required to legitimate citizenship is itself enabled in relations of social
equality as the rational capacity of the good life (discussed in Chapter
Three) and of relations of solidarity (discussed in Chapter Four).
Marshall's account of the practical excellence required for legitimation
corresponds to Gadamer's historically embedded and ethically motivated
practical capacity. Further, it is through such practical insight that social
citizenship can be reformulated now. In this chapter I reject a radical
interpretation and critique of Marshall. I argue that, for Marshall,
historical development is not teleological but a mutual learning process,
and that Marshall's position, therefore, does not necessarily imply
subjugation. I also criticise Esping-Andersen's argument that only
enlightenment de-commodified equal relations will ensure a legitimate
social citizenship. I argue that Marshall's conservatism will not naively
perpetuate class and gender domination, even though his social
citizenship does not create a de-commodified sphere. Finally I reject
Habermas' argument that the egalitarian collective intervention must be
guided alone by the considerations of the life-world rather than those of
the State and economy. Rather, I argue, a hermeneutic social citizenship
must normatively guide State intervention in the economy so as to
ensure an ethical good life and relations of recognition through this
process.
Chapter Three discusses Marshall's argument that social citizenship is to
ensure the satisfaction of needs required to enable the good life of a
practical, authoritative capacity. This collective intervention will be seen
as legitimate by the capacity it enables, when it is ensured for all as a
measure of social equality. However, there are shortcomings in
Marshall's account of practical authority. It is one-sided and deferential, it
presumes a homogenous culture, it excludes parenting from the valued
practices to be enabled, and it is not ensured for all as the status of social
equality. However, hermeneutics will show how the good life can be
consistently reformulated as a "mutual learning process." Further, in
analysing how this capacity can be attained as a status of social equality,
hermeneutics itself will be extended to account both for the collective
interventions required here and for the enablement of this capacity in
everyday and institutional practices. This will be contrasted with John
Rawls' enlightenment position, and his argument that the insight of the
good life only legitimates impartial collective interventions. Martha
Nussbaum criticises Rawls in these respects, and argues that the
requirements for the good life are only known from a practically derived
positive commitment to "capabilities." I argue that, despite its merits,
Nussbaum's conception of capabilities must be hermeneutically
reformulated to account for the significance of practical relations as part
of, rather than secondary to, the good life.
Chapter Four discusses Marshall's argument that the valued capacity
which is to legitimate collective intervention can only be enabled in
relations of mutuality. Marshall's account of practical capacity will again
be revised, in line with Gadamer's hermeneutic account of "recognition"
as an open-ended dialectic of mutual learning. Hermeneutics can also be
extended to account for the necessity for recognition of a social equality
between classes. This position will then be distinguished from Charles
Taylor's communitarianism which, I argue, does not assume that mutual
learning is necessary for recognition. For that reason, he can neither
identify nor avoid ideological conditions. I also discuss Foucault's radical
claim that mutuality must be violently resisted in the interests of liberty. I
argue that what he calls a transgression here can be understood, and that
the attainment of understanding confirms the necessity of mutual
recognition. I also discuss Habermas' argument that the equal relations of
mutual recognition advance only to the extent that they secure an
impartial respect based on a greater transparency of motivations. I argue
instead that dialectical progress is possible only for the prejudiced
perspective of hermeneutics, and that this is a capacity realised in ethical
and authoritative mutual relations of social equality.
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In the Conclusion I return to Giddens' argument that social citizenship
can no longer be justified. From the preceding analysis of meta-theory,
and its relation to the pursuit of citizenship, I argue that Giddens'
position should be rejected. In its place, an account of the hermeneutic
reformulation of social citizenship is needed. Giddens does appeal to a
"philosophical conservatism" to justify the duties of welfare recipients,
but argues that this appeal to tradition is not made "in a conservative
way", but so as to enable the autotelic self. I argue that Giddens' account
of the autotelic self is derived from enlightenment meta-theory and that,
as Gadamer shows, an enlightenment position cannot account for the
mutuality which is necessary for relations both of learning and of
justified power. This weakness is brought out most forcefully in Giddens'
substantive account of duty-led relations of welfare. Not only will the
relation between the welfare recipient and the bureaucrat not be
reciprocal, but it will also be one of an acute inequality of power. For that
reason, Giddens' account of the autotelic self will be indistinguishable
from an identity which can be imposed through a process of
normalisation on the powerless. In rejecting Giddens' theory, the need
for a reformulated account of Marshall's social citizenship which
proceeds from hermeneutics is again made apparent.
*****
In this thesis, where I use the terms "social citizenship" and "social
equality", it is to refer specifically to Marshall's conception of social
citizenship and social equality. My concern in this thesis is to analyse
Marshall's own conceptual understanding of these terms, which is
distinct from the generic meanings they have. My use of these terms does
not equate their meaning with the policies of specific Welfare States, for
instance, the period following the second world war in Britain. The terms
have also been developed in various ways by proponents of an egalitarian
social democratic conception of citizenship. Where I discuss the use of the
term "social citizenship" by Esping-Andersen I will distinguish the
different meaning it is given. Moreover, I also propose that the concepts
of social citizenship and social equality can be reformulated through
hermeneutic meta-theory. I will indicate where my proposals entail a
critical departure from Marshall's own use of these terms with the
qualification that this is a "hermeneutic reformulation" of social
citizenship and social equality.
I argue that Marshall presupposes a meta-theory that corresponds to
hermeneutics. However, Marshall does not refer to or draw on
Gadamer's arguments. Nor is Marshall concerned with the level of
debate so central for Gadamer, specifically the conflict between Husserl's
phenomenological grounding of reflection and Heidegger's account of
prejudicial understanding. Rather, my argument is that Marshall
understands the nature of justification and of rational capacity in a
specific way, that he presumes an account of meta-theoretical reflection,
and that this account corresponds closely to Gadamer's arguments.
Further, I also argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics can be used to
reformulate Marshall's theoretical project. Again, Gadamer does not refer
to Marshall's work. Nor does Gadamer give any detailed account of the
structural possibilities for, and the content of, social justice. More
importantly, and unlike Marshall, Gadamer does not assume that the
collective intervention of social justice, as a form of activity in itself and
in its effects on society, plays a positive role in shaping the nature of
justification. However, my argument is that Gadamer's thought does not
militate against, but rather provides the best possibility for, a critical and
progressive reformulation of social citizenship. I therefore argue that
hermeneutics can be applied to the analysis and pursuit of an egalitarian
politics.
Finally, some of the texts referred to in this thesis were originally written
in German or French. They have all been read in English translation. In
the bibliography I note the specific English translation which I have relied
on.
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Chapter One. Meta-Theory, Justification, and Citizenship.
Introduction
In the Introduction I discussed Giddens' interpretation and critique of
Marshall's social citizenship. According to Giddens, Marshall's social
citizenship assumes a world of pre-given forms of rationality and power
relations. In turn, Giddens argues that these assumptions about the
nature of the world and the way in which it can be understood are
untenable and antithetical to freedom in a post-traditional and post-
productivist environment. For Giddens, the equal status which a social
democratic citizenship is to guarantee cannot, as a result, be a social
conception of equality. However, in this chapter I argue that Marshall's
social citizenship is not a materialist concern with production and
distribution, and nor does it rely on pre-given forms of rationality and
relations of power. This follows from Marshall's meta-theoretical
position, which corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics. Gadamer's
hermeneutics will be distinguished from materialism, and from the
authoritarian, ethnocentric, and atavistic elements of a "cultural
conservatism." As Marshall's conception of citizenship proceeds from
this meta-theory, it is neither untenable nor antithetical to freedom.
Rather, social citizenship can be reformulated now as a "radically
undogmatic" form of "mutual learning." This is an instance of what I
argue is a mutual relation between meta-theory and conceptions of
citizenship.
In the Introduction I described meta-theory as the form of reflection that
analyses both the nature of bases for justification and the conditions of
possibility for the rational capacity required for justification. Meta-theory
also analyses both how a rational advance can be conceived and how it
can be attained in response to changed circumstances. I argue in this
chapter that there is a mutual relation of a specific kind between meta-
theory and conceptions of citizenship. It is for this reason that the meta-
theory Marshall presupposes can enable a reformulation of social
citizenship which will ensure a rational and normative advance. My
argument, therefore, opposes those for whom the bases for meta-theory
remain unaffected by ongoing rational activity, and those for whom
meta-theoretical claims have no substantive normative implications. An
account of the nature of justification will not pre-determine what the
actual bases for justification in citizenship are. However, the meta-
theoretical position from which a conception of citizenship proceeds not
only specifies the nature of normative justification, but has normative
implications concerning the relations in which rational capacity can be
enabled. Further, I argue that the awareness of the nature of justification
must always also be attained in practical and theoretical pursuits which
realise the meta-theoretical account of the capacity required for
justification. Therefore, an awareness of the nature of justification and of
the conditions of possibility for rational capacity continues to be attained.
In this chapter I distinguish conservative, enlightenment, and radical
positions. I argue that there is room for divergence within each, while
this divergence also brings to light the mutual relation between meta-
theory and practical and theoretical pursuits. The conservative argues
that meta-theoretical awareness continues to be developed through
traditional socialised experience, and so activities which perpetuate this
tradition will be positively valued. However, not all conservatives
conceive of critique and traditional belonging as antithetical, and nor
need they be normatively committed to atavistic conceptions of the
valued life. For the enlightenment, meta-theoretical awareness continues
to be developed in activities which realise the power of reason in itself,
while an equal neutral respect will alone safeguard the activities in which
this is realised. However, an enlightenment position need not conceive
of the power of reason as subjective or ahistorical, and nor need it reduce
impartiality to a freedom from infringement. Finally, the radical argues
that meta-theoretical awareness continues to be developed through
resistance, and so relations which minimise subjugation will be of value.
However, radicals need not reduce this capacity to an effect of power
alone, while radicals also strategically lay claim to various justificatory
principles to attain relations where resistance can be ensured.
In Section 1. I distinguish the three meta-theoretical positions and their
opposing accounts of justification. The distinction between the three does
not concern the degree of certainty attainable in justification, but its
nature. They also give opposing accounts of how another activity can be
made commensurable. Activities are commensurable when it is possible
to determine either the nature of certainty for each or whether the
appropriate certainty for an activity is in fact attained. However, the
distinction between the three positions concerns the level at which
commensurability can be pursued, rather than the likelihood of its
attainment. For the conservative, commensurability can be pursued at
the level of justification, due to the shared meaning of presuppositions of
justification required for the certainty of a life led in tradition; for the
enlightenment, commensurability can be pursued only at the level of
translation, in equating activities according to the requirements for the
certainty of reason; while for the radical, commensurability is always
pursued at the level of evaluation, where inferior ways of knowing and
doing are excluded. The three positions also give opposing accounts of
the mutual relation between meta-theory and the pursuit of citizenship.
The conservative insight into traditional meanings requires citizenship
relations that are directed by a socialised insight; the enlightenment
rational capacity will only be ensured in relations which respect, and are
justified by, the power of reason; while the will to know of the radical can
only be ensured in resisting and transgressing subjugation.
In the second section I elaborate on my argument that Marshall's social
citizenship proceeds from a conservative meta-theory that corresponds to
Gadamer's hermeneutics. I argue that hermeneutics is distinct from
Romantic and Heideggerian "cultural conservatism." For the latter, I
argue, justification tends towards an authoritarian, ethnocentric, and
atavistic nature. For hermeneutics, on the contrary, bases for justification
are established by an authoritative insight which is radically undogmatic,
a prejudiced insight which is open to learning, and a traditional insight
which is mediated through the concerns of the present. Hermeneutics
offers a "positive" justification of the rational capacity realised in the
good life of a mutual learning process which is "substantive", or
embedded, and "comprehensive", or pursued in all spheres. Marshall's
account of the practical relations of citizenship and the theoretical
analysis of social citizenship corresponds to hermeneutic mutual
learning. Therefore, to reformulate Marshall's conception of social
citizenship is to take part in this mutual learning process, both with
Marshall and with the diverse demands of the present. I argue that the
project of social citizenship is possible now only with hermeneutics, and
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that the pursuit of this project refines and extends the hermeneutic
account of justification and its normative implications for citizenship.
In Section 3. I examine Jurgen Habermas' enlightenment account of the
mutual relation between meta-theory and the pursuit of citizenship.
Habermas argues that "communicative action" represents the
intersubjective potential for the power of reason to establish bases for
justification. The conditions of possibility required for communicative
action will, however, only be secured by the collective intervention
which safeguards what Habermas calls "the ideal speech situation." It can
secure the "formal" communicative requirements for our rational
capacity because it both has a normatively "negative" justification and is
"dualistically" distinct from systemic integration. The ideal speech
situation ensures that the power of reason in itself is respected, and so it
enables us to make diverse bases for justification commensurable at the
level of translation. It is only in the ideal speech situation that the bases
for justification for a conception of citizenship can be determined, and the
rights and duties of citizenship legitimated. However, it is also only here
that the equal respect which, for the enlightenment, is necessary for all
rational capacity will be attained and, in turn, this capacity itself realised.
In Section 4. I discuss a radical account of the mutual relation between
meta-theory and the pursuit of citizenship. I look at the radical meta-
theory of Michel Foucault and the attempt made by Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe to realise this position in a socialist citizenship. For the
radical, the conditions of possibility for the rational capacity of
justification are established through continuous resistance. The radical
rejects the "humanist" position, whether conservative or enlightenment,
which assumes that the certainty of traditional life or of the power of
reason motivates the search for bases for justification. For the radical,
humanism itself intensifies and extends domination as it helps
perpetuate the arbitrarily achieved commensurability which rejects and
excludes subordinate ways of knowing and doing. However, Laclau and
Mouffe appeal to republican and liberal principles to establish the
conditions of possibility for a continuous radical resistance. I argue that in
doing this they themselves fall back on a "humanist" meta-theory which
they had hoped to overcome. I argue that this shows up a central
weakness of the radical position, namely: that the radical can not establish
mutuality between meta-theory and citizenship, that radical meta-
theoretical resistance is antithetical to the pursuit of citizenship.
§1. Meta-Theoretical Reflection: Justification and its Normative
Implications.
In this section I elaborate on the claims made so far concerning meta-
theory, the distinction of three meta-theoretical positions, and the
mutual relation between meta-theory and the pursuit of citizenship. I
give a brief description of the three meta-theoretical positions according
to the distinctive accounts they give of the nature of justification and
rational capacity. I argue that bases for justification are formed with
assumptions of what can be taken for granted concerning the nature of
the world and our reflection. The three positions give opposing accounts
of how to determine whether these "presuppositions of justification" are
acceptable: whether they enable our rational assessment of assumptions,
are arrived at in accordance with the conditions of possibility for
justification, and enable us to advance in understanding. I argue that
these bases for justification must be arrived at and evaluated in a variety
of "rational activities", where, in turn, rational capacity is realised as an
awareness of the nature of justification. The conservative,
enlightenment, and radical positions will determine whether rational
activities are acceptable by making them "commensurable", respectively,
at the level of justification, translation, and evaluation. Further, a
conception of citizenship will attempt to make activities commensurable
and, in doing this, realise a meta-theoretical commitment to ensure
relations in which the valued rational capacity can be enabled.
1.1. The necessity of meta-theoretical reflection.
I argue that meta-theoretical reflection is necessary for the pursuit of
citizenship. Conceptions of citizenship must proceed from meta-
theoretical positions, as they must presume how the theoretical and
practical claims they rely on can be justified. However, a conception of
citizenship is also itself involved in meta-theoretical reflection, in
determining how bases for justification can be assessed and reformulated.
A conception of citizenship is composed of numerous "rational
activities" with different sorts of "bases for justification." A basis for
justification enables us to assume a degree of certainty regarding the truth
or correctness of our perceptions, beliefs, statements, or findings.
Certainty must itself always be appropriate to a specific "rational activity",
and so the certainty which is required will differ across various
theoretical, scientific, and practical pursuits. In each rational activity,
specific "presuppositions of justification" are to enable our assessment of
the claims which are made here. These are the basic presuppositions
concerning the nature of the world and our fundamental forms of
reasoning. Meta-theoretical reflection assesses whether bases for
justification are acceptable. They are assessed both according to the extent
to which they ensure the certainty which is appropriate and according to a
meta-theoretical account of the requirements for arriving at acceptable
bases for justification.
In a rational activity, the "presuppositions of justification" are composed
of what is taken for granted regarding the nature of the world and our
reasoning. They are "presupposed" both in the sense that they are not put
in question as we proceed in this activity, but also in the sense that they
are not themselves established with absolute certainty. That such
presuppositions are necessary can be seen in various theoretical and
practical rational activities. For example, theoretical interpretation may
take for granted what significance is to be ascribed in reflection to the
historical nature of interpretative methods. It also may take for granted
what social context the object of interpretation belongs to. In practical
activities also it must be possible to give reasons to justify assumptions,
such as, that some act is ethically justified or expedient. It is therefore
necessary here also to proceed from presuppositions of justification. For
instance, to practically interpret the meaning of interaction we must also
presuppose what the scope of interpretation itself is. We must take for
granted the way in which the methods of interpretative analysis can be
deployed from within practice and to what objects they can refer.
Meta-theoretical reflection determines how presuppositions are justified,
and how we can justify the decision to proceed from new
presuppositions. Presuppositions of justification are not put in question
as we proceed in a rational activity. However, the awareness required of
how to justify the decision to proceed from such presuppositions itself
develops from within such activities. Bases for justification are open to
reassessment because their presuppositions are not established with
absolute certainty. However, they are only acceptable to the extent that
they still ensure the certainty which is asked of them. Altered
circumstances may be taken to invalidate what we had assumed to be
justified, or it may force us to alter the requirements we place on the way
we arrive at acceptable bases for justification. However, the awareness of
the nature of certainty which is required, and of its conditions of
possibility, must be attained within this ongoing activity. For instance,
increasing cultural diversity may convince us that the rights of
citizenship we have justified are in fact ethnocentric, or that the bases for
justification of government policy must be arrived at in a way which
incorporates this plurality. This entails, however, that our awareness of
the nature of justification can itself develop in such activity. The
conservative, enlightenment, and radical positions will give different
meta-theoretical accounts of how this reflection is possible.
Conservative meta-theory argues that bases for justification are composed
of presuppositions which can be understood because they are historically
embedded and shared, while only those socialised in this tradition can
determine the appropriate presuppositions in specific rational activities.
Presuppositions embedded within historical rational activities form the
tradition from which all reflection must proceed. This is the historical
dimension in which reflection is socialised, and which also creates new
situations in which to determine what presuppositions are appropriate.
For the conservative, the capacity for meta-theoretical reflection can be
engendered by experience and socialisation. This is the "authoritative
insight" which is aware that tradition sustains rational activity. It is the
awareness that traditional presuppositions have authority for reflection,
and that certainty can be attained as the stability provided by life within
tradition. The correct response to changed conditions is that which also
perpetuates this sustaining tradition. This conception of an authoritative
insight can be seen in Aristotle, where the intellectual virtue of
"phronesis" is fostered in a community and is the means by which its
ethical virtues can exist; and in Durkheim, where "autonomy" is possible
only where the necessary laws of the social world are not merely external
but are made our own through thought.1
Enlightenment meta-theory argues that human reason has the power to
abstract from inappropriate presuppositions concerning the nature of the
world and our fundamental forms of reasoning. It has the power to
proceed from the presuppositions which are appropriate to one specific
activity and not another and to assess these presuppositions in the light
of changed circumstances. The appropriateness of a presupposition is
determined by the power of reason to deploy a rational criterion of
assessment, and to assess presuppositions according to the certainty
which they ensure for this power of reason in itself. A rational advance
will therefore consist in the extension of enlightenment bases for
justification to ever more activities. It must, therefore, also consist in the
extension of the enlightenment meta-theoretical awareness required
within such activities, that the power of reason, and not tradition or
power, is the sole determinant of justification. This effort to establish
appropriate presuppositions of justification which ensure the certainty of
reason can be seen in modern sociological and political thought: both in
Weber, where bases for justification are established independently of our
ethical commitments, and in Marx, where the presuppositions of a future
socialist science will be freed from the social assumptions distorted by
class relations.2
Radical meta-theory argues that rational capacity is constituted through
arbitrary power relations so as to exclude the ways of knowing and doing
of subordinated groups. However, the bases for justification which are
established in this way will also retain this excluded other as a category to
define normatively deviant and irrational experiences. Further, arbitrary
violence is also the means by which this exclusion is carried out in the
subjugation of subjects of knowledge. There can be no hoped-for period
where knowledge and arbitrary violence are separated, such as the
1 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI., trans. David Ross, revised by J. L. Ackrill
& J. O. Urmonson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Durkheim, E., (1957)
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, trans. Cornelia Brookfield (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul), p. 91.
2 Weber, M., (1905) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott
Parsons (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930); Marx K., Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, trans. Martin Milligan (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973).
enlightenment bases for justification enabled by Marx's revolution. Bases
for justification will always undermine their own constitution of
subjects, as they always retain the other, the excluded ways of knowing
and doing, to which experience is arbitrarily and violently reduced. Our
rational activities will never enable the enlightenment certainty attained
by the power of reason in itself, or the conservative certainty attained in
the rational experience of traditional belonging. However, there is a
potential for truth and liberty in the radical meta-theoretical awareness
that the wilful exertion which establishes our bases for justification is
never overcome. As Nietzsche and Foucault argue, truth and liberty are
made possible through the resistance which also acknowledges that the
bases for justification established in this way will be arbitrary.3
1.2. Meta-theoretical reflection and its normative implications
Meta-theoretical reflection assesses how bases for justification can be
arrived at in diverse rational activities. It must, therefore, assess how this
diversity can be accounted for, or made "commensurable." We can
attempt to make another activity commensurable by assessing whether it
does in fact justify claims, and by categorising the nature of certainty
which is attained in justification. For example, in deciding what rights
citizens should have to resources, scientific findings may be appealed to
concerning the cultural divergence in the enjoyment of resources. It must
be possible to assess the scientific certainty of these findings. However, it
must also be possible to determine their significance in relation to other
considerations in political debate. Commensurability must also be
pursued if we are to take part in another activity. For instance, to be able
to move from scientific to political activity there must be some way to
account for their similarities and differences in terms of their bases for
justification. The possibility of commensurability can be conceived of at
three levels. Commensurability can be pursued at the level of
"translation", where we equate in meaning or reference the terms in one
activity with that of another; at the level of "justification", where we can
share fundamental premises about the nature of the world and forms of
3 Nietzsche, F., (1886) Beyond Good and Evil , p. 44 ff.; Foucault, M., (1984) The History of
Sexuality, vol. 3, trans. Robert Flurley (New York: Pantheon), p. 101 ff..
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reasoning; and at the level of "evaluation", where we can judge the
superiority of one activity over another.4
Although meta-theory assesses how to make activities commensurable,
the insight required to attain commensurability can not be determined
sufficiently at a distinct meta-theoretical level. It must be attained in
ongoing rational efforts. Again, a conception of citizenship must account
for the nature of justification in various activities, but it must also
account for the capacity to make such activities commensurable. For
instance, to theoretically prescribe what rights of social justice can and
should be enjoyed, we must determine how the same right will effect the
lives led in diverse activities. We must, therefore, account for the capacity
which will attempt to make divergent lives commensurable on this
issue, and also bridge the gap between theory and practice, or politics and
social relations. However, the meta-theoretical account of
commensurability which is presupposed here also has significant
normative implications. It describes how equally acceptable activities
ought to be treated, and therefore describes how the rational capacity
valued by meta-theory can itself be acknowledged, enabled, or ensured.
These points can be seen by again turning to the three meta-theoretical
positions, which give opposing accounts of commensurability and its
normative implications, and of the mutuality between meta-theory and
the pursuit of a normative and rational advance.
For conservative meta-theory, our knowledge of the appropriate
presuppositions of justification is arrived at through an authoritative
insight into the shared presuppositions of a tradition. These are the
presuppositions which different rational activities must always deploy,
because such activities are historically embedded. These presuppositions,
therefore, admit of divergent yet correct interpretations. Therefore, the
authoritative insight must determine in what way the shared traditional
meaning of presuppositions is itself realised in the interpretation of what
is appropriate for a specific rational activity. To deploy such traditional
presuppositions in a specific rational activity requires an insight into
4 For a discussion of this distinction, see: Wong, D. B., (1989) "Three Kinds of
Incommensurability", in Relativism. Interpretation and Confrontation, ed. Michael
Krauser, (University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 140-1.
their traditional meaning, and therefore always also requires an insight
into the divergent ways in which these traditional presuppositions are
realised as bases for justification. To determine what the appropriate
presuppositions of a specific rational activity are, a commensurability
must therefore be pursued between the bases for justification of divergent
rational activities. The commensurability which must be sought is at the
level of justification, as it is derived from an insight into the shared
traditional meaning of the presuppositions of justification of divergent
rational activities.
Bases for justification must be formed from an authoritative insight
concerning the traditional presuppositions of rational activities. The
insight which can determine what presuppositions are appropriate must
itself be developed as a capacity with certain characteristics. This is the
capacity which is aware that a shared tradition sustains reflection, and
that certainty is ensured through the perpetuation of this tradition over
time. However, this capacity which can be aware of the conservative
nature of justification must also itself develop and change. As a capacity
which is attained only within tradition, and in making diverse activities
commensurable, it has a temporal and social nature. A conservative
conception of citizenship will, therefore, seek to enable social
developments which foster this capacity. It will attempt to make diverse
activities commensurable so as to identity the conditions of possibility for
this capacity. However, in enabling this capacity, conservative citizenship
also unleashes the socially and temporally dynamic nature of the ability
to carry out conservative meta-theoretical reflection. For example,
Maclntyre argues that the good life, which is the "quest" for the good life
pursued together in political community, is made possible by tradition as
this is the particularity from which to proceed forward.5
For the enlightenment, the power of reason in itself can assess what
presuppositions are appropriate, while appropriate presuppositions
ensure the certainty which reason can attain in this activity. Rational
activities are incommensurable at the level of justification. To assess
whether one's own activity enables the certainty of reason, one must
abstract from presuppositions concerning the nature of the world and
5 Maclntyre, A., (1987) After Virtue, pp. 219-221.
reflection which are appropriate instead to other activities. However, due
to the rational capacity to abstract from inappropriate presuppositions,
rational activities can be made commensurable at the level of translation.
Presuppositions of justification can be equated in meaning and reference,
according to whether they create a basis for justification or not. A
commensurability can be pursued on a basis which is independent of the
content of the presuppositions of justification of these specific activities.
Just as the acceptable activity can only be identified according to whether
or not it ensures the certainty of reason, the presuppositions of divergent
rational activities can be translated as being equally appropriate only on a
basis which enables reflection to abstract from the presuppositions of
justification of specific rational activities.
The enlightenment makes rational activities commensurable at the level
of translation alone. This expresses a normative commitment to treat the
capacity realised in acceptable rational activities with an equal respect
which is neutral concerning the content of these activities. However, a
rational activity that is equally acceptable also enables the rational capacity
which can have an enlightenment meta-theoretical awareness of the
nature of justification. It is only in such activities that the criteria of
appropriateness for presuppositions are determined over and again.
Therefore, rational activities have normatively advanced to the extent
that they foster this capacity to proceed according to the requirements of
rational certainty, over and against the accepted assumptions of tradition
and the arbitrary force of will. This is also the capacity required in a
conception of citizenship to make normative evaluations, as with it we
will judge the equal validity of another rational activity without a
commitment to the presuppositions of justification appropriate to our
own activity. For instance, liberal and utilitarian thought each claim to
treat the individual with an equal respect by ensuring, respectively, that
the autonomy or preference of each individual is sovereign, as it is for
each individual to determine how the requirements for justification in
their own lives are to be determined.6
6 See: Sen, A., and Williams, B., (1982) "Introduction: Utilitarianism and Beyond", pp. 1-
21, in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
Radical meta-theory agues that commensurability, and the forces which
undermine it, is always pursued at the level of evaluation. The bases for
justification of specific rational activities are always undermined, the
radical argues, by their own arbitrariness. This arbitrariness results not
only from the continued exertion of power but from the continued
presence of the inferior, irrational, or deviant ways of knowing and doing
which were to have been excluded. Although a subject is always
constituted in a relation of power and knowledge which tends to
undermine itself, it is always constituted according to the requirements of
a specific activity, such as the activity of psychoanalytic self-analysis. The
power and knowledge relation which is established through arbitrary
exclusions therefore constitutes subjects at the level of the evaluation of
competing rational activities and their bases for justification. As Michel
Foucault argues, diverse rational activities are integrated to the extent
that "nodal points" of the power/knowledge nexus form, points at which
diverse rational activities form a network of power/knowledge relations.
Not only will such nodal points always provide plural, and therefore
competing, bases for commensurability, but they will also continue to do
so arbitrarily, and so will provide sites of resistance to the diverse ways in
which commensurability is pursued.
At the level both of specific rational activities and of their
commensurability, the process of subjugation creates openings for
resistance, conceived as the wilful uncovering of the violently and
arbitrarily excluded other. Further, where this resistance is continuous, it
is possible both to establish practices which do not claim to be grounded
on non-arbitrary presuppositions, and to do so at the expense of practices
which intensify subjugation through their pursuit of a non-arbitrary
rational normative advance. It is only then that the capabilities of
practices can be enabled without also intensifying the subjugation which
follows from the constitution of subjects of knowledge. For radical meta-
theory, the nature of justification will only be determined through the
"suspicion" and "transgression" which is carried out in practice. It is also
only through the radical meta-theoretical awareness that all bases for
justification are arbitrary that the normative distinctions between
subjugation and liberty can be made. This is evident in Nietzsche's
creation of a new table of values through a will to power, in Foucault's
parodic, plural, and embodied ethics of the self, and in Goffman's micro-
sociological account of reality as a dramaturgical series of interactions.7
From these introductory remarks it is possible to distinguish the three
meta-theoretical positions before going on to discuss the prevailing
contemporary accounts of each which have been proposed. The different
positions can be identified by the answers given to the following
questions: (a) what is the nature of the capacity required by meta-theory to
determine appropriate presuppositions of justification?; (b) what is the
nature of the commensurability of divergent rational activities?; (c) as the
appropriateness of presuppositions continues to be determined through
time, what effect does historical experience have on this meta-theoretical
reflection?; and (d) how can a rational normative advance be discerned in
the way appropriate presuppositions of justification are determined in
these ongoing rational activities?
For conservative meta-theory: (a) the capacity for an authoritative insight
into the shared traditional meaning of presuppositions must be enabled
so as to determine the appropriate presuppositions of any specific activity
in which the certainty of a life led in the continuity of tradition is
ensured; (b) a plurality of historically embedded rational activities is to be
made commensurable, and the basis for this commensurability must be
formed through an authoritative understanding of the shared traditional
meaning of presuppositions of justification; (c) tradition constitutes a
dimension which sustains the meta-theoretical awareness required for
authoritative reflection, but does so as part of an ongoing social
interaction in which this valued capacity is developed; and (d) while a
conservative conception of citizenship must help sustain the traditional
dimension in which certainty is ensured, it can only do so by enabling the
rational authoritative capacity which, in turn, is to determine how an
advance can be assessed and ensured in rational activities.
For enlightenment meta-theory: (a) the power of reason in itself is the
capacity which must be enabled to assess what presuppositions are
7 Nietzsche, F., (1885) Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1969), pp. 70-1, pp. 78-9; Foucault, M., (1984) History of Sexuality vol. 3, pp. 44-
67; Goffman, E., (1971) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (London: Pelican), pp.
207-30.
appropriate in a specific activity, while appropriate presuppositions
ensure the certainty of reason that can be attained in this activity; (b)
divergent rational activities, which are incommensurable at the level of
justification, can be made commensurable at the level of translation by
abstracting from inappropriate presuppositions to equate the
presuppositions of different activities according to the universal
requirements for the certainty of reason; (c) the enlightenment capacity
can only be enabled in ongoing rational activities, but is enabled as the
capacity to attain rational certainty over and against the anonymous
arbitrary effects of tradition or of historical events; and so (d) the criteria
which measure a rational normative advance will express the certainty of
reason, and they will justify the conception of citizenship which enables
this capacity to develop in specific activities and in the mutual respect
conferred on the valued capacity realised in divergent activities.
For radical meta-theory: (a) rational capacity is enabled by sites of possible
resistance presented by the deviant and rational ways of knowing and
doing excluded by power and knowledge, and is realised only in the
suspicion and transgression which accepts the arbitrariness of its own
bases; (b) the mutual reliance of power and knowledge of any rational
activity also characterises the forming of nodal points between rational
activities, and so the attempt to establish a commensurability at the level
of evaluation is always undermined by the potential for resistance it
creates; (c) the subject of radical meta-theoretical awareness is constituted
through resistance in relations of power, in their techniques of discipline
and practically embedded presuppositions, and so continues to be
disrupted by the impossibility of certainty and the necessity of resistance;
and so (d) a radical rational normative advance entails a suspicion of
accepted bases for justification, and is pursued through acts which
transgress these bases, uncover the potential others which have been
excluded, and develop these possibilities of liberty and truth without
attempting to establish a non-arbitrary commensurability at the level of
evaluation.
§2. Conservative meta-theory: the valued life in tradition.
I argued in Section 1 that there is a mutual relation between a meta-
theoretical position and the conceptions of citizenship which can be
pursued from it. While meta-theory attempts to determine both how
justification and a rational and normative advance are possible, the
capacity for meta-theoretical awareness will be developed in specific
rational activities and in the pursuit of a rational and normative advance
through citizenship. In this section I elaborate on this claim with
reference to the mutual relation between Gadamer's hermeneutic meta-
theory and Marshall's conception of social citizenship. I argue that
Marshall's social citizenship is not tied to productivist and traditionalist
assumptions which are now untenable and antithetical to freedom.
Rather, Marshall presupposes a meta-theory which corresponds to
Gadamer's hermeneutics. For that reason, Marshall's assumptions must
be applied in the present to determine whether they are appropriate,
while hermeneutics will enable us to do that through relations which are
normatively justified and conducive to learning.
In this section I argue that within conservative meta-theory
hermeneutics can be distinguished from a "cultural conservatism" which
perpetuates authoritarian power relations and communally ethnocentric
and traditionally atavistic presuppositions of justification. This
distinction can be seen when we contrast Gadamer's hermeneutics with
Heidegger and with the Romanticism of Herder and Humboldt. I argue
that this distinction is also evident in social citizenship as it proceeds
from a meta-theory that corresponds to hermeneutics. The priority which
Marshall gives to the material requirements of our rational capacity
within relations of authority can be distinguished from a materialist,
authoritarian, and traditionalist position which is no longer tenable. It is
on this basis, I argue, that a hermeneutic reformulation of social
citizenship will be possible. However, in the reformulation of social
citizenship, hermeneutics will itself have to be extended and refined. It
must account for the necessity of social equality for rational capacity. It
must account for how this capacity is enabled by, and within, technical
and strategic interventions through bureaucratic agencies of the State. It
must also account for the how the conditions of possibility for the shared
understanding of an authoritative insight can be enabled only by limiting
inequality and securing social equality.
2.1. Hermeneutics contra cultural conservatism.
For conservative meta-theory, the certainty which can be attained by
rational capacity is that of a life led in the active perpetuation of tradition.
The conservative rational capacity is "substantive", or traditionally
embedded, "comprehensive", or realised in all spheres, and "positive", or
normatively justified by a commitment to its realisation in the good life.
Flowever, within conservative meta-theory, a distinction can be made
between hermeneutics and cultural conservatism. They can be
distinguished in their treatment of three issues: the authority of tradition
and the nature of an authoritative insight; the prejudicial nature of
reflection; and the continuity of meaning in tradition.
For conservative meta-theory, an authoritative insight into traditional
presuppositions determines the bases for justification in rational
activities. Reflection and freedom are not, therefore, antithetical to
authority. They are not antithetical to the authority which traditional
beliefs have as presuppositions of justification for an individual whose
capacity is substantive, or developed from within a tradition. Nor are
they antithetical to the authority of the insight which identifies
appropriate presuppositions. It also follows from this that power relations
can be justified for conservatism only when they are structured as
relations of authority. The practical claim which demands conformity can
only be justified if it represents an authoritative insight. Gadamer agrees
with the Romantic argument that communal languages offer an
"horizon" for reflection that is comprehensive, or manifest in all spheres.
However, Gadamer rejects Herder's and Humboldt's Romantic
assumption that the presuppositions of an horizon express a "collective
subjectivity."8 The presuppositions of a Romantic horizon have an
authority for reflection because their appropriateness is determined
independently of that reflection, and so the insight which has authority
identifies the communal bases of knowledge claims which community
members should obey.
8 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 438 ff.
Gadamer argues instead that bases for justification are formed only
through a "mutual learning process" where the presuppositions of
justification of divergent rational activities are "questioned", "risked",
and possibly redefined. The hermeneutic authoritative insight is aware
that these "radically undogmatic" relations are necessary. Only they will
perpetuate the sustaining dimension of reflection and actively determine
bases for justification. The presuppositions of an horizon have authority
only in the way they can be rationally and dialogically mediated.9
Further, "authoritative" power relations are distinct from
"authoritarianism", as they must arise from, and be conducive to, this
mutual learning. They can not be based on an unquestioning obedience
to superiors.10 A hermeneutic citizenship should, therefore, be able to
deal with contemporary political and cultural concerns. Radically
undogmatic relations are open to the value of other cultures, to the
concrete demands of the present, and to the demands for greater political
participation. However, hermeneutics is neither culturally relativistic
with regard to the worth of differences, and nor is it normatively
relativistic with regard to the goals and power relations required for
practice. Rather, it assesses contemporary developments in terms of the
ideal of a mutual learning process of which they are to be a part.
For conservative meta-theory, the basis for commensurability is formed
from an insight into shared presuppositions developed as bases for
justification in specific rational activities. Gadamer develops this position
through a discussion of what Heidegger calls the "prejudicial fore-
structure" of understanding. Gadamer argues that the term "prejudice"
must be rehabilitated. Since the Philosophes, it has referred to
assumptions that are not justified by an anterior methodological doubt.
In this usage, prejudices arise from individual error, whether they are
commitments which have gone unnoticed in reflection or assumptions
which are accepted in an unreflective obedience to others. On this
account, we can only attain "certainty" after we have doubted everything
so as to assess our assumptions through methods of verification. Instead,
Gadamer agrees with Heidegger that "concealment" is necessary for
"illumination." Reflection is prejudiced because we are finite, and so
9 Ibid., p. 355.
10 Ibid., pp. 279-80.
cannot make all our assumptions transparent. Reflection is prejudiced
also because, as traditional beings, it is a sustaining horizon which cannot
be made fully transparent. The reflection which justifies prejudices
thereby attains "a living certainty" within the continuity which is
ensured for this dimension.11 Therefore, a substantive reflection derives
its positive commitments from, and for, the perpetuation of this
dimension.
Gadamer argues, however, that our prejudicial constitution is dialogical
in structure. To understand an "other" historical situation or divergent
rational activity, reflection must be open. It must be prepared to
reformulate its presuppositions of justification so as to arrive at a shared
basis for understanding. The "living certainty" attained when we proceed
from and rehabilitate justified prejudices is, therefore, not a barrier to
new experiences and perspectives. Rather, it is the certainty which
proceeds "from doubts arising and being overcome."12 Gadamer,
therefore, rejects what could be called Heidegger's ethnocentric account of
a communal linguistic irreconcilability, which results from the different
understandings of Being which are sent by Being to different languages.13
Gadamer argues that the experience of conversation and translation show
us that each linguistic horizon can contain within its view of the world
that of any other.14 However, horizons also have the character of
"games" which "play us" as they determine both that we must be open
and in what prejudicial way we are open.15 For instance, we can not
choose to close our ears to the cultural difference, the diversity of valued
practices, and the new needs of our society. However, nor can we choose
freely how we are addressed here in the way that these phenomena
become for us, among other things, concerns of citizenship.
Conservative meta-theory also assumes that tradition is the sustaining
dimension of reflection. As this is a temporal and social dimension, we
must continue to pursue an understanding of the standard of
appropriateness which can be shared in the assessment of
11 Ibid., pp. 238-9.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 304.
34 Ibid., pp. 447-9.
15 Ibid., p. 110 ff.
presuppositions of justification. As Heidegger argues, the finitude of
rational capacity is determined just as much by its belonging to tradition
as by the projected nature of understanding which this necessitates.16
Tradition sustains and has authority for reflection because such rational
activity must proceed with prejudicial positive commitments derived
from it and from the activity which perpetuates it. It is from the shared
presuppositions of tradition which precede reflection, that standards
which measure a rational normative advance can be derived; while an
advance is measured in terms of the perpetuation of this dimension,
which sustains the conditions of possibility of advance. Gadamer and
Heidegger therefore reject the modern subjective conception of historical
consciousness, which assumes that the reflection of the present situation
can reconceive its tradition with complete autonomy. Rather, this
assumption is a potentially alienating obstacle to the continued reflective
perpetuation of tradition.
Gadamer argues, however, that there are no authoritarian or
ethnocentric solutions to alienation. It can not be overcome either in a
Romantic insight into a collective subjectivity, which has authority over
and against the will and reason of the individual, or through Heidegger's
ethnocentric worldviews, which resist the reflective efforts to transcend
their boundaries. Nor can there be an atavistic solution to alienation. It
will not be overcome through the "historicist" arguments that we can
only have access to tradition either through the Romantic unquestioning
renewal of our medieval past, or through Heidegger's return to the
tradition of thought before modern metaphysics.17 Rather, historicism
concedes too much to the subjective rationalist self-understanding of
modernity. It accepts the diagnosis that the continuity of meaning in
tradition has been lost, and reverses the evaluation so as to reconstitute
tradition in opposition to the reflective and dialogical mediation of
presuppositions in the present.18 Gadamer argues instead that alienation
can be overcome only through the continued reflective and dialogical
appropriation of tradition.
16 Ibid., pp. 260-62, pp. 266-67.
Gadamer, H.-G., (1979) "The Heritage of Hegel", in Reason in the Age of Science
(London: MIT Press, 1981), p. 57 (further references to this volume abbreviated RAS).
18 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 281.
Gadamer criticises Heidegger's transcendental account of Being and Time
as insufficient precisely in the task of grounding being in time.19 In place
of Heidegger's thesis of discontinuity, Gadamer argues that the
"historically effected consciousness" represents the dialogical structure of
reflection's prejudicial constitution. It enables us to disengage from
traditional belonging so as to appropriate, or evaluate, our own
presuppositions in the light of the present situation.20 The continuity of
meaning in tradition can be secured, but only through a continued
mutual learning process, where both the presuppositions of the present
situation and those of one's tradition are put at risk. In new situations the
shared presuppositions of historical belonging will only continue into the
future to the extent that they can be "applied" appropriately. At the same
time, they will only be "applied" through pursuing with them a
commensurability at the level of justification.21 Therefore, a loss of
meaning in modern life can not be responded to with a conception of
citizenship which pursues an ethnocentric account of national culture
and an atavistic account of gender roles. However, life will only be
meaningful through tradition, by finding a shared language both between
cultural traditions and between the prejudices of the past and the
aspirations for freedom of the present.
A brief outline can be given of the conservative meta-theoretical account
of justification which is provided by Gadamer's hermeneutics.
Appropriate presuppositions of justification are arrived at by a
distinctively hermeneutical shared authoritative understanding.
Traditional presuppositions cannot have authority in and of themselves.
They must be shown to still have meaning for the prejudicial
perspectives of specific rational activities. To the extent that traditional
presuppositions are still meaningful, they will also address questions to,
or make problematic, the "hermeneutic direction" or "motivating
interest" of our prejudicial perspectives. They will have authority to the
extent that we cannot but be addressed by these questions. At the same
time, to answer these questions posed for us we must evaluate the
19 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "The Phenomenological Movement", in Philosophical
Hermeneutics, trans. & ed. David Linge (University of California Press, 1976), pp. 171-2
(further references to this volume abbreviated PH).
20 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth arid Method, p. 295, 299, pp. 350-62.
21 Ibid., pp. 338-40.
appropriateness of these traditional presuppositions in the situations
encountered in the present. In answering the question posed to our self-
understanding, we determine the appropriateness of traditional
presuppositions of justification in specific rational activities.22 This must
be a mutual learning process, and it not only determines what of our
tradition has authority for us, but is also the process whereby an
authoritative insight is developed.
The substantive, comprehensive, and positive hermeneutic account of
justification has specific normative implications. Hermeneutics entails a
positive commitment to mutual learning, in which a rational advance
and the good life are secured and understood. They are secured through a
prejudicial but radical openness to the significance which the
substantiveness of the other has for our perspective.23 Further, as it
comprehensive, the hermeneutic dimension will embed material
relations of production and distribution along with the gender, class, and
occupational power relations of practices. These relations can, therefore,
only be justified when their prejudicial direction is provided by a
hermeneutic authoritative insight. Further, a community's principles of
citizenship must also be shown to be authoritative, and so must be
applied again through mutual learning. They must not express an
ethnocentric commitment or an atavistic understanding of how such
principles are to be applied. If Marshall's social citizenship is to be
reformulated now, it is these requirements which must be met. It must be
shown that the commitment to social equality does not express either a
materialistic understanding of the significance of productive relations, or
an authoritarian account of power relations, or an ethnocentric and
atavistic understandings of what is to count as an advance in citizenship.
2.2. Hermeneutic mutual learning and social equality.
In this section I argue that the conception of citizenship which can follow
from hermeneutics will be distinct from productivism and
traditionalism. Unlike "cultural conservatism", the hermeneutic account
of the traditional normative significance of material relations will not be
authoritarian, ethnocentric, and atavistic. I argue that a hermeneutic
22 Ibid., pp. 374-5.
23 Ibid., pp. 358-62.
account of social citizenship will provide appropriate bases for
justification to determine the rights and duties of citizenship now. It will
also do so in situations where a productivist, traditionalist position
would be untenable and antithetical to freedom. These are the situations,
discussed in the Introduction, where resources are required to alleviate
the poverty of the single-parent, to enable an artistic life, and to deliver
services which respect cultural diversity. For hermeneutics, citizenship
must pursue our ultimate purpose, the mutual learning process in which
we both perpetuate our shared tradition and attain that "immediate
living certainty" which enables us to be open to learn. This goal must be
attained in the various theoretical and practical activities of citizenship.
The bases for justification of these activities will only be acceptable when
their presuppositions concerning the attainment of our ultimate
purposes are, themselves, arrived at through a radically open learning
process.
The theoretical analysis of the rights which can and should be enjoyed
must be based on a mutual learning process. For conservative meta-
theory, to understand another activity we must attempt to make
commensurable its presuppositions of justification. For hermeneutics,
this commensurability can only be attained through a learning process
which puts these presuppositions at risk.24 Theory cannot be motivated
by "culturally conservative" presupposed commitments whose authority
is independent of their reflective and dialogical appropriation now.
Rather, theory must practically "apply" its motivating presuppositions in
a learning process with the situation it wishes to understand.25 As
Gadamer argues, the social scientist must become a "social partner" rather
than a social engineer,26 while the moral philosopher is not a teacher,
but is to "aid in making present for rational consideration the ultimate
purposes" of our action.27 A hermeneutically based theory is required to
determine how rights which enable social equality could be appropriate
now in, for instance, the situation of the single-parent in poverty. We
24 Gadamer, H.-G., (1969) "The Science of the Life-World", in PH, pp. 196-7; Gadamer,
H.-G., (1981) "Philosophy or Theory of Science?", in RAS, p. 161.
25 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task", in RAS, p.
131.
26 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Philosophy or Theory of Science", in RAS, p. 166.
27 Gadamer , H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task", p. 135.
must open and reassess our presuppositions concerning the nature and
worth of parenting as a practice, the nature of poverty as an infringement
on our ultimate purposes, and the collective responsibilities to remove
that infringement.
For hermeneutics, we must always give a positive conception of our
valued capacity, which itself is realised through mutual learning as the
pursuit of a conception of the "good life." It is the capacity for an
authoritative insight into our ultimate purposes. A necessary aspect of
the good life will therefore be the pursuit of commensurability at the
level of justification. It is the only means to make life meaningful, to
rehabilitate those prejudices concerning our ultimate purposes which are
acceptable.28 A hermeneutic normative evaluation of practice will
therefore be concerned with the extent to which hermeneutic conditions
are made possible, the extent to which the prejudiced and radical
openness of an authoritative learning process is enabled. The good life
will not be possible in "culturally conservative" rational activities which
are authoritarian, ethnocentric, and atavistic.29 Nor will the good life be
possible in productivist practices, where cultural conservatism is
compounded by materialism. The hermeneutic good life is only enabled
when the technical aspects of a practice are "applied" through the
learning process which is an instance of, and can lead to an insight into,
our ultimate purposes. Both art and more conventional occupations are
characterised by these technical aspects, and both types of practice can be
judged according to the hermeneutic requirements for the good life.
The mutual relation between meta-theory and the pursuit of citizenship
takes on a particular aspect in our concern with hermeneutics and social
citizenship. On the one hand, I argue that Marshall's social citizenship
proceeds from a meta-theory which corresponds with hermeneutics, and
for that reason his commitment to social equality can be reformulated
and made appropriate. On the other hand, Marshall argues that the
valued characteristics of human capacity, the good life, can only be
ensured when it is also enabled equally. Marshall and Gadamer share a
28 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 312 ff.
29 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "On the Possibility of Philosophical Ethics", trans. Michael
Kelly, in Kant and Political Philosophy. The Contemporary Legacy, ed. Ronald Beiner &
William James Booth (London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 369-72.
substantive, comprehensive, and positive conception of the rational
capacity of humans. However, it is Marshall who argues that the
collective interventions of citizenship which are to enable this capacity
equally are necessary for the capacity of all individuals. It is only in
relations of social equality, which are experienced only from within a
practice which enables the good life, that the shared basis required for
understanding can be attained. Gadamer's concept of mutual learning is
derived from a meta-theoretical awareness, which is itself fostered in the
ongoing development of the sustaining dimension of tradition. For
Marshall, a sustaining dimension must also ensure the rational capacity
of all equally.
Marshall's critics argue that the State's collective interventions required
to ensure social equality can no longer be justified either by normative or
functional criteria. However, Marshall assumed that the nature and scope
of collective intervention are questions which we must continue to
answer. He also specified how these questions could be addressed in
changed situations. Marshall argued that the State was to be directed by a
"public interest", which is only arrived at through an ongoing debate of
"professionals."30 For Marshall, professionalism is the capacity required
for an insight into the values which should guide society. It is developed
by experts who can deliver essential services, such as health care and
education. However, professionalism also refers to any valued capacity
made possible in practices directed by our self-understanding. When
collective intervention ensures that practices attain this standard in, for
example, the market, then contractual relations can operate within a
shared status of social equality. For Marshall, the bureaucratic structure of
the State, the services the State can deliver, and market relations, can be
said to "function" only when they are directed by this insight to enable
this capacity for others. In Chapter Two, I argue that the nature and scope
of collective intervention are, therefore, questions which we must
continue to answer through practical reflection.
For Marshall, the collective interventions of citizenship were to be
guided by practical insight, to help enable the same valued capacity which
could also identify with this intervention as legitimate. Marshall's critics
30 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 169.
argue that his account is irrevocably tied to an outdated conception of
practice, a male, materialist, inflexible, and authoritarian account of an
occupation. However, Marshall argues that "professionalism" provides
us with a critical ideal for the analysis of, and intervention in, everyday
interaction. Power relations can only be justified when based on this
superiority of insight, and when they enable this insight for others
through a process of learning. This insight can also only be developed
where the individual is not threatened with being reduced to a mindless
functionary, but can insightfully deploy the technical aspects of that
practice. However, I argue that some of Marshall's commitments must be
revised, and that this can be guided by a hermeneutic account of rational
capacity. The authoritative insight is not unquestionable, or reliant on a
national culture, or the potential of only a limited number of practices, as
Marshall assumed, while we must give greater significance then Marshall
did to practices outside the occupational structure, such as parenting. I
argue in Chapter Three, that practical roles must be analysed through the
prejudicial and radically open learning process of hermeneutics, and
evaluated according to the extent to which they enable such a learning
process.
Marshall argues that social equality is the shared status required for
mutual relations between citizens. It can only be attained by limiting
inequalities of status, class, and power. It then provides a shared basis of
interaction and understanding which has a significant degree of
autonomy from the partial and specific interests following from
differences of status, class, and power. However, Marshall's critics argue
that this shared status assumes a unified account of the requirements for
human mutuality which, now, is inappropriately materialistic and
culturally monolithic. In Chapter Four, I argue that Marshall's account of
the requirements of social equality for mutuality can be retained and
reformulated as a hermeneutic conception of recognition. For
hermeneutics, the conditions required for recognition can not be finally
determined, but they can be analysed by a critique of ideology. A
hermeneutic analysis must presuppose what conditions of power will
dominate our capacity, what technical conditions will objectify
individuals, and what conditions impose normalised identities on
subordinated cultures and on undervalued roles such as parenting.
However, we must also be open to learn about these presuppositions
through this analysis. We must be open to learn about the requirements
for the hoped-for community of recognition,31 for the social citizenship
community of social equality.
Gadamer argues that the substantive and normatively positive
hermeneutic understanding is comprehensive. It must characterise the
practical and theoretical rational activities of and concerning the State,
the market, social practices, and ideological conditions. In each situation a
prejudicial and radically open mutual learning process must be pursued.
Through this learning process the hermeneutic dimension is "built back
up" in theoretical and practical rational activity.32 What hermeneutic
meta-theory cannot specify because of its meta-theoretical status is how
this is to be achieved, or what the specific conditions of possibility for
rational capacity are, and what specific bases for justification are required.
However, the reformulation of social citizenship also develops the
hermeneutic meta-theoretical awareness of the nature of justification
from within new practical and theoretical situations. In this specific
analysis, hermeneutics is being extended to areas which Gadamer was not
primarily concerned with, namely: the scope, nature, and goals of the
collective interventions of social justice. The hermeneutic meta-
theoretical awareness will, in the analysis and pursuit of social
citizenship, be fostered in bureaucratic and technical practices, in strategic
interventions within tradition, and in the interaction peculiar to class
and occupational interrelations of social equality.
For Marshall, the collective interventions of citizenship are to ensure
that the State and market function according to a professionally measured
criterion of "social efficiency", rather than business or mechanical
efficiency.33 Gadamer also argues that the capacity for hermeneutic
understanding is developed by the professional,34 while the social
scientist is to be a social partner rather than a social engineer. In the
hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship, the shared dimension
required by hermeneutic capacity must be "built back up" within the
31 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Practical Philosophy", in RAS, pp. 104-9.
32 Gadamer, H-G., (1966) "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem", in PH, p. 16.
33 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 169.
34 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 13 ff.
practices of the State, professions, and the market. The hermeneutic
capacity must mediate the bureaucratic criteria of efficiency and
administrative power, the professional criteria of service quality and
legitimate expertise, and the market criteria of price and economic
interests. Hermeneutic meta-theoretical awareness must be developed
here if social citizenship is to be legitimated. It must therefore develop an
awareness of the necessity of bureaucratic, technical, and economic
criteria for our self-understanding. In contrast, Gadamer's concern with
these forms of power and rationality is with the threat they pose to
rational capacity when they are not hermeneutically mediated. He has
taken a primarily negative perspective concerning these areas of
interaction, as his concern is to protect the traditional requirements for
dialogical understanding from dissolution where technical and strategic
rationality claim to offer a certainty which is ahistorical in nature.35
For Gadamer, our meta-theoretical awareness is fostered both in
understanding the requirements for capacity and in enabling the capacity
of others. While Gadamer is committed to the necessity of strategic
planning to eliminate hunger,36 for the reformulation of social
citizenship, a hermeneutic awareness is required which can build the
hermeneutic dimension back up in the strategic and technical action
taken to ensure the capacity of others. This is the site in which a
hermeneutic meta-theoretical awareness can develop concerning the
material and structural mutuality of human interaction. It is from within
a perspective such as this that Marshall identifies both the collective
responsibilities to enable the good life for others and the socially efficient
way to ensure this end.37 Social citizenship can be seen to follow from
the Gadamerian commitment, namely: that to learn from the "other" I
must be radically open to the potential future value of its perspective.
However, this enablement of learning is a normative and strategic
intervention in the course of events. In contrast, Gadamer's meta-theory
is primarily derived from a rationality required in the "unfolding of
35 Gadamer, H.-G., (1976) "What is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason", in RAS,
p. 74.
36 Gadamer, H.-G., (1966) "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem", p. 16.
37 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp, 109-110.
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tradition", and his concern has been to contrast this "effective reflection"
to thematic reflection and to technical strategic rationality.38
Marshall argues that the valued capacity can only be enabled in relations
of social equality. By limiting material inequality and recognising and
limiting status differences, a shared status can be ensured which is also
the active sharing of culture. For Marshall, the shared status of social
equality is established only in the experience of valued practices, in which
the capacity to share in a culture is developed. Gadamer argues, in line
with Marshall, that the valued capacity can only be enabled in certain
types of practices, where the individual is not dominated, objectified, or
normalised. Ffowever, Gadamer does not develop his meta-theoretical
awareness of the nature of justification either from within practices
which overcome these conditions, or from within the collective efforts to
bring this about. For Marshall, the shared basis for understanding one's
fellow citizen must be established as a status which is, in part,
autonomous from class, status, and power inequalities. However, as this
capacity is only enabled through the division of labour, these
differentiations are never completely left behind. What hermeneutics
defines as the prejudicial and dialogical structure of interaction and
rational capacity must, in the reformulation of social citizenship, emerge
from this situation of the division of labour. It is as the structure and
substance of this division changes that Marshall's assumptions will have
to be reformulated.
Before we return to these questions of the mutual compatibility of
hermeneutics and social citizenship, the alternative positions of
enlightenment and radical meta-theory must be discussed, respectively in
Sections 3. and 4.. For both positions, meta-theoretical reflection is seen as
necessary for any conception of citizenship. The meta-theoretical
awareness of the nature of justification, and the normative implications
which follow from this awareness, must be realised through a project of
citizenship. I have argued in this section that social citizenship can only
be pursued now through a hermeneutical conservative meta-theory. In
the two sections which follow I argue that social citizenship cannot
follow from enlightenment or radical meta-theory.
38 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 301-307.
§3. Enlightenment meta-theory: universalizable
criteria of rationality.
I turn now to discuss Jurgen Habermas' work, so as to elaborate on my
introductory characterisation of "enlightenment" meta-theory. For the
enlightenment, the power of reason in itself is the capacity to assess what
presuppositions are appropriate. At the same time, appropriate
presuppositions ensure the certainty of reason which can be attained in a
specific activity. Rational activities can, therefore, be commensurable only
at the level of translation, where presuppositions of justification are
equated in meaning in terms of the certainty of reason they ensure. This
also expresses a normative commitment to treat the capacity realised in
acceptable rational activities with an equal respect which is neutral
concerning the content of these activities. Further, for the enlightenment,
rational activities have normatively advanced to the extent that they
foster this capacity to determine appropriate presuppositions of
justification according to the universal requirements of rational certainty.
It is through normative relations which treat acceptable rational activities
with an equal respect which is neutral concerning the content of that
activity that enlightenment meta-theoretical awareness is fostered as a
rational capacity.
Habermas has a special significance for the goal of this thesis. On the one
hand, he gives an enlightenment account of the nature of hermeneutic
understanding. He argues that hermeneutics is only one among several
"worlds of knowledge", and so the potential for hermeneutic
understanding will only be realised when we acknowledge the limited
scope it has in rational activities and in the meta-theoretical reflection
pursued here. On the other hand, Habermas argues that his
enlightenment meta-theory must be realised within a project of social
justice which itself rejects social citizenship. It is a formal rational
capacity, which will be realised only in a normatively negative
conception of citizenship, which itself can only be pursued in the life-
world sphere and not the dualistically separate systems of the State and
economy. In contrast, I have argued that, for hermeneutics, a substantive
and positively justified capacity is comprehensively realised, that
Marshall proceeds from a meta-theory which corresponds with this
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hermeneutic position, and for that reason social citizenship can be
reformulated.
3.1. The formal and dual Intersubjectivity of reason.
Habermas argues that bases for justification are established by the ability
of a formal rational faculty to identify and deploy formal criteria of
validity. It is because criteria of validity are formal that they do not differ
between the divergent rational activities in which they are identified and
deployed. The criteria of objective truth, of normative and interpretative
Tightness, and of subjective truthfulness and ethical and artistic
authenticity, do not themselves differ between the various rational
activities of science and technology, of political and moral discourse, and
of art and the pursuits of human flourishing. A formal criterion of
validity offers the same standard to assess whether a knowledge claim is
justified and, therefore, whether the presuppositions of a rational activity
fulfil the universal requirements of certainty. It is also only because the
human rational capacity is a formal faculty that the abstraction from
historically shared presuppositions which the enlightenment demands
can be achieved. This capacity to abstract, so as to identify and deploy
formal criteria of validity, does not itself differ between divergent rational
activities; rather, it is the "intuitive sense" we all have of how to assess
knowledge claims.39
Habermas here develops the enlightenment argument that our meta-
theoretical reflection is not reliant on what can be meaningful within a
tradition. Nor are the bases for justification of meta-theory disrupted by
the contingencies of historical life, the contingent encounters with a
divergent set of traditional presuppositions or a traditionally meaningful
situation. For Habermas, this enlightenment meta-theoretical reflection
is a possibility now only because of the historical emergence of modern
philosophical discourse. However, its bases for justification escape the
sustaining and disruptive effects of history, as it only justifies statements
which are formal and universal. He argues that it can thereby enable the
enlightenment meta-theoretical knowledge claims of the universal
39 Habermas, J., (1990) "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant apply
to Discourse Ethics?", trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen, in Kant and
Political Philosophy. The Contemporary Legacy (London: Yale University Press, 1993), p.
323.
requirements for certainty in all rational activities, and so identify what
can be considered an advance in such activities.40
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Habermas argues that the incommensurability of rational activities at the
level of justification does not present to those in interaction an obstacle to
rational discursive efforts to make these divergent rational activities
commensurable at the level of translation alone.41 Although such
practical and theoretical activities proceed from the historically variable
context of taken for granted presuppositions of the "life-world", rational
activity entails an abstraction from this condition of historical belonging.
Through this process of abstraction, the appropriate presuppositions of
rational activities which are incommensurable at the level of justification
can be determined and deployed. This can be seen in the various
institutionalised "specialised forms of argumentation" of the life-
world.42 The universal formal criteria of validity of truth, Tightness, and
truthfulness are each evident in the rational activities of the life-world. It
is with these criteria of validity that divergent rational activities can be
made commensurable at the level of translation alone.43 In this way it is
possible to assess the explanatory claims of science and the application of
technology, the theoretical and practical claims of the institutions of
justice, and the claims made of the value of a good life or the worth of
works of art.44
Habermas argues that rational activities will only be made
commensurable when the universal potential for the "communicative
action" of the life-world is enabled. This is the rational action motivated
by the goal of a discursively achieved consensus, a goal made possible by
the capacity of life-world participants to abstract from inappropriate
40 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, trans. Thomas
McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 357 ff..
41 Habermas, J., (1994) "An alternative way out of the philosophy of the subject.
Communicative V Subject-Centred Reason", in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.
Txvelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity),p. 298.
42 White, S., (1988) The recent ivork of Jurgen Habermas. Reason, justice and modernity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 95.
43 Habermas, J., (1990) "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical
Justification", trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen, in The
Communicative Ethics Controversy, ed. Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr (London: MIT
Press, 1995), pp. 62-5.
44 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2, p. 352.
presuppositions and to proceed in rational activities which are
incommensurable at the level of justification.45 Through
communicative action we can integrate divergent rational activities
through a "transference of validity", and so determine "the symbolic
reproduction of the life-world."46 As symbolic reproduction will only be
achieved by abstracting from the historically embedded condition which
Gadamer assumes is universal, Habermas' account significantly limits
the scope of hermeneutics. For Habermas, substantive hermeneutic
understanding is not universal. It is only one "world" of rational action;
and it is not based on the formal communicative action through which
alone it is possible to ensure commensurability. Habermas also argues
that this formal symbolic reproduction of society is dualistically separate
from, and limited by, the "material reproduction" of society. This is the
"strategic" or "instrumental" action of the "systems" of the State and the
market, which is to satisfy the interests of control and power.47
Habermas argues that his meta-theory is a potential which is derived
from, and can be furthered in, the life-world relations where citizenship
can be pursued. This "critical theory" is motivated by an interest in the
emancipation and enlightenment of humans which can only be realised
in the communicative action of the life-world. The bases for justification
of critical theory are attained by abstracting from the universal potential
for enlightenment and emancipation so as to determine the necessary
requirements for communicative action itself. Critical theory is a
potential of the life-world for self-thematization, to reflectively transform
it from the status of "in-itself" to "for-itself."48 This enables critical theory
to identify the formal requirements for all emancipation and
enlightenment, and the dualistic limitation to that potential. The
enlightenment argument that rational activities are incommensurable at
the level of justification only entails that presuppositions of justification
must be assessed according to the requirements for the certainty of reason
in a specific activity. Habermas develops this as an account of social
45 Habermas, J., (1970) "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality", trans. Jerry Dibble, in
The Hermeneutics Reader. Texts of the German tradition from the Enlightenment to the
Present, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 314-5.
46 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, p. 308 ff., p. 357 ff..
47 Ibid., p. 367 ff..




structure, where normative criteria are appropriate to the linguistically
mediated activity of the life-world, while only strategic and technical
criteria can ensure the functioning of systems through the media of
money and power.
This critical thematization of the life-world shows us, Habermas argues,
that the potential for emancipation and enlightenment will only be
realised to the extent that the dual nature of integration is respected. As
they are antithetical forms of integration, the attempt to direct
administrative and economic systems through the linguistically
mediated practical rationality of communicative action would lead to
crises in the functioning of systems. Further, the material reproduction
attained through labour and power relations is a necessary condition for
the communicative reproduction of the life-world. In turn, systemic
crises will, through an extension into, and "colonization" of the life-
world, undermine the requirements for emancipation and
enlightenment.49 Habermas would argue that social citizenship will lead
to the same crises and life-world pathologies he identifies in the modern
welfare State.50 For Habermas, intervention to overcome economic crises
creates a rationality crisis where the State's functioning becomes
subordinated to the interests of one class in the unplanned nature of
commodity production, which in turn can create a legitimation crisis for
a supposedly democratic State.51 Furthermore, to give individuals a
social right to certain market relations ensures that systemic forms of
integration colonize the life-world, as it attempts to ensure the social ends
of the good life through the State's administrative processes.52
Habermas' critical theory also distinguishes between the worlds of
knowledge of theoretical and scientific truth, the practical discourse of
communicative action, and the substantive and positive pursuit of
human flourishing. A conception of citizenship which integrates these
activities will also have to account for how they relate to each other in
49 White, S., (1988) The recent work of Jurgen Habermas, pp. 100 -1.
50 Habermas, J., (1976) Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (London:
Heinemann), pp. 68-9.
51 Held, D., (1980) Introduction to Critical Theory. Horkheimer to Habermas (Cambridge:
Polity Press), p. 287 ff..
52 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2, p. 187.
the attainment of critical theory's goal of emancipation and
enlightenment. This goal is realised through the practical activity of
communicative action. However, the conditions in which the potential is
realised can, Habermas argues, be known by scientific claims to objective
or quasi-objective truth. These claims must in turn be assessed through
the practical and theoretical discourse established by critical theory. Only
then will the "logocentric" conclusion be avoided, where scientific
knowledge is divorced from a dialogical basis and, in turn, makes the
social world an object of manipulation.53 Through a direction derived
from critical theory, formal and universal scientific claims can identify
the conditions of all emancipation and enlightenment.54 In contrast,
Habermas characterises Gadamer's hermeneutic interpretation as valid
only for those who happen to share the same traditional presuppositions.
A substantive account of the requirements for rational capacity will, he
argues, always be contextually limited.55
Habermas argues that enlightenment explanatory scientific claims
provide not only universally applicable knowledge of emancipation and
enlightenment, but also methodological guidelines for the rational
activities of emancipation and enlightenment themselves. The universal
requirements for normative rational action can be theoretically prescribed
independently of its realisation in practice. A method for legitimating
norms can be derived from the normative implications of the
"unavoidable rules of argumentation" associated with the criterion of
normative Tightness. This method is to be equally applicable in every
attempt to legitimate the norms of a given life-world which, in the
process of justification, and in the rights justified, realises the universal
potential for emancipation and enlightenment.56 This is the potential to
take ever more responsibility for the justification of the norms of social
integration according to formally universalizable requirements. It is also
the potential to justify norms with the criterion of impartiality which
confers an equal and neutral respect. For critical theory, an account of the
valued capacity will only be universalizable and formal if it is also
53 Habermas, J., (1994) "An alternative way out of the philosophy of the subject", p. 311.
54 Habermas, J., (1995) "Discourse Ethics", p. 95.
55 Warnke, G., (1987) Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition, and Reason (Oxford: Polity
Press), pp. 125-6.
56 Habermas, J., (1995) "Discourse Ethics", p. 79.
negatively justified. It must be formulated without reference to a
conception of the good life and ensured in relations of impartiality.
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3.2. Life-world citizenship of the "ideal speech situation."
Habermas argues that a rational and normative advance is possible now
to the extent that his account of the enlightenment certainty of reason is
attained through citizenship. Conscious reflection is increasingly
responsible for the content of its life-world, and so there is a new
potential now to develop the universal rational faculty of humans to an
ever greater degree.57 Our rational capacity does not rely on the
historically varying presuppositions we happen to proceed from. As such,
we must not assume that some have "authority", the mysterious because
unrepeatable insight into such presuppositions. Rather, universalizable
requirements for the realisation of an enlightenment rational capacity
can be outlined. Furthermore, these requirements ensure that each
individual is conferred with the equal neutral respect which is owed to
the power of rationality as such. This is the capacity of communicative
action realised in the life-world. Therefore, an equal and neutral respect
will only be ensured when interaction is not affected by socially-derived
inequalities, whether based on technical expertise, class or gender
difference, or an assumed authoritative insight.
Habermas' citizenship rights of the life-world oppose the social
conception of citizenship. Their purpose is not to enable the valued life of
an authoritative insight through a collective intervention which is State-
centred and directed by the insight of the professional. Rather,
intervention is to be directed from the life-world so as to ensure the
universal requirements for a formal rational faculty. We can see this
most clearly in regard to the three situations we have mentioned, that of
the single-parent in poverty, the valued life of the artist, and culturally
diverse conceptions of essential services. In each instance, justice
demands that resources be distributed so as to enable the formal faculty of
communicative action. To ensure the conditions of equal respect for the
enlightenment capacity, rights of social justice must not be distributed on
57 This account of modernity as a universally significant advance in human learning
combines Lawrence Kohlberg's developmental model of moral consciousness with Klaus
Elder's model of moral and legal development: Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of
Communicative Action Vol. 2, p. 174.
the basis of a traditional understanding of the value of the capacity and
insight realised in specific activities. This objection to social citizenship
need not, however, presuppose Habermas' dualistic account of life-world
and system. It follows from enlightenment meta-theory itself. Therefore,
Habermas derives from his interpretation of Hannah Arendt's
republicanism an account of the dialogical justification of norms, and
from John Rawls' neutral liberalism an account of the impartial
prescription and distribution of needed resources.58
Habermas argues that rights of citizenship can only be justified in the
"ideal speech situation", a republican participation which secures the
potential for communicative action. As it enables individuals to abstract
from inappropriate presuppositions, it secures the enlightenment
conception of our rational capacity and its normative implications. It
ensures that the rational capacity of each participant is treated with an
equal neutral respect, and that the rights of citizenship which it justifies
will treat rational activities in society with this equal neutral respect.59
Rights are justified here only when a consensus is achieved by all those
whose interests in rational activities would be affected by their
implementation. A consensus is possible, as the ideal speech situation
demands that individuals adopt the appropriate presuppositions to make
activities commensurable through translation alone. Individuals must
abstract from the presuppositions of justification appropriate to, for
instance, their own interests in the good life. Rights can then express an
agreement concerning the requirements of any conception of the good
life, including that of a minority culture. It is only then that a minority
culture will be treated justly. The insight into the general interest, which
is required to ensure impartial Rawlsian rights to needed resources, must
be agreed to in an actual public sphere.60
58 Habermas, J., (1977) "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power", pp. 211-231,
in Hannah Arendt. Critical Essays, ed. L. Hinchmann, & S. Hinchmann (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994); Habermas, J., (1990) "Morality and Ethical Life", p.
323.
59 Habermas, J., (1995) "Discourse Ethics", p. 66.
60 Habermas, J., (1994) "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State",
in Taylor, C., Mnlticulturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann
(Chichester: Princeton University Press), pp. 129-132.
The interests of all will only be understood if, in reflection, we abstract
from the presuppositions of justification of specific rational activities; yet
this itself is possible only when all have an equal status in republican
participation.61 For instance, the expertise which an artist may rightly
claim in the organised form of argumentation of art must not be allowed
to influence the validity conferred on his arguments in public sphere
discourse. Rather, all authority derived from anything other than the
power of reason is inappropriate, whether the authority of economic
power, of technical expertise, or of traditional insight into a community's
substantive beliefs. Citizen rights are also to distribute goods which
protect the private autonomy to pursue equally acceptable conceptions of
human flourishing. But questions of the valued life can not be the subject
matter of communicative action, as the presuppositions of such
commitments must be abstracted from in the ideal speech situation of the
life-world. From the thesis of the requirements for the life-world,
Flabermas argues that the collective interventions of justice must be
justified on the negative basis of liberal neutrality which is not
committed to any specific valuable practices.62
Habermas argues that a critical theory must identify the requirements for
justification and its conditions of possibility. Social scientific accounts of
the human linguistic faculty can identify our capacity for communicative
action, and distinguish it from the faculty for instrumental purposive
action. Further, depth psychological explanations of "systematic
distortions" in the symbolisation process of individuals, and social
scientific accounts of ideological conditions at the social level, can identify
how unnoticed forces impede rational activity and generate
rationalisations for compulsive behaviour. Critical theory will identify
where bureaucratic, systemic power imposes normalised identities on
those in vulnerable situations, such as the welfare policies which
penalise single-parents for not conforming to traditionalist family
relations. It can also identify where women adopt such imposed identities
to rationalise their lack of autonomy as bureaucratic clients.63 Habermas
argues that humans do assume the ideal speech situation as the "ideal"
63 Habermas, J., (1995) "Discourse Ethics", pp. 70-1.
62 Habermas, J., (1990) "Morality and Ethical Life", p. 323.
63 Habermas, J., (1994) "Struggles for Recognition", pp. 114-6.
requirement of dialogue. However, the meta-theoretical awareness that
rights must be legitimated in this way will only follow when a critical
theory helps individuals overcome the presuppositions derived
heteronomously from tradition and from systems of control and power.
For Habermas, critical theory alone will make the knowledge claims of
science commensurable, so as to achieve the end of emancipation and
enlightenment.64 Critical theory is to identify from these knowledge
claims cases where presuppositions of justification are the outcome of
power, control, or prejudice rather than of the universal requirements of
rationality. It is to identify those situations where presuppositions will
impede the communicative action of the life-world, and where the
encroachment of systems and of traditional commitments are the cause
of this impediment. In Chapter Two, I return to this question in the
discussion of the collective interventions of citizenship and the basis
from which they can be justified. Habermas rejects hermeneutics and
social citizenship as they do not make his distinction between systems
and life-world. Hermeneutics assumes that all aspects of rational activity
must be understood from a practically derived reflection. This entails, for
Habermas, that it will neither account for the duality of integration, nor
be aware of when its own reflection expresses a systemically derived
distortion. On the other hand, on Habermas' account, social citizenship
actively perpetuates colonization, as it directs the State to intervene
within the life-world, replacing informal modes of interaction with a
constitutive juridifying formal law.65
In Chapter Three, I also return to John Rawls' formal and negative
enlightenment position, and its rejection of social citizenship. Rawls
argues that the rights of distribution are justified independently of the
nature of the production and enjoyment of the primary goods
distributed.66 This argument does not presuppose Habermas' account
that the instrumental rationality of productive practices is antithetical to
normative reflection. Rather, it is an enlightenment argument that rights
of citizenship can and should have as their goal a neutral equal respect
64 White, S., (1988) The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas, pp. 114-5.
65 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 361-372.
66 Rawls, J., (1971) A Theory of Justice, p. 5, p. 30.
for the rational capacity realised in divergent rational activities, and that
substantive goods which enable human well-being can attain this end.
Neither does Rawls' position presuppose that the imperatives of the State
tend to undermine the potential for freedom. Primary goods can be
distributed through the State mechanism. Their neutral and
unconditional status is unaffected by this mechanism and also ensures
what is significant for Rawls, that the particularistic inclinations of
bureaucrats and experts do not influence this distribution.
§4. Radical meta-theory: the (im)possibility
of citizenship rationality.
in this final section I discuss radical meta-theory, its normative
implications, and its realisation within a radical conception of
citizenship. I look first at Michel Foucault's radical argument, that both
conservative and enlightenment meta-theory, and the conceptions of
citizenship in which they are realised, pursue "humanistic" projects of
arbitrary domination. I then discuss the attempt made by Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe to realise Foucault's radical meta-theory in a socialist
citizenship. I argue that this radical pursuit of citizenship, which is
proposed as a way out of humanistic projects of arbitrary domination, is
untenable. I argue that it is forced to fall back on an unacknowledged
humanistic basis, specifically, that offered by enlightenment meta-theory.
In the following chapters I return to radical meta-theory, but only to
assess its claim that a so-called humanistic practical and theoretical
pursuit of citizenship of any sort is always a form of arbitrary subjugation.
My concern will be to rebut the radical rejection of conservative meta-
theory and social citizenship.
4.1. Michel Foucault and the meta-theory
of suspicion and transgression.
In Section 1. above I gave a brief account of radical meta-theory which I
elaborate on here. I argued that, for a radical position, a relation of power
and knowledge establishes bases for justification and the rational capacity
required for justification. For the radical, our rational capacity is
constituted through the force of will in the will to know which excludes
inferior ways of knowing and doing. It is therefore constituted through
the pursuit of commensurability at the level of evaluation. However, the
radical also argues that bases for justification never enable the certainty
which is claimed for them, whether the certainty of the enlightenment
power of reason in itself, or the certainty of the conservative rational
perpetuation of tradition. Rather, not only does the will to know
continue to undermine bases for justification. In so doing, the potential
to resist subjugation is ever present, and is the basis alone from which
liberty and truth can be pursued. In the continuous resistance of
subjugation, the radical meta-theoretical awareness of the nature of a
freedom from subjugation continues to be realised.
Michel Foucault's radical meta-theory rejects the "humanist" tradition,
which includes both Gadamer's conservatism and Habermas'
enlightenment meta-theory. For Foucault, humanist thought propagates
the "illusion" that appropriate presuppositions are not the outcome of a
process of domination which is perpetuated every time bases for
justification are deployed. Foucault argues that all bases for justification
are formed through a conjunction of power and knowledge, where the
effects of power circulate among and govern the formation of statements
which are accepted as true.67 Therefore, domination is not limited to the
objectification of positivism and technology. It is not limited to what
Habermas calls a science which is logocentric rather than dialogically
based, or to the colonization of the life-world by systemic functioning;
and nor is it limited to those technical and strategic situations in which,
Gadamer argues, we must build back up a hermeneutic dimension. For
Foucault, this distinction of rational self realisation from objectifying
activities is only a humanistic illusion. Not only are science and
technology not characterised by a submission of human will to the real
laws of the object, but also the power relations of moral and political
activities arbitrarily constitute subjects of knowledge.68 This can be seen
in institutions such as the school and the prison where regimes of power
and knowledge discipline the body in the name of truth and freedom.69
67 Foucault, M., (1984) "Truth and Power", in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow
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Foucault argues that there are no universal standards, which meta-theory
can discover, to justify the decisions to proceed from presuppositions in
rational activities. There are only the standards which subjects are
constituted through exertions of will to accept as universal. As
humanistic meta-theories presume that universally binding bases for
justification can be discovered for logic, evaluation, and morality,70 they
serve to intensify the subjugation of subjects of knowledge through an
ever-more comprehensive exclusion of otherness. They also create the
effective illusion that a non-arbitrary measure of rational normative
advance can be attained. This is an illusion by which subjects of
knowledge protect themselves from the responsibility of living without
such certainty.71 Foucault claims that only a Nietzschean "curative
science" will avoid this humanistic outcome. This is because it rejects the
"metahistorical deployment of ideal specifications and indefinite
teleologies", which claims to derive universal standards of
appropriateness for presuppositions, whether from our traditional
origins or rational faculty.72 In bringing to our awareness the arbitrary
violence entailed in our bases for justification, a curative science
therefore also indicates the potential for truth and freedom which exists
in resisting the processes of subjugation within which we happen to be
constituted.
Foucault's meta-theory is radical, as it conceptualises bases for
justification as inescapable from arbitrary exertions of will. It is also a
radical form of reflection in itself, as it seeks to disrupt the comforting
illusions of humanism. This itself entails the commitment to a radical
form of practice. A curative science is to intervene in practice and disrupt
the illusion that bases for justification are derived from a universally
binding standard of appropriateness. At the same time, the prescriptions
of a curative science are justified only on the presuppositions of
justification in which this radical intervention has its effect. For these
reasons, radical meta-theoretical reflection is realised through the acts of a
"local philosopher", within regimes of domination and resistance.73
70 Foucault (1971) "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", p. 85.
71 Ibid. p. 95.
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However, just as radical bases for justification can not be transcendent,
neither also can they be subsumed within the specificity of a rational
activity. Radical reflection must invert Kant's dictum that the "mature"
rational capacity acknowledges the limits of its reflection. Radical
reflection must instead position itself at the "limit" point of discourses in
an analysis of their "frontiers."74 A radical maturity is evident in the
"suspicion" which is to "transgress" limits, the reflection which
identifies, within what is taken as universal, necessary, and obligatory in
these activities, that which is singular, contingent and the result of
arbitrary constraints.75
Although radical philosophy is "local", it is to identify the "contemporary
limits of the necessary", and thereby determine what from our historical
determination since the Enlightenment is "no longer indispensable" for
the constitution of ourselves as "autonomous subjects."76 The goal of a
radical intervention is to foster resistance and disruption. However,
resistance is to limit the domination which follows from humanistic
interventions of social reform, in schools, prisons, and elsewhere.77 It
therefore entails a normative commitment to an account both of rational
advance in interaction and of the nature of normative evaluation. An
evaluative distinction between forms of subjugation will reveal itself
"locally", as the measure of how the growth of capabilities generally can
be disconnected from "the intensification of power relations." In
Foucault's later work, he discusses the possibilities for making this
distinction between subjugation and a liberty achieved in regimens of the
body, and does so by appealing to Kant's account of the maturity to rely
on one's own rational capacity.78 However, Foucault still stays within a
Nietzschean radical position of suspicion and transgression.79 For
74 Foucault, M.,(1984) "What is Enlightenment", in FR, p. 45.
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Foucault, the mature self does not respect the limits of rationality, as Kant
argued, but transgresses the ways in which we have been constituted as
rational and autonomous beings.80
For the radical, the enlightenment and conservative positions arbitrarily
exclude other potential ways of knowing and doing. Therefore, they
entail an unacknowledged judgement of commensurability at the level of
evaluation, whether on the basis of enlightenment universalizable
criteria of the power of reason or conservative traditional criteria of the
capacity enabled in belonging. Foucault argues that, instead of these
projects of subjugation, an "archaeological" analysis can be pursued.
Archaeological analysis identifies the instances of discourses that
articulate what we think, say, and do as historical events alone, and not as
instances of the universal conception of rationality and freedom.81
Further, Foucault's "genealogical" analysis of history separates this
contingency that has made us from the possibility of no longer being
what we are. It therefore determines that our bases for justification are
not the outcome either of the advance of reason or of the unfolding of
tradition.82 The nature of our rational capacity now is, rather, established
by the transgression which discards what of our constitution is no longer
efficacious. The conditions for truth are determined arbitrarily, both by
the activity in which we happen to be constituted, and by the
transgression which this constitution makes possible.
As Foucault denies that universally binding standards of appropriateness
can and should be pursued, his work is often criticised as linguistically
relative to a world to which it cannot refer, as historically relativistic in
the assessment of progress, and as normatively relativistic in its refusal to
prescribe limits to violence.83 Foucault argues, however, that relativism
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is only a problem when we accept the illusory and subjugating humanist
dichotomy between a "foundation" of knowledge and the relativism
which results from its absence. This is the illusory ideal of the "totality
fully closed in on itself", which would require the end of time and the
reconciliation of all displacements of the past,84 whether in
enlightenment universalizable requirements of appropriateness, or in
the conservative "appropriation" of tradition. Foucault argues that "the
problems of relativism" are overcome in both positions through an
unacknowledged arbitrary domination. The enlightenment reduces what
is "other" to the arbitrary universal "kernel of rationality", while it is
reduced by conservatism to the arbitrary hermeneutic "horizon."
We can avoid making these illusory and subjugating reductions when,
Foucault argues, we accept that the exertion of will which establishes a
basis for justification also continues to disrupt it. This continued
disruption is also the condition of possibility now for a normative
advance, where "strategic games of liberty" are pursued at the expense of
a "technical rationality." The significant distinction in rational action is
not between activities of rational self-realisation and the practices of
systemic functioning and objectifying sciences. Rather, the success of our
explanatory and predictive knowledge, and the normative advance in
freedom in our social relations, are both to be judged with criteria
established through strategic and suspicious transgressions, through our
exertion of will in resistance to power and knowledge.85
Foucault argues that the "ethics of the self" of antiquity, which focused on
establishing one's own power/knowledge relation as a regime of the
body, supports his argument that strategic games of liberty will enable
truth and freedom.86 The Foucauldian position would also identify such
games of liberty as the normatively valued end-state which should be
pursued in the situations we have discussed above. The practices of
parenting and of art, and the culturally diverse experiences of health and
education must be developed as games of liberty. This requires
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity
Press), pp. 276-293.
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continuous efforts to transgress accepted conceptions of the valued
capacity realised here, and the regimes of power and techniques of
discipline in which they are perpetuated.87 The efforts of an
enlightenment polity to ensure the equal respect of all practices which
attain the universal standards of rationality, or the efforts of a
conservative social citizenship to attain a process of mutual learning in
which the valued insight emerges, will both serve only to intensify
subjugation. The unacknowledged arbitrary pursuit of a
commensurability at the level of evaluation will reduce the parent to
subjugating family structures, the artist to accepted standards of taste and
genius, and individuals to a rigid conception of the culture to which they
belong.
4.2. The (im)possibility of a radical socialist citizenship.
I turn now to assess whether radical meta-theory can be realised as a
conception of citizenship. For radical meta-theory, resistance must be
continuous, so that rational activities can be established which do not
claim to be grounded on non-arbitrary presuppositions. It is also only
then that the capabilities of practices can be enabled without also
intensifying the subjugation which follows from the constitution of
subjects of knowledge. This is the nature of the normative commitment
entailed in the radical reflection of "suspicion", and the description of the
necessity of "transgression" for liberty and truth is also to provide the
means to normatively evaluate practices. Nevertheless, the distinction
between games of liberty and disciplinary regimes of technical rationality
only emerges locally and arbitrarily. The question then arises of how such
radical distinctions can be realised in a project of citizenship.
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe attempt to answer this question, in
the application of Foucault's meta-theoretical reflection within the
socialist tradition of the critique of ideology. They argue that the rational
activity of citizenship which radical reflection will prescribe for us here
cannot be assessed according to a humanistic account of the justification
87 For a similar affirmation of a "politics of ethical difference", but derived from
Levinas, and from the ethical, responsible non-totalizing relation with the other, see:
Critchley, S., (1992) The Ethics of Deconstrnction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford:
Blackwell), p. 220 ff..
of theoretical and practical knowledge claims. Radical thought instead
offers ways in which to pursue politics without offering us the illusion
that humanistic theoretical and practical bases for justification exist for
this pursuit. Laclau and Mouffe would therefore reject both a
hermeneutic social citizenship and Habermas' enlightenment republican
and liberal citizenship. Instead, the conditions of possibility of a radical
citizenship will always also be its conditions of impossibility, and so a
radical conception of socialist citizenship is to offer ways to "decide in an
undecidable terrain."88
Laclau and Mouffe argue that Antonio Gramsci's Marxist theory of
hegemony corresponds with the radical methodology of Foucault, which
seeks to continuously uncover the arbitrary violence which constitutes,
and is perpetuated by, discourses of social interaction.89 Gramsci's
thought can be conceived in this way as it accounts for hegemony as an
"articulation." It is an organic and relational whole rather than a "false
consciousness" behind which genuine and valid bases for justification are
to be discovered. A hegemony is not the dissimulation which an unjust
set of class relations has caused, but the political-ideological articulation
of dispersed and fragmented forces, the forces which constitute subjects of
knowledge. Laclau and Mouffe argue that the concept of articulation
correlates with Foucault's account of the formulation which emerges
among members of a practice and continues to alter their identity as it
does so.90 The hegemonic articulation is therefore to control the horizon
in which the values and principles of a political community are inscribed.
To do so, it must exclude the "other" which obstructs its representation of
itself as the embodiment of the horizon, and so it must reduce to
sameness the difference of the groups which are to be represented
hegemonically according to these principles and values.91
Foucault's radical meta-theory also aims to be an exertion of will in its
own right. The "local" philosopher is to enter political practice, to
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distinguish there that which is no longer necessary now for the
constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects. Laclau and Mouffe
accept this commitment, as they argue that the political involvement of
the radical thinker should be pursued through "new social movements",
which themselves pursue the hegemonic articulation of their specific
"group myths."92 However, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the politics of
new social movements must be both hegemonic and democratic.93 They
thereby prescribe a qualified and limited closure of the horizon of politics,
a limitation to the radical disruption of our sense of certainty. The
presuppositions of justification which they seek to establish are,
therefore, not restricted to the efficacious disruptions effected by the local
philosopher within rational activities.
Laclau and Mouffe argue, however, that their conception of citizenship is
still radical, but that its radical nature is only discernible where it enables
a Foucauldian uncoupling of "the development of our capabilities" from
"the intensification of power relations." Radical rational activity
combines the "need to decide" with "the impossibility of deciding."
Decisions will be made on divergent bases for justification, while we
cannot hope to finally reconcile this divergence. Laclau and Mouffe argue
that irreconcilable difference is the permanent condition of politics. This
is also the condition of freedom, truth, and justice in a radical "politics of
antagonism." Since the moment of the subject is the "creative act" of
deciding without rules for decision, the possibility of freedom expresses
itself in this "need to decide."94 The "impossibility of deciding" reflects
the fact that the bases for justification of truth, justice, and freedom can
only ever be determined by the free exertion of a will, whose differences
can never finally be reconciled. Although the "tolerant" society of
democracy must exclude what is intolerable, it must do so on bases for
justification which are not solely normative nor securely established.95
The radical nature of a hegemonic citizenship can neither be identified
nor prescribed with the certainty demanded by humanistic thought.
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Radical meta-theory argues that the distinction between types of rational
action is established by a power/knowledge relation. Subjects of
knowledge are constituted to accept that the presuppositions of technical
rationality must remain independent of popular control, as they must be
established by universally binding criteria of validity, whether of
positivistic science, of the functional requirements of systems, or of the
normative social rules of rational activities. From this humanistic
assumption, there follows the identification of the practices where
political participation can not be rationally justified, where it would lead
to the adoption of inappropriate presuppositions for the justification of
knowledge claims. It is here that the radical intervenes, to show that
these humanistic assumptions reduce the individual to an object of
manipulation within the practices of technical rationality which it
justifies. The radical argues that the proliferation of strategic games of
liberty will counteract subjugation. An antagonistic hegemonic project
extends democratic forms of participation to new aspects of social
relations. It both politicises the spaces which are now considered non-
political, by opening bases for justification throughout social relations to
the exertion of will, and secures the radical nature of democracy, by
ensuring that politics itself remains open.
Laclau's and Mouffe's antagonistic hegemony therefore acknowledges
that it cannot finally reduce all difference to sameness.96 To ensure that
political spaces are opened and remain open, however, Laclau and
Mouffe deploy the republican principle of political autonomy and the
liberal principle of neutrality without, they argue, at the same time
appealing to a humanistic basis for their justification. Radically deployed
republican and liberal principles are to protect the difference of others
within participation and in the citizen rights agreed to by participation.97
Laclau and Mouffe, therefore, adopt Foucault's argument that the radical
should intervene strategically to enable "games of liberty." It is in this
way that a politics of new social movements can be theoretically and
practically justified. It is also as new social movements that citizenship
rights to needed resources can be justified in the situations which we
96 Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C., (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 176-7.
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have discussed. The single parent, the artist, and the minority culture
will have to strategically appeal to the principles of republican and liberal
thought to justify their claims to have their difference treated equally.
Foucault's radical response to the charge of relativism was to reject the
humanistic dichotomies on which it rests. But if Laclau and Mouffe are to
realise radical meta-theory as a project of citizenship, they can not refuse
to answer the question of relativism. They must be able to distinguish the
arbitrary exclusion and the openness characteristic of an antagonistic
hegemony from the openness which the arbitrary exclusions of
humanism is unable to overcome. On the one hand, Laclau and Mouffe
give a radical response to the question of relativism. They argue that
antagonistic characteristics can be identified in the radical nature of the
awareness of political participants, when social groups do not attempt to
justify claims transcendentally or essentialistically but on criteria of
validity which each identity finds within itself.98 However, this does not
answer the question of relativism. It does not enable us to identify a
distinctively radical meta-theoretical awareness of the nature of
justification. The radical must assume that the awareness which
constituted subjects of knowledge have of the nature of their bases for
justification results from the power/knowledge relation which itself
determines the presuppositions with which they can be aware at all. The
radical can not state that the standards with which we can identify and
reject essentialism and transcendentalism are themselves determined in
a radical way.
Laclau's and Mouffe's second attempt to give a non-relativist account of
an antagonistic openness is, I argue, derived from an unacknowledged
enlightenment conception of the nature of appropriate presuppositions
of justification. For their "post-Marxist" hegemony, they argue that
theoretical knowledge cannot construct an "objective" identity of a group
based on its class relations. This is not merely a radical argument that
identity can not be objectively and finally known because it is inseparable
from the practical exertion of will in which it continues to be
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constituted." Rather, they conceive of the appropriate presuppositions of
justification of an identity as being derived from what is, I argue, a
distinctively enlightenment process of reflective abstraction. They argue
that, when reason disengages from the immediacy of social relations, and
acts in a "public" space of politics, then bases for justification can
legitimate the identity claims of an antagonistically open citizenship. A
legitimate claim must be made with presuppositions which are
independent from the social forces which confer an identity on groups. A
democratic discourse, where resistance can be articulated, can then be
distinguished from social relations where agents are subjected to the
decisions of others in relations of subjugation100
For Laclau and Mouffe, the antagonistically open citizenship will enable
the proliferation of strategic games of liberty. Again, this is not solely a
radical conception of the nature of intervention and of the freedom
which it is to enable. A consistently radical conception of freedom and
intervention would acknowledge that, as bases for justification are
irreconcilably different, the rational activity constituted by a free exertion
of will can not be distinguished from the rational activity which is
heteronomously constituted. Laclau and Mouffe presuppose an
unacknowledged, universally binding enlightenment distinction
between the nature of justification in the rational activities of freedom
and of heteronomy. On this basis, Laclau and Mouffe identify the political
processes of State bureaucratisation and capitalist commodification as
forms of subordination, and distinguish them from a radically open and
free, or "public", democracy.101 This is a deviation from Foucault's
argument that it is the concept of strategic games of liberty itself which is
constituted by the exertion of will in determining the nature of
justification in practices.
" The Marxist thesis of class "contradiction" presupposes that identities are "full" and
that the relations between identities can be "objective", and therefore objectively known.
For Laclau and Mouffe, "antagonism" is the limit of all objectivity, and that which
prevents me from being totally myself: Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C., (1985) Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy, pp. 122-5.
100 Ibid., p. 153.
101 Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C., (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p.159, p. 164.
Laclau's and Mouffe's antagonistic hegemony also rejects social
citizenship. For Laclau and Mouffe, the project of social citizenship to
enable the good life within existing practices would have to presuppose
that a substantive account of the identity of the individual could be
derived from, what radical meta-theory characterises as. the mere
technical rational discourse in which the individual is subjugated. Laclau
and Mouffe therefore reject social rights. They argue that the political
participation of the individual alone can establish what rights are
justified, because they reflect the individual's freely constituted identity.
However, Laclau and Mouffe nevertheless argue that "liberal" rights will
protect each individual's basic material needs from the infringement of
others. These liberal rights of non-infringement or forbearance must,
however, reflect a decision regarding what is universally required for
freedom. They must, to use Laclau and Mouffe's terms, "essentialise"
each self to some extent, so as to close political debate concerning basic
rights. This is the case also with the distinction of games of liberty from
subjugating practices. Social rights are rejected by Laclau and Mouffe as
they entail bureaucratic practices of subjugation, yet subjugation can only
be identified by appealing to standards other than those that are
immanent to the specific practice.
The necessity of a "humanistic" account of meta-theoretical reflection
and its realisation in a project of social justice has not been overcome by
Laclau and Mouffe. Our attention must therefore turn to the crucial
distinctions within humanism which radical meta-theory elides. These
are the distinctions, on the one hand, between conservative and
enlightenment meta-theory and, on the other hand, between collective
interventions of citizenship which are justified and those which are
antithetical to a free rational and normative advance.
Conclusion.
I have argued in this chapter that there is a mutual relation between
meta-theory and the pursuit of citizenship, and that this relation differs
significantly across the three meta-theoretical positions. A meta-
theoretical position will give a distinctive account of the nature of
justification, the conditions in which acceptable bases for justification can
be established, the normative significance of the conception of rational
capacity which is entailed here, and the nature of the normative relations
in which this capacity can be fostered. However, it is in our diverse
theoretical and practical rational activities, most significantly in the
pursuit of citizenship, that this meta-theoretical awareness can be
developed. This is the practically and theoretically realised awareness of
how bases for justification can be established which, in response to the
demands of the present situation, represent a rational and normative
advance. I have been concerned in this chapter to indicate the difference
between the three positions with reference to the project of social
citizenship, and I have argued that only the hermeneutic development of
the conservative position will be able to pursue social citizenship now.
The mutual relation which I argue can be developed between
hermeneutics and social citizenship will be further elaborated in the
coming chapters.
I have argued in this chapter that Marshall presupposes a meta-theory
which corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics. This entails not only that
the concept of social citizenship must be assessed in terms of the demands
of the present, but also that Marshall's argument, that social equality is
necessary for our rational capacity, can itself be defended as the correct
account of the nature of justification. I also argued that Gadamer's
hermeneutics will both support this meta-theoretical account of
justification and determine how the reformulation of social citizenship
can be carried out. Gadamer's hermeneutics can be distinguished from an
authoritarian, ethnocentric, and atavistic cultural conservatism. A
hermeneutic social citizenship should be able to accommodate the
demands now for greater democratic participation, recognition of
diversity, and individual self-determination. The hermeneutic concern
to safeguard the conditions of meaningful dialogue also ensures that
social citizenship can be distinguished from a merely materialistic
position. Further, the reformulation of social citizenship will develop the
hermeneutic capacity within activities whose characteristics Gadamer has
only analysed in terms of the dangers they pose. For social citizenship, the
collective intervention to ensure social equality, and the relations in
which it is enjoyed, are necessary for rational capacity.
I argued in this chapter that a radical conception of citizenship will be
inadequate on its own terms. The radical argues that the conditions of
possibility for citizenship are also always its conditions of impossibility,
that, if truth and liberty are to be ensured, our bases for justification must
continue to be undermined by the arbitrary will of resistance. I argued
that the radical is in fact unable to pursue citizenship without
presupposing the humanism it wished to overcome. For that reason, we
should not be deterred by the radical arguments from continuing to
pursue our hermeneutic theory of social citizenship. However, I do
return to the radical meta-theoretical rejection of "humanism" again. In
Chapter Two I look at the radical rejection of social citizenship, and the
argument that Marshall's account of the history of citizenship must rest
on an unacknowledged teleology and, for that reason, will extend and
intensify modern forms of subjugation. In Chapter Four I discuss
Foucault's attempt to propose a radical alternative to citizenship itself.
For Foucault, the relations of recognition in citizenship are sites of
subjugation which must be actively resisted, while a radical critical
transgression can overcome this reliance on mutual recognition.
The primary concern in the defence of social citizenship in the remaining
chapters is the distinction which can be drawn between hermeneutics and
enlightenment meta-theory. In Chapter Two I argue that both positions
can conceive of the mutual relation between meta-theory and
conceptions of citizenship in terms of the legitimation of the egalitarian
collective interventions which are to enable the valued rational capacity.
This is the capacity which must be aware of the nature of justification if it
can in turn identify with this collective intervention as legitimate.
Chapters Three and Four then explore the opposing enlightenment and
hermeneutic accounts of, respectively, the good life which is to be
ensured as a rational capacity by this collective intervention, and the
relations of mutuality in which the good life is recognised as an identity.
The capacity to legitimate collective interventions has certain conditions
of possibility which must be ensured. For social citizenship, this capacity
will be fostered only when collective responsibility is taken for the
material and practical requirements for the good life of each citizen, and
when relations between citizens are established on a shared status of
social equality. I turn now, in Chapter Two, to discuss Marshall's
argument that the collective intervention to secure social equality can be
evaluated as a normative advance in the tradition of citizenship, and also
is the feature which characterises socially efficient practices and
institutions.
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Chapter Two: The Legitimation of Collective Intervention.
Introduction.
The three meta-theoretical positions discussed in Chapter One are most
clearly distinguished in their treatment of both the historical nature of
reflection and, as a corollary of this, the historical nature of the analysis of
progress. The enlightenment argues that the shared presuppositions of
history can and should be abstracted from in theoretical and practical
activity. Such rational activity both enables certainty in our study of
progress and provides the evaluative standard with which to assess
historical developments. For conservative meta-theory, historical
tradition is the sustaining dimension of reason. We must not abstract
from it, but rather attempt to learn from what continues to constitute us.
Finally, for radical meta-theory, a genealogical analysis of history is to
discard what of our constitution is no longer necessary. In doing so, it
must remind us that we lack a determinate origin from which reason has
unfolded teleologically into a locus of certainty in the present for our
practical and theoretical activity. This chapter discusses how a rational
and normative progress is to be achieved in the collective intervention of
citizenship to secure social justice. My concern here is how such action
can both be justified and in accord with the principles and self-
understandings of the society in which it intervenes. Therefore, I assess
how the collective interventions of citizenship can be legitimated.
In this chapter I defend Marshall's account of the collective intervention
required to secure social justice through citizenship. For Marshall, the
legitimate collective intervention must seek to enable the shared status of
social equality between citizens, while it is on the basis of social equality
that a shared perspective can be attained which identifies with the
legitimate project of collective intervention. However, in justifying
Marshall's position, I argue that it can and should be reformulated and
made appropriate to our present requirements. My discussion proceeds
through an analysis of the meta-theoretical position which is realised in
Marshall's conception of social citizenship. I analyse the historical nature
of Marshall's conception of social citizenship and, therefore, the meta-
theory Marshall presupposes. I also analyse how such a project of social
justice can be pursued as an advance now and, therefore, how the correct
meta-theory is to be realised in such a project. I argue in this chapter that
not only is a Gadamerian conservatism the correct meta-theory, but that
Marshall presupposes it in his conception of social citizenship. Both these
arguments are at odds with prevailing accounts of Marshall's and
Gadamer's work, and it is with these debates that I will be concerned here.
I begin in Section 1. by giving an outline of Marshall's account of three
stages and conceptions of modern citizenship. For Marshall, the
development from "civil" to "political" and to "social" citizenship is a
rational normative progress. Marshall defends the rights and duties of
social citizenship as an advance, both in the collective intervention it
justifies and the rational capacity which this intervention is to enable and
form which it is identified with as legitimate. In this section I also discuss
two alternative interpretations and critiques of Marshall. A radical
interpretation argues that Marshall conceives of social citizenship as the
teleological end-point of the historical project of freedom and reason. The
radical goes on to criticise social citizenship for escalating the subjugation
which is constitutive of our capacity, and, on that basis, ensuring the
identification with this collective intervention as legitimate. In Section 2.
I respond to this analysis by proposing an alternative interpretation and
critical appraisal of Marshall's conception of social citizenship. I argue
that Marshall can be interpreted instead to proceed from a meta-theory
which corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics, and that this can be
distinguished from a Hegelian teleology. From hermeneutics, Marshall's
position can be critically reformulated to ensure a rational and normative
advance.
In Section 1. I also discuss Gosta Esping-Andersen's enlightenment
analysis of Marshall's work. Esping-Andersen argues that Marshall can be
interpreted as proceeding from a conservative position, but that his
conservatism can be criticised as a naive inability to abstract from
presuppositions which help perpetuate class and gender domination. For
Esping-Andersen, an enlightenment basis for the legitimation of
collective interventions of social citizenship must be secured. However, it
will only be secured if we adapt the radical awareness of the constitutive
nature of power, and oppose domination with a counter force of
resistance. Marshall's social citizenship can be rehabilitated, but only on
the enlightenment bases for justification established by de-
commodification, where the domination of class and gender relations is
overcome. In Section 2., I argue that the nature of Marshall's
conservatism must be interpreted differently. As it corresponds to
hermeneutics, Marshall's position can account for the social scientific
knowledge of unjustified relations of power. For the same reason, this
position also enables the critical reformulation of Marshall's specific
proposals for social citizenship. Therefore, to ensure that it will intervene
to enable equality on the basis of a critical understanding, Marshall's
social citizenship must be reformulated from within this conservative
position.
In Section 3. I discuss Jurgen Habermas' position. Habermas argues that a
process of "rationalisation" has determined the universal requirements
of "life-world" interaction, from which egalitarian collective
interventions of citizenship can be legitimated. This interaction will be
impeded where "systems" "colonize" the life-world, and this will result
from an intervention which is State-directed. Systemic functioning will
also enter crises when its dualistic separateness from the life-world is not
respected, and this will ensue from a normative intervention in
economic functioning. Neither Esping-Andersen's nor Marshall's social
citizenship respect this dualism, but are State-directed interventions
within the market and life-world. For Habermas, they cannot therefore be
legitimated, but undermine the rational capacity to identify with
legitimate interventions. Habermas also argues that hermeneutics cannot
take an "observer's" standpoint and identify the universal requirements
for a rational and normative advance. It is unable to account for the
knowledge we can have, including the capacity of the life-world to
abstract from traditional commitments in agreeing on the impartial
norms of citizenship. It is also unable to account for the distinct forms of
integration, and so cannot enable the rational advance which overcomes
crises and pathologies to ensure equality in emancipation and
enlightenment.
In Section 4. I defend the hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship
against Habermas' critique. Habermas and Gadamer give opposing
conceptions of the "life-world", and this concerns how meta-theoretical
reflection is to be realised in projects of social justice. For both authors, a
linguistic and historical reflection can reformulate the life-world horizon,
while this is to bring about the intersubjective relations in which alone
correct bases for justification are identified and deployed. However,
Gadamer proposes that the concept of the "worldview" indicates the
substantive, comprehensive, and positive nature of the horizon of
understanding. In Gadamer's critique of Edmund Flusserl's
phenomenology, he argues that the requirements for the reflective
reformulation of the life-world are not formally specifiable, but continue
to be determined in tradition. This reformulation is pursued
comprehensively, in relations of power and of technology, and is
positively justified by the goal of attaining the good life of mutual
learning. I argue that this corresponds to Marshall's account of the
legitimate goal of social citizenship, and of the practical reflection
required to identify with it. Further, I argue that Marshall's position
shows that Gadamer's worldview will only be reformulated when
directed through this process of collective intervention to attain social
equality in relations of class, status, and power.
§1. T.H. Marshall's Conception of Social Citizenship.
In this section I discuss Marshall's historical and conceptual analysis of
citizenship. Marshall accounts for the history of modern citizenship in
terms of three stages of development. This account also provides a
conceptual scheme to explain and evaluate the legitimation of citizenship
collective interventions, most significantly the intervention of the social
stage. In this section I also discuss two alternative interpretations and
critiques of Marshall's conception of social citizenship. Various radical
commentators argue that Marshall can be interpreted as ascribing an
inner telos, or immanent developmental logic, to the process of
citizenship itself. Moreover, for the radical, the comprehensive nature of
Marshall's account can be criticised for intensifying the constitutive
subjugation characteristic of citizenship. In this section I also discuss
Esping-Andersen's argument, that Marshall's social citizenship can be
interpreted as proposing a de-commodified sphere, which excludes
capitalist market and traditionalist familial considerations. Esping-
Andersen also interprets Marshall's position as being conservative, but
critically rejects his conservatism as antithetical to the attainment of de-
commodification. He argues that only an enlightenment de-commodified
basis of justification, established through resistance, can avoid the naive
perpetuation of domination.
1.1. The history and theory of social citizenship.
Marshall's theory of social citizenship is formulated within an historical
analysis of modern citizenship in Britain. His theory distinguishes
between civil, political, and social citizenship.1 Each represents, for
Marshall, the defining characteristic of a stage and conception of modern
citizenship, while the progress from one stage and conception to the next
has been accomplished by incorporating its predecessors. For this reason,
the three stages of citizenship converge within the social stage of the post¬
war era in British politics. Further, Marshall's theoretical concept of social
citizenship itself incorporates the civil and political conceptions, and so
reformulates them from within a new conceptual horizon. Both the
practical activity of social citizenship and our theoretical knowledge of it
proceed from within a broader horizon which incorporates the civil and
political stages and conceptions.
Marshall argues that modern citizenship can be identified only against
the background of the preceding feudal forms of social integration and its
theoretical justification. Within the revolutionary departure which is
entailed by modern citizenship, feudal concepts and practices are critically
revived. The three modern stages and conceptions of citizenship can be
correlated with the three conceptually and institutionally intertwined
dimensions of feudal membership: the civil/legal, the political, and the
social. Modern citizenship revives these dimensions, but conceives of
them as functionally and institutionally separate spheres. It distinguishes
the civil sphere of economic and religious legal rights and duties, the
political sphere of the democratic legitimation of power, and the social
sphere of welfare provision, income security, and social services. At the
same time, modern citizenship establishes a universal equal status
between citizens at the nation State level. Unlike feudalism, the
1 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 73-75.
integration pursued in modern citizenship can not be reduced to the
securing of social differentiations through local institutions.2
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Marshall argues that "civil" citizenship emerged in Britain in the
eighteenth century, as a conception of universal equal membership
within the nation State. In civil citizenship, the citizen is equal in terms
of economic contractual freedoms and social and religious freedoms of
conscience.3 The individual is freed from communal and familial
responsibilities in the realm of contract and conscience, but at the same
time must bear responsibility for the uses of property and for the
determination of ethical and religious truths. Citizenship membership is
therefore defined and secured through the economic and normatively
"negative" freedom of the individual, rather than the "positive" liberties
of feudal institutional roles. This conception of the citizen, as an
individual freed from interference, was to be institutionally protected by
homogeneous and universally applicable rights and duties. Only an equal
legal status within a universal legal system, which was distinct from
other dimensions of membership and established nationally, could
achieve this function. For that reason it had to replace communally
established legal institutions which primarily guaranteed the liberties and
responsibilities of institutional roles.4
Civil citizenship not only established membership as a universal,
individualised, and national status. In establishing and conceiving of
citizenship as civil, social and political dimensions were excluded from
the horizon of citizenship. At the same time, in establishing and
conceiving of legal rights and duties as civil, social and political
dimensions were excluded from the conception and institutionalisation
of contractual and religious freedoms. Marshall emphasises how, at this
stage, the receipt of communal social services was inimical to one's status
as a citizen. They were only extended to those who were excluded, either
in a de jure or de facto way, from the civil status of citizenship itself: to
women and children workers specifically. Karl Polanyi also points out
how, at this time, the receipt of feudal forms of social entitlements to
2 Ibid., p. 75.
3 Ibid., p. 77.
4 Ibid., p. 74.
needed resources in the Speenhamland system was antithetical to the
attempts to create a national market where labour could be freely
purchased and sold.5 Marshall argues that it is as a corollary of this that
the status of civil citizenship was also divorced from the exercise of
political power and from the performance of social duties. For instance,
property ownership no longer entailed communal feudal duties to
ensure the social security of others.6
The "political" and "social" stages and conceptions which followed not
only continued the formation of a universal, individualised, and
national citizenship. They also entailed that the horizon of citizenship
was now composed of the newly revived three dimensions of feudalism,
and also that each conceptually and institutionally distinct dimension of
citizenship was meaningful within this broadened horizon. With regard
to civil citizenship, this entailed that the freedoms of contract and
conscience could no longer be institutionalised or conceptualised
independently of the social and political rights and duties of the citizen.
The civil equality of the citizen was problematised when the individual
lacked either political power or social resources, while the enjoyment of
this civil status now brought with it political duties of participation and
social duties with regard to the well-being of others.
An institutionally and conceptually distinct "political" stage emerged in
the nineteenth century, when democratic rights and duties were extended
to ever-more economically measured classes of individuals. As with the
civil stage and conception, political citizenship was antipathetic to the
social dimension of feudal membership.7 This entailed that political
rights and duties were not to be extended to all those entitled to civil
rights, but only to those whose social position clearly distinguished them
from the class whose civil citizenship is threatened or abrogated by
pauperism.8 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, efforts
were made not only to extend the status of political citizenship to ever¬
more economic categories, but also to improve the social and economic
5 Polanyi, K., (1944) The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press), p. 85.
6 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", p. 82.
7 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
8 Ibid., p. 84.
status of ever-more individuals, and by that means include them within
political citizenship. Interventionist policies of compulsory public
education and subsidised legal aid were justified by a civil conception of
natural rights.9 Marshall argues, however, that these measures
contradicted the premises that the enjoyment of social rights was
antithetical to the status of civil-political equality, and that civil-political
rights did not entail social duties.10 This ambivalence can also be seen
where J. S. Mill argues that collective intervention of this kind is
necessary to secure the liberal autonomy of the individual.11
Marshall argues that "social" citizenship only fully emerged in the
twentieth century, when measures taken to ensure the well-being of all
were part of the conceptual and institutional horizon of citizenship, and
not that which is antithetical to it. The feudal social entitlements to a
substantive status were thereby revived, but as the universal rights to
social equality of an institutionally differentiated sphere within a
national citizenship. Social citizenship could only be institutionalised
and conceptualised along with the civil and political dimensions of a
modern citizenship. The socially defined goals of membership could,
therefore, only be attained now as the universal rights to a socially
defined equality.12 At the same time, a substantive conception of the
shared status of membership could also only be fostered in modern
citizenship through the common enjoyment of universal rights.13 The
social stage also alters the civil and political dimensions of citizenship.
They are now contained within a citizenship composed of the social
rights and duties to a social conception of equality. This is most evident
where the normative principles and rational activities associated with
citizenship and the market are concerned.
9 Ibid., p. 81, p. 95.
10 Ibid., pp. 94-5.
11 For a discussion of this problem of justifying compulsory education alongside a
commitment to the equal rights of civil and political freedom, see: Gutmann, A., (1982)
"What's the use of going to school?", pp. 261-276, in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed.
Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
12 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", p. 84.
13 Ibid., pp. 96-7.
Marshall argues that modern citizenship has always attempted to make
the equality of citizenship and the inequality of social class compatible,
rather than to replace one with the other, and that this itself has always
required intervention by collective institutions in the freedom of market
activity. The social stage of citizenship is distinct, but only because this
intervention created what Marshall calls a "socialist system" in and
through which market activity and social class inequality continued.14
Unlike the radical and enlightenment interpretations I discuss in
Sections 1.2. and 1.3., I argue that Marshall does not conceive of the
principles and activities of citizenship and the market in terms of an
antithetical opposition of status to contract, of equality to inequality, of
the State to the economy, or of inclusion to polarisation. For instance,
Marshall argues that although civil citizenship legitimated a new form of
economic inequality, it was still committed to a conception of universal
equal freedom, and although it legitimated a freedom of contract, it also
presupposed that contractors shared a social status defined ostensibly as
the absence of pauperism. Further, although civil freedoms were enjoyed
in the market, they were ensured through State legal institutions, and
although they are connected with the formation of capitalist class
distinctions, they also established a universal basis of inclusion.15
For social citizenship, class inequality must be made compatible with
social citizenship equality. Marshall argues that there are definite
boundaries of possibility for this project. The collective intervention
which is to secure this end must be legitimate. It must not only be
normatively justified. It must also be based on a correct explanation and
understanding of social interaction, and on the correct understanding of
citizens within such interaction. Marshall argues that social citizenship
could be normatively justified through a reformulation of the principles
already entailed in modern citizenship and feudal membership. This
reformulation itself could be based on an understanding of the nature of
rational activities already pursued, and of the practical insights developed
here. In the terms of the political-philosophical debate concerning
citizenship and social justice, Marshall gives an account of the
14 Ibid., p. 73.
15 Ibid., p. 91.
legitimation of collective intervention.16 It is an account of how the
normatively justified intervention to ensure social equality can
correspond with, and arise from, the identification of citizens with this
intervention as legitimate.
A legitimate project of social equality must not subordinate civil equality,
and so the freedom of contract can not be abrogated but must, instead, be
infused with a new status of social equality.17 For Marshall, this
conception of social equality must be derived from the insight of what he
calls "professionals", concerning the requirements for a good life, or
"civilization."18 This insight can be fostered in practices which deliver
services to enable the good life, for example, where medical practice is to
ensure an "education in the art of living."19 From this professional
insight into human needs, the economic, social, and cultural
requirements for social equality can be determined. Further, social
equality must be ensured within the occupational divisions which are a
primary factor in stratification,20 and so the concept of social equality
must also account for justified economic differentiation, or the "fair
wage."21 Social equality is ensured when both ends of the income scale
are compressed so that an area of common culture and experience can be
extended, the "heritage" which is to be shared as a standard of living. The
reduction of inequality and the extension of a common culture can
enable the enrichment of the status of citizenship, in which certain status
differences can be recognised and stabilised.22
The legitimate intervention of the social services should seek to enable
this shared status.23 However, it is also on the basis of this shared status
that the insight required to legitimate this intervention is developed. A
16 For a discussion of the debate, issuing from Hegel, concerning the identification with
legitimate projects of social justice, see: Plant, R., (1983) Hegel. An Introduction, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 207-232.
17 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", p. 96.
18 Ibid., p. 98.
19 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 151, p. 158, p. 156, p.
166.
20 Marshall, T. H., (1953) "The Nature and Determinants of Social Class", in Sociology at
the Crossroads and other essays (London: Heinemann, 1963), pp. 203-5.
21 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", p. 118.
22 Ibid., p. 121.
23 Ibid., p. 107.
professional insight is to assess the nature of the good life, while the good
life to be enabled itself is a general capacity attained in practices which
enable the development of this insight into the nature of the valued
life.24 "Professionalism" can be developed in practices which train
individual qualities of judgement and perception to understand human
nature, assess human need, and deliver valued services. The good life
can be characterised as "professionalism" even where it refers to a
capacity attained in a practice such as art, where the "service" delivered
and the "needs" that are met differ significantly from those of medicine
or education.25 Practical insight also must play a political role in defining
the goals of social equality which are to be pursued as the "public interest"
of citizenship. The legitimate collective intervention, therefore, not only
arises from the insights arrived at in rational activities of the civil sphere.
It is also derived from the political sphere activity of those with a
practically-derived insight. Social citizenship, in this way, includes and
develops political citizenship, as can also be seen in the collective
representation of the working class, which was to continue as a central
dimension of citizenship after their enfranchisement.26
1.2. The radical rejection of teleological subjugation.
I turn now to the reception of Marshall's position from within radical
meta-theory. Later on in this chapter I assess the attempts made by
enlightenment thinkers to incorporate the radical concerns regarding the
role power can play in projects of social justice. My interest here,
however, is with consistently radical interpretations and critiques.
Radical commentators interpret Marshall's social citizenship as a
teleological concept, and criticise what they see as its arbitrary
exclusionary basis. For the radical, Marshall's social citizenship attempts
to ensure, as the inner goal of citizenship, an increasingly substantive
account of the good life for ever more citizens, and for that reason
intensifies the violent exclusion of otherness in our constitution. The
24 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 154, p. 156, p. 158.
25 Ibid. p. 154.
26 Marshall does argue that the collective bargaining of trade-unions is "anomalous", but
only when it is used to secure social rights. Social rights should already be universally
enjoyed and not something which reflects economic power, and therefore social rights will
only be equally enjoyed if they are established through the exercise of political, rather
than civil, rights: Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 97-8, p. 116.
goal of the radical commentator is to show that such violent exclusions of
otherness cannot be overcome, but that they can be made less intensive.
This account can be seen in the radical critique of social rights by
Zygmunt Bauman and Chaim Waxman,27 while Mitchel Dean and Ann
Phillips have focused specifically on Marshall's work.28 I argued in
Chapter One that radical meta-theory will not be realised in a radical
project of citizenship. In this section I present the radical argument,
which I respond to in Section 2. 1, that social citizenship is both based on
a teleological illusion, and secures its own legitimacy through an
intensification of subjugating forms of constitution.
For the radical, humanistic projects of social justice violently exclude
otherness, so as to constitute citizens to identify with this intervention as
legitimate. The radical, therefore, rejects the humanistic self-
understanding, that this extension of our bases for justification to account
for the experiences of others is justified by rational and normative criteria
alone. The radical interprets Marshall's developmental model of
citizenship as an instance of this humanistic project. On this
interpretation, Marshall reduces history to three teleological stages, and
does so by excluding from consideration the subjugation of citizens and
the exclusion of subordinate groups from citizenship in these stages. For
the radical, Marshall defines a stage of citizenship according to a
normative principle which guarantees a universally significant
dimension of freedom. The progression of stages is, in turn, defined as
that which should be identified with as the legitimate realisation of
another universal normative principle and dimension of freedom.29 The
radical sees this teleological assumption in Marshall's claim that social
relations progressed normatively by securing alongside our civil freedom
our political autonomy and, finally, our equal social potential. As Phillips
argues, citizenship is a history of normative progress for Marshall, for as
27 Waxman, C., (1983) The Stigma of Poverty. A Critique of Poverty Theories and Policies
(Oxford: Pergamon Press), pp. 85-92; Bauman, Z., (1988) Freedom (Milton Keynes: Open
University Press), pp. 68-98.
28 Dean, M., (1991) The Constitution of Poverty (London: Routledge), pp. 13-14; Phillips,
A., (1993) Democracy and Difference (Oxford: Polity Press), p. 78.
29 From Marshall's perspective, "exclusion will appear as an historical anomaly when set
against the egalitarian thrust of the main story": Vogel, U., (1991) "Is Citizenship Gender
Specific?", in The Frontiers of Citizenship, ed. Ursula Vogel & Michael Moran (London:
Macmillan), p. 65.
its principles become increasingly comprehensive and substantive they
include ever more experiences to which can be ascribed a positive
normative value.30
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For the radical, Marshall assumes that citizenship is the unique locus for
a telos of normative progression. On this interpretation, Marshall
contrasts an inner logic of citizenship, which compels the pursuit of the
universal freedom of all citizens, with that of capitalism, which ensures
only the benefit of a few. As a result, Marshall is held to assume that the
agencies through which citizenship social rights are ensured are
themselves necessary to normative progression.31 However, Marshall is
not only interpreted by the radical as giving a teleological account of
historical progress. The radical also criticises Marshall's social citizenship
as a more pervasive form of domination. The radical argues that "social
equality" could be ensured only through an increasingly pervasive
system of surveillance and discipline in the agencies of citizenship. This
is because social citizenship requires an extensive reconceptualisation of
the human experience of freedom, which must be maintained in practice
in distinction from heteronomy. As Bauman argues, this is achieved
through the bureaucratic and technological capacities available in our
increasingly rationalised society.32 This can be seen where State services
of health, education, and welfare concern themselves with ever-more
areas of human experience, while simultaneously reducing this
experience primarily to its relation to paid work 33
The radical argues that the discipline and surveillance of those outside
paid work must be a central issue for social citizenship. The primary goal
of practices of welfare is to constitute the unemployed poor, who are
nonetheless "able" to work, as an "other" of free experience. Such
practices discipline recipients by forcing them to actively participate in the
surveillance of their own experiences, and so internalise the identity of
30 Phillips, A., (1993) Democracy and Difference, p. 78.
31 Hindess, B., (1983) Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul), p. 54; Bourdieu, quoted in: Faulks, K., (1998) Citizenship in Modern
Britain (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), pp. 43-6.
32 Bauman, Z., (1988) Freedom, pp. 67-72.
33 Pateman takes up this radical theme in: Pateman, C., (1989) The Disorder of Women.
Democracy, Feminism and Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 188-93.
the "unworthy poor" who lack the characteristics of free self-reliance.34
As the experience of freedom requires paid work, women working in the
domestic sphere must also be supported by a partner who secures a family
income through the sphere of employment. Therefore, the single mother
in poverty will be an other who must be disciplined. She must be judged
according to the normative standard of motherhood as a form of
domestic labour within marriage, and yet prevented from attaining this
goal by the demand made on her to prove her own availability for
employment.35
Despite the implicit appeal to a teleological account of normative
progress, the radical argues, the arbitrary and exclusionary nature of the
bases for justification of social citizenship can be identified. For the
radical, each stage and conception of citizenship in Marshall's account is
arbitrarily established by and perpetuates a violent exclusion of otherness.
As we saw in Chapter One, radical meta-theory also distinguishes such
arbitrary and violent constitutions of subjects from the radical conception
of truth and liberty. Radical liberty and truth are that which emerge from
the resistance directed against humanistic domination, against the
attempts to establish a commensurability between rational activities at
the level of evaluation. Marshall's social citizenship is guilty, for the
radical, of a more extensive and intensive domination and normalisation
of experience. This is the case, as social citizenship pursues its substantive
and ethically committed normative principles and conceptions of
freedom more comprehensively, or in ever more aspects of rational
activities.
I argued in Chapter One that the radical position will not be realised in a
conception of citizenship. This point can be made here again in response
to their rejection of social citizenship. The radical rejects Marshall's
citizenship, not only because it is State- and market-centred, but because it
attempts to ensure an increasingly substantive and positive conception of
human freedom more comprehensively. However, in place of this, the
34 Waxman, C., (1983) The Stigma of Poverty, pp. 87-9, pp. 94-5; Dean, M., (1991) The
Constitution of Poverty, pp. 13-4.
35 Schram, S., (1995) Words of Welfare. The Poverty of Social Science and The Social
Science of Poverty (University of Minneapolis Press), p. 145.
radical can only propose a politics of local resistance, whether to reverse
the valuation of the "stigmatised" other of welfare dependency, or to
"locally" control the conceptualisation of need and the relief of
deprivation.36 I argue instead, in the remainder of this chapter, that a
hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship is required, for the very
reason that State- and market-centred projects of intervention are
necessary to eliminate the deprivation which effects all aspects of human
interaction. Although we must limit and control relations of technology
and power, we must do so to safe-guard from deprivation the universally
significant characteristics of freedom. In contrast, the local radical
resistance of transgression offers us no way to legitimate such collective
interventions. However, the radical will respond that our project must
still presuppose an untenable and subjugating teleology. Therefore, in
Section 2. I propose an interpretation of how Marshall does account for
normative advances, which distinguishes the Gadamerian meta-theory
he proceeds with from a teleological account of progress.
1.3. The enlightenment de-commodification
of social citizenship.
In this section I discuss one possible response to the radical interpretation
and critique. This is Gosta Esping-Andersen's account of social
citizenship. He argues that Marshall's theory can be legitimated, but only
if it is reformulated on what I have characterised as enlightenment bases
for justification, so as to enable what Esping-Andersen refers to as de-
commodified relations of equality. Esping-Andersen argues that
Marshall's position is conservative. However, he also argues both that
Marshall's social citizenship can attain de-commodification and only if its
conservative elements are rejected. For Esping-Andersen, de-
commodified relations of citizenship can and should be separated from
those of the market and traditional family roles, as the latter are
antithetical to an enlightenment conception of the equal respect owed to
our free rational capacity. Esping-Andersen agrees with the radical, that
the bases for justification of modern citizenship have tended to reflect an
arbitrary exertion of power. However, Esping-Andersen argues that
enlightenment bases which enable us to prescribe for the attainment of
36 Ibid., p. 35 ff„ p. 77 ff.
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just power relations can be ensured for citizenship, and through
interactive relations which are themselves freed from domination.
Esping-Andersen argues that Marshall has not properly dealt with the
need to overcome the effects of unjustified relations of power on our
bases for justification, and that this is because of what Esping-Andersen
interprets as the "conservative" elements of Marshall's thought. For
Esping-Andersen, presuppositions of justification only provide the bases
for the rational activity of citizenship if they are not subject to the
variability of ongoing practice. It is only then that the explanations of
social science and the prescriptions of moral theory can legitimate the
project of social citizenship. It is in contrast to this that Esping-Andersen
defines the "conservative" position. Esping-Andersen argues that, as
Marshall's account continues to rely on the embedded understanding of
the "professional", it will be unable to identify the valid enlightenment
justifications of theoretical and practical activity. Further, as Marshall's
account relies on the "authority" of the professional, it does not
acknowledge that unequal power relations in the market and traditional
family structures have a distortive, ideological, effect on the bases for
justification of practice.37 Esping-Andersen argues that, for these reasons,
the bases for justification of rational activity must enable reason to
abstract from practice.
Esping-Andersen adopts the radical concern, that power relations shape
our bases for justification, but incorporates it within an enlightenment
meta-theory. The correct bases for justification of social citizenship will
emerge when subordinated groups, the politically unorganised working
class and women in traditional roles, are freed from domination. "De-
commodification" brings this about, as it frees the rational action of
employees from the economic imperatives of employers, and also frees
the rational action of women from the norms of the traditionalist family
structures which the capitalist market presupposes as a shadow
economy.38 De-commodified conditions are constituted not only through
37 Esping-Andersen, G., (1985) Politics against markets: the social democratic road to
power (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 34.
38 Esping-Andersen, G., (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge:
Polity Press), pp. 144- 162.
an enlightenment abstraction from historically shared presuppositions,
but specifically from the presuppositions which serve to perpetuate
domination in practice. It is for this reason that they provide bases for
justification, both to legitimate explanations and evaluations concerning
the characteristics of well-being and freedom, and to determine the
rationality of action enabled by a citizenship of mutual respect.
In Esping-Andersen's earlier work,39 he argues that de-commodification
is achieved through common universal social services, and only to the
extent that social services secure the well-being of all irrespective of the
market contributions of the individuals concerned. Further, it is only in
these conditions that the collective action taken to ensure this
substantive account of human well-being as a right of citizenship will
itself be identified with as legitimate by citizens. Prior to the attainment of
de-commodification, only a politically unified and organised working
class will have an interest in creating these universal services, as it is only
in such conditions that the social and economic needs of its members can
be met. In contrast, in situations where a capitalist market is dominant,
individuals are encouraged to define both evaluative principles and
explanatory hypotheses in individualistic or familial terms. Not only will
the capitalist process of commodification entail that citizens will not
identify with social rights as legitimate. This process also leads to the
adoption of presuppositions which ensure that well-being and autonomy
can be defined only in atomistic and egotistical terms, to the exclusion of
our necessary intersubjective characteristics.40
In his more recent work, Esping-Andersen argues that, with social and
economic changes, the conditions for de-commodification have
themselves altered.41 The demise of a politically unified working class
entails that their interests can no longer be relied on to create the
conditions in which social rights will be identified with as legitimate.
Domination is experienced now, more importantly, as an individual in
the market and the family. The conditions of de-commodification now
are those which enable equally each individual to define and pursue their
39 Esping-Andersen, G., (1985) Politics against Markets, p. 31.
40 Ibid.
41 Esping-Andersen, G., (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, p. 28.
own conception of well-being and freedom. Social rights must "socialise"
the "costs of reproduction" for individuals. They will also only be
identified as legitimate by individuals who are themselves free from the
imperatives of securing market employment and fulfilling traditional
role expectations.42 Where individuals can abstract from the
presuppositions derived from the price-mechanism and pre-given ethical
expectations, they can identify as legitimate the prescriptions which
explain well-being as a phenomenon which is individualistically pursued
on the basis of goods distributed as an unconditional right. They will also
then identify as legitimate the prescriptions which positively value the
life which is individualistically determined under such conditions.
Conflicting interests and normative principles of justification in
interaction are, for Esping-Andersen, reconciled by the attainment of his
account of a de-commodified social equality.
Social citizenship will, therefore, only be identified with as legitimate in
certain conditions, where the nature of an individual's rational activity is
no longer governed by the power of traditional authority figures in the
family and by employers in the market. Enlightenment theory can
provide us with a universalizable account of why this is the case, but only
because enlightenment social theory abstracts from the presuppositions of
everyday conservative understanding. Enlightenment theory will also
provide a universalizable account of why de-commodified conditions
themselves represent a normative and rational advance, but again only
because they enable the enlightenment abstraction from everyday
presuppositions which perpetuate relations of domination through
ideological discourses.43
Esping-Andersen argues that an explanatory account of capitalism can
identify the effects of the profit-motive and class inequality on the pursuit
of social justice through liberal democratic institutions. In capitalist
liberal democracies, collective intervention is identified as legitimate
only where it is supported by a majority of individuals. As the radical
42 Ibid.
43 Esping-Andersen, G., (1985) Politics against Markets, p. 30 ff.; (1990) The Three Worlds
of Welfare Capitalism, pp. 60-68.
socialist commentators Przeworski and Miliband also argue,44 the
majority of individuals in capitalist liberal democracies have an
economic interest to presuppose that well-being is individualistically
determined through market pursuits. The capitalist reward structure,
which Marshall's conservatism will not subordinate, therefore generates
an aggregate of individual interests in services which ensure well-being
at the expense of others45 In Esping-Andersen's earlier work, an
enlightenment explanatory account justified the forceful intervention of
the organised working class. Social citizenship could only be achieved
through the force of the working class, not through evaluative
prescriptions made from within the self-understandings of that time. In
his later work, the socialisation of reproduction ensures each individual's
freedom from prevailing norms and power relations, so that they can
effect in practice their own conception of well-being.
Esping-Andersen's enlightenment social theory claims to have identified
that rational action in the market and in traditional roles is antithetical to
freedom. In the market, action is only rational when one's labour-time is
determined by the profit-motive alone, while in traditional roles one
must accept pre-given assumptions governing the division of labour.46
Enlightenment moral theory demands that citizenship rationality must
enable individuals to abstract from inappropriate presuppositions.
However, abstraction is only possible when we have rendered
heteronomous presuppositions unnecessary through a counter-force. An
exertion of power against domination will free workers to exercise choice
concerning the nature of their work and their access to, and paid absence
from, work. For instance, the well-being of the single-parent can be
ensured only when the power of employers, and those governing the
domestic division of labour, is opposed. Well-being can be ensured here
in a manner which dissolves the stigmatising category formed around
44 Miliband, R., (1969) The State in Capitalist Society. The Analysis of the Western
System of Power (London: Quartet Books, 1982), p. 171 ff.; Przeworski, A., (1985)
Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 27 ff..
45 Esping-Andersen, G., (1985) Politics against Markets, p. 32.; (1990) The Three Worlds of
Welfare Capitalism, pp. 187-8.
46 The "conditions under which labour enters employment" is just as significant for de-
commodification as "the conditions shaping behaviour within the labour market": Esping-
Andersen, G., (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, p. 149.
unemployment and an unorthodox family form, a category whose causes
Marshall's conservatism will not oppose. De-commodification is a
universalizable measure of freedom. For example, it measures the nature
of a women's experience both of paid absence from work in domestic
labour, and of the quality of, and means of entry to, paid work itself.47
Esping-Andersen argues that Marshall's theory of social citizenship can
be reformulated, but only from within an enlightenment theory which
also acknowledges the role power must play in ensuring equality. He also
argues that the conservative elements of Marshall's theory entail that it
will be unable to secure the end which it prescribes, as it must express a
naive historical commitment. In contrast, enlightenment theoretical
reflection can explain both the nature of social relations and how our
social understandings may hinder our identification with legitimate
forms of collective action. An enlightenment social citizenship must,
therefore, pursue the de-commodification of relations, as it is here alone
that the collective action to ensure social equality will be identified with
as legitimate.
§2. The conservative meta-theory of social citizenship.
The radical and enlightenment positions I have discussed in Section 1.
each offer a specific interpretation of Marshall, and a corresponding
critique of his conception of social citizenship. However, in this section I
argue that Marshall's work presupposes neither a teleological necessity
nor a latent enlightenment potential. It presupposes a conservative meta-
theory which corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics, and which can be
distinguished from Esping-Andersen's characterisation of a conservative
position. Marshall presupposes that the conception of social citizenship
must be reformulated in new situations. However, this will not be
achieved through an enlightenment process of reflective abstraction from
everyday presuppositions, but through a practically derived form of
reflection. This itself will be neither a naive conservative perpetuation of
domination, nor an exclusionary intensification of subjugation. Rather,
the bases for justification on which social citizenship will be correctly
47 Ibid., p. 156.
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identified as legitimate will themselves be reconstituted through the
practical insight of citizens which social equality is to enable.
2.1. The dialogical learning process of tradition.
I turn first to Gadamer's account of hermeneutic and historical studies,
and this will enable the distinction to be made between the conservative
meta-theory which Marshall does presuppose and the teleological
account which the radicals ascribe to him. Gadamer's position itself
emerges in the contrast he draws with Hegel's idealist teleology.48
Gadamer agrees with Hegel that bases for justification emerge in a
rationally mediated dialectical development of history and tradition.
However, Gadamer argues that this dialectic is open-ended. The historical
character of rationality does not have the inner telos which Hegel
ascribed to it. It does not have the goal of a pure self-consciousness in our
knowledge of the world, which is realised socially as the Absolute Spirit.
As we saw in Chapter One, Gadamer does not assume that the prejudicial
nature of reflection can be overcome, and so the historically variant
conditions of possibility of this finite rational capacity must continually
be re-established.
Gadamer places the reflection of historical and hermeneutic studies in
the position between familiarity and strangeness, between belonging to
the history and tradition being studied and the separateness of our
horizon in the present. As an "historically effected consciousness", we
can be aware both that our conscious reasoning is an effect of history and
tradition, and that we possess the rational potential in turn to affect
history and tradition in our understanding in the present.49 However,
our capacity to be aware of our historical and traditional presuppositions
is limited. It is limited by the fact that we can not abstract as such from the
tradition and history which sustains our reflection. It is also limited by
the fact that the necessity of such a sustaining dimension also leaves our
bases for justification open to the disruptions of historical experiences. It
is for this reason that we are "obliged" to "apply" the objects of historical
and hermeneutic reflection in the present.50 We cannot step outside our
48 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 347 ff.
49 Ibid., pp. 358-9.
50 Ibid., pp. 361-2.
situation now in our attempts to understand an historical phenomenon
or a traditional work, and so we must always understand it by applying it
within changing, disruptive situations. Our inability to abstract from this
sustaining dimension also entails that we can only understand ourselves
through applying the objects studied in the present, and so we are obliged
to apply them so as to proceed towards self-understanding.51
In a teleology, the subject-matter of the past is made concrete in our
understanding of it in the present in line with its inner telos. This
correlates with only one half of Gadamer's account of understanding. It
expresses only the fact that we are addressed by and obliged to discern the
truth of the subject-matter of history and tradition. However, Gadamer
also argues that our belongingness has the structure of a dialogue, and so
the truth of the subject-matter of history and tradition is determined only
by our reflective application of it in our specific situation. The subject
matter of history and tradition addresses us, but only as an answer to a
question which we already pose in the dialogical nature of our
belongingness to it.52 Our capacity to reflectively appropriate our own
situation is also limited, and so the application of this subject-matter in
the present can never be completed once and for all.53 History and
tradition will not be completed in any present situation, as the self-
understanding from which we question and through which we apply the
subject-matter is itself an ongoing process which we pursue.
Hegel's goal of an Absolute Spirit does conform to the radical's
characterisation of a teleological development, to the extent that in it the
human rational capacity is brought to a final consciousness of itself
through the realisation of the universal normative principles of history.
Gadamer does argue that modernity's governing principle is the
"universal freedom of all" which Hegel identified. However, Gadamer
argues that the universal must continually be "applied."54 As our
rational capacity is finite, and as the universal depends on human reason
51 Ibid., p. 300
52 Ibid., pp. 462-3.
53 Ibid., p. 397.
54 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hegel's Philosophy And Its Aftereffects Until Today", in
RAS, pp. 36-7.
for its application, there can be no final account of the universal realised
through a pure self-consciousness. The universal principle of freedom is
applied within the practices of social life, such as the family, as it is from
within these that our power of reflection is enabled. However, such
practices themselves are reflectively transformed by this exercise, and so
the content of family life is, in the pursuit of freedom, reflectively
mediated as part of our ongoing tradition.55
We can see both these Gadamerian characteristics in Marshall's work:
that our belongingness is also an ongoing dialogue, and that the
normative principles of history and tradition must be continually applied
as part of our normative progress. For Marshall, the history of citizenship
has an unavoidable significance for us now, but one which we continue
to determine as we progress in understanding. Marshall was fully aware
that the realisation of the social conception of equality did not complete
the unfolding of the inner truth of citizenship. Rather, it was a
normative accomplishment which had to be continually re-determined.
It was not just that the potential conflict between the interests and
justifying principles of the market and of social justice could never finally
be overcome, and that the means by which social equality could be
realised would need to be re-addressed in new situations. It was also that
Marshall's conception of the good life, of civilisation and
professionalism, which was to be ensured in social equality, was itself the
capacity to come to an insight into the good life, and to do so again in new
situations. Marshall, therefore, cannot be reduced to a teleological
position. The substantive and comprehensive account of the good life to
be achieved in social equality is not the final definitive account of our
human rational capacity, but the capacity itself to continue the historical
learning process of tradition.
55 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "On the Possibility of Philosophical Ethics", p. 372.
2.2. Hermeneutic evaluative understanding.
I return now to Esping-Andersen's argument that enlightenment bases
for normative evaluation will only be available in practice once material
conditions of equality have been created. He argues that the
presuppositions of everyday practice are shaped by the relations of power
in which individuals act, and from which they derive assumptions
concerning the appropriate criteria for action. From class and gender
power relations, individuals derive assumptions concerning the way in
which well-being can and should be ensured, which also serve to
perpetuate these power relations. If we are to attain enlightenment bases
for justification to evaluate relations of production and distribution we
must abstract from such everyday presuppositions. Enlightenment bases
for justification will, therefore, also only be established when the power
relations which determine everyday presuppositions have been
overcome. This entails that we will only be able to evaluate the practices
of the market and paternalistic power relations by first explaining how
invalid presuppositions of justification have been arrived at here.
Further, if we are to account for the conditions in which the
universalizable principles of citizenship will be identified with as
legitimate, we must first explain the causal relations between power and
the creation of meaningful presuppositions.
The Gadamerian conservative meta-theory which I am proposing shows
us, however, that practical relations continue to sustain our power of
reflection, and that this is the case even for the methodological reflection
of the objective social sciences. The causal knowledge we can have of the
social relations of which we continue to be a part cannot, therefore, have
the nature which Esping-Andersen ascribes to it. We will not causally
explain the origin of our presuppositions of reflection in a way which is
compatible with the ideal of objectification which motivates the natural
sciences. The causal explanation of our constitution as practical role-
players must itself be practically embedded. It cannot help but be
motivated by considerations of what is significant enough to study and in
what way, considerations which themselves reflect our interests as
humans in a specific time and place. It cannot claim to have stepped
outside practice so as to stand over and against it. This entails, however,
that since hermeneutics is the understanding which can identify and
evaluate just such historical presuppositions of reflection, hermeneutic
understanding is appropriate within our methodological efforts to
explain. We must therefore discard the antithesis between enlightenment
bases for justification of methodological, objective science and an
embedded hermeneutics.
This has the further consequence that hermeneutic understanding
cannot have the nature which is often ascribed to it. Just as an
explanation of the cause of a meaningful object does not do away with the
need for hermeneutic understanding of the object or of our explanation,
so too hermeneutic understanding is not restricted to the analysis of
intentional meaning. That the hermeneutic meaning of a subject-matter
cannot be exhausted by the intentions behind it is indicated by the fact
that our understanding of meaning is not empathetic. To understand the
subject-matter of a literary text, for example, it is not sufficient to
empathetically reconstruct the author's intentions, or to hypothesise the
intentions of the ideal author of genius.56 The fact that the meaning of
any object escapes a reduction to the intentions behind it is evidenced by
the fact that we are interested in it, that it is meaningful from our
perspective. It has become of interest to us because it has already posed a
question to us, and it could only question us if we have already
questioned it, if we are already involved in a dialogue with it.
Gadamer argues that this model of the question and answer of dialogue is
appropriate for the understanding involved in the evaluation both of
social practices now and of our tradition and history. As we saw, Gadamer
distinguishes his position from Hegel, by arguing that the reflective
mediation of our history and tradition is ongoing. This will be the case
for our normative evaluation of its content. We must accept that we can
only normatively judge its meaning when we apply it, and accept that we
will only apply it as part of a process of self-understanding, a process of
critically appraising the presuppositions motivating us in our situation of
application.57 Gadamer's critique of a non-hermeneutic causal
explanation and an empathetic intentional understanding is also
56 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 93, p. 276.
57 Ibid., pp. 356-7.
relevant to the question of the normative evaluation of current social
practices. Our understanding of the meaning of a practice is not secured
by placing ourselves within its horizon, by reconstructing the intentions
and causes of the utterances and acts of this practice.58 Rather, its
meaning is only available to us now precisely because it escapes this
reduction, not only to its intentions and causes, but also to the boundaries
of the practice in which it first emerges. This entails also that this
meaning already addresses us, and so we are obliged to apply it within
our horizon and to question our presuppositions in doing so.
When the subject-matter of understanding is the normative significance
of a stage or practice of citizenship, its meaning cannot be reduced to an
account of the causes which operate there. For instance, Marshall
presupposed that the stage of civil citizenship had a normative
significance still for the stage of social citizenship, despite the fact that the
principle of civil equality served to ensure and justify capitalist forces of
polarisation.59 We can still learn from the civil stage that contract
relations are always mediated through a social status, which is both a sub-
cultural category and a stratum that includes different social classes.60
With a normative commitment to attain a shared equal status, the most
significant question for Marshall is the substance of this status, the nature
of the lives that could be led in and through and alongside the market.
This also entails that Marshall does not reduce the normative
significance of practices to their supposed causal structure. Even the price-
mechanism can be co-opted within the distribution of social services to
ensure an equal quality of outcome, such as in means-tested legal aid.61
The normative significance of market acts cannot be reduced to the profit
motive. Rather, they are the subject-matter of reflection for those who
cannot but be participants within or alongside a market which itself is
greatly determined by the status relations in which it is mediated.
58 Ibid., p. 275.
59 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", p. 91.
60 Marshall, T. H., (1953) "The Nature and Determinants of Social Status", pp. 186-8, pp.
203-5.
61 A graded means-test in legal-aid, Marshall argued, could attain the ends of social
justice through the price mechanism, where the cost of legal representation, or de-facto
civil equality, was equal in real terms: Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social
Class", pp. 101-4.
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2.3. Hermeneutic social explanation.
For Gadamer, both the objects and subjects of science are marked by
processes of abstraction and projection. Social relations can be the object
of a social science because these relations already attain a level of
distancing from their surroundings, while the reflection of the social
sciences self-consciously attempts to bracket historical prejudices. The
goal of hermeneutics is to work in the opposite direction. It brings to the
awareness of individuals in society and in science the presuppositions
which they have not overcome, what of their situation they have not
fully appropriated. Gadamer argues that the historical dimension of
tradition and interaction acts not only as a reservoir of meaning for
reflection, since all reflection also feeds back into this reservoir of
historically shared presuppositions, even the reflection of the sciences.62
The hermeneutic insight into the nature of this dimension of meaning
in science is therefore necessary for the self-understanding of the scientist.
As we saw, Esping-Andersen argues that enlightenment social sciences
can identify the power relations which have led to the adoption of
presuppositions which perpetuate domination. They can therefore
identify for us where a counter-force is required. This is an act of power
which cannot be justified by the presuppositions of everyday practice, but
will bring about a context in which this intervention would be
legitimated. However, I argue that this would require our knowledge of
the unchanging causal relations between power and the acceptance of
presuppositions as valid. It is on that basis alone that we could specify
what causal relations will in all situations constitute enlightenment
subjects of normative knowledge. Rather, for hermeneutics, our causal
knowledge of power is continually pursued, and in situations where
power itself is a factor which forces us to reconceptualise our
presuppositions of justification. As the causal relations which constitute
domination can never be known finally and exhaustively, domination
itself always remains a danger we cannot completely overcome. Further,
as our bases for justification will always be practically derived, the
normative evaluation of all acts of force, even that proposed by Esping-
62 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task", p. 134 ff.
Andersen, cannot be postponed to some future date when the historical
disruptions of practical power relations have been overcome.
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A similar argument is evident in Marshall's position. I also argue that,
on this basis, Marshall rejects de-commodification as a normative goal.
Marshall is in agreement with Karl Polanyi, who argues that the market
can not be explained and evaluated as a sphere which is separated from
social relations generally. Attempts to turn human labour into a
commodity produced for sale will strip humans of the necessary social
context for any activity, but so also the attempts to establish social justice
on bases which are antithetical to those of the market will divorce
human activity from a necessary feature of that life.63 Marshall assumes
that the formal logic of the market is embedded, as it can only be
explained along with an understanding of the status differentials which
are inseparable from the workings of the price mechanism. At the same
time, relations of justice do not subordinate a market logic, as they are not
simply a force pitted against a causal structure of domination. Social
justice requires, instead, an infusion of these status divisions and their
presuppositions with the logic and commitments of social equality.64
This returns market relations and actors from the abstractions of the
contract and of functional divisions. It returns them to the relations of
status which already exist between functional divisions, and also to the
consciously fostered status of social equality. It returns them to a
Gadamerian common hermeneutic dimension.
For Gadamer, the explanations of social science are not legitimate
independently of a hermeneutic understanding of how they are applied.
This is not merely because the objects of social explanations are free to
change, and so will one day falsify criteria of validity which until then
had been reliable. We must also overcome the reflective methodological
abstraction required to make this explanation, and so return to the
practice from which it proceeds. A practical excellence is required, the
ability to ask the questions which have significance for the place of both
the object and subject of reflection in history. Similarly, Marshall's
explanation of the market is not independent either from the nature of
63 Polanyi, K., (1944) The Great Transformation, p. 88.
64 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 118-20.
the medium in which the market is embedded, or from his commitment
to a social conception of equality. This historically and evaluatively
motivated reflection is something which itself is attained. However,
unlike Gadamer, Marshall emphasises that this "authoritative insight"
can only be attained in practices which are themselves developed within
relations of class, status, and power inequality. As Esping-Andersen
argues, the capacity to legitimate collective interventions is not
independent of relations which may be unjust, and so its enablement
must be the goal of justice. Unlike Esping-Andersen, however, the
requirements for this capacity are not specifiable over and against such
practices as the market themselves, and so, also, such requirements will
continue to be specified as this insight is developed.
Marshall argues that the excellence of practical reason is realised as the
status of "professionalism." Professionalism is the insight fostered in
practices which enable the good life of that individual and others through
the delivery of the "services" appropriate to this practice, whether that of
the artist, the teacher, or the doctor.65 Professional insight is developed in
practices with the guidance of corporate standards, which are also only
realised as personal intellectual virtues of the professional.66 The
standards of rationality here could never be finally codified, as they are
only realised in practical activities in the application considered
appropriate by the professionals involved. This practical insight is a
possibility of all aspects of practice. It can be achieved in contractual
market employment, in the socialised professions of social citizenship, or
outside paid employment, as can be the case with the artist.67 It is also an
insight which is realised in the very deployment of the methods and
techniques of science which are available in productive activities. It is
through the correct application of techniques that the professional skill is
developed and realised.68
Marshall conceives of professionalism as a specific instance of the
excellence in practical reasoning, and so does not restrict an authoritative
65 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", pp. 151-3.
66 Ibid., pp. 153-5.
67 Ibid., pp. 158-62.
68 Ibid., pp. 153-4.
insight to that which is appropriate to occupations. Further, this account
also corresponds with Gadamer's meta-theoretical insight into the nature
of all understanding. For both authors, excellence in practical reason is
the capacity to have understanding, or awareness. It is fostered in mutual
reliance, and in all aspects of practices. It is fostered as a disposition to
attain the capacity for understanding in a way that is appropriate to a
practice. It is a universal capacity, both because it is required in all spheres
of life, and proceeds from all aspects of life. All aspects of our humanity
are themselves prejudicially conceived, or "read" "as-something." This
means that they are understood from a perspective, and with the
expectation that humanity can and should attain understanding.69
Marshall expresses this argument in the concept of "civilization."70
Civilization is the substance of the status of social equality. It forms a
continuum from the absolute necessities for material life to the "sharing
of heritage", the area of common culture in social equality. Material well-
being and the capability of free action are valued ends in themselves.
However, they are ends which necessarily enable an equal sharing of
heritage, the mutual development of excellence in practical reason.
Esping-Andersen's attempts to specify the universal requirements for
citizenship depart from Marshall's social citizenship. Neither contractual
nor traditional relations are in principle inimical to free, normatively
significant, rationality. At the same time, the continued pursuit of insight
by professionals is the end which citizenship should ensure. It is also this
insight which, in turn, should reformulate the goals of citizenship
through the definitions of the "public interest" concerning "policy
fundamentals" in the Welfare State.71 Marshall has left an opening
within the practice of citizenship for its own continued, practically
determined, growth. For instance, the capacity of the professional was to
be ensured for more social groups in new situations, for the social
categories of women and the working class who formerly had been
assumed to lack the required characteristics.72 Further, this can only be
69 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task", p. 131;
(1989) Truth and Method, pp. 90-1.
7^ Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 70-1.
71 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 159.
72 Ibid., p. 153.
ensured by reconceptualising the concept of the professional itself in the
process. This continued reconceptualisation already characterises the
activity of professionals, both in the definition of the public interest and
in the attempt to account for the nature of their services in altered
conditions of possibility. It is in the continual enablement of this capacity
that the substance of social equality can be reformulated and ensured.
I have argued that Marshall's social citizenship need not, and in fact
cannot, be reconceptualised according to enlightenment meta-theory. The
explanations of the social sciences cannot identify for us what the
universal conditions are in which the legitimate project of social equality
will always be identified in practice. Further, judgements of the means
used to attain justice must be based on the criteria available to us now,
and not postponed until we have attained a hypothetical end-state where
all the requirements for legitimacy are ensured. With an enlightenment
conception of social science and moral theory, something other than
social citizenship would be pursued. At the same time, the bases for
justification of the rational activities of social citizenship must remain
hermeneutical. The hermeneutic dimension of practical insight must be
pursued here over and again, and it is only as a continuous pursuit that
we establish bases for justification from which to identify correctly with
the legitimate projects of social justice.
§3. Critical theory: rationalization and the limits of legitimation.
I have defended Marshall's position so far against what I argue is, first, a
mis-interpretation by radical commentators and, second, an
enlightenment mis-appropriation on Esping-Andersen's part. In this
section I return to Jiirgen Habermas' position, which was discussed in
Chapter One. Habermas agrees with both Marshall and Esping-Andersen
that the legitimate intervention is to ensure equality, both of resources
and of power relations, and that this itself is the necessary basis for
citizens to legitimate such intervention. However, Habermas argues that
equal relations have a formal, negative, and dual nature. For Habermas,
modern normative thought represents a progression, as with it we can
justify the ethically neutral prescriptions of a "post-conventional ethics."
This is the case, however, only because of the distinctive nature of our
modern life-world from which our rational capacity proceeds. Collective
interventions of citizenship must be guided alone by the ethically neutral
prescriptions of the life-world, so as to meet the requirements for the
freedom of all equally in the life-world. Further, collective intervention
must respect the antithetical nature of systemic and life-world
integration, so as, in turn, to enable the rational and normative progress
which overcomes conditions that colonise and undermine our life-world
potential.
Habermas would reject our hermeneutic reformulation of social
citizenship. For Habermas, a State-led collective intervention will extend
a systemic colonisation which results in a loss of freedom, or reification,
and a loss of meaning, or the fragmentation of consciousness. Habermas
also argues that, as hermeneutics is traditionally and linguistically
embedded, it will neither identify the universal requirements for
rationality nor ensure these requirements through impartial norms of
integration. Habermas will also reject Esping-Andersen's enlightenment
account, where material relations of power determine both our criteria of
legitimacy and the capacity to legitimate collective interventions.
Habermas argues instead that the nature of rational capacity is
determined by a universalizable rationalisation process, and so progress
in egalitarian relations must conform to the universal requirements of
rationality in the life-world and systems. In this section, I distinguish
Habermas' account of egalitarian intervention from Esping-Andersen's
enlightenment account of a de-commodified social citizenship. I then
turn to Habermas' rejection of an historically variable and ethically
committed hermeneutics, and discuss its implications for my argument
that egalitarian intervention is to enable social equality, and is to be
legitimated by the insight of practical excellence enabled here.
3.1. Rationalisation and communicative action.
Both Habermas and Esping-Andersen proceed from an enlightenment
meta-theory, to give an account of the necessity of equal relations for the
rational activity of citizenship. However, they give opposing accounts of
the conditions of possibility for both the justified collective intervention
of citizenship and the identification with this intervention as legitimate.
As we saw in Sections 1. and 2., Esping-Andersen argues that, when class
and gender domination are overcome in de-commodified relations of
equality, the bases for justification will be established with which to
legitimate this intervention. Two interrelated claims are made here
which Habermas will reject. The first is that the nature of bases for
justification in rational activities is determined by the power relations of
those activities. For Esping-Andersen, de-commodification will only be
identified with as a legitimate goal of intervention where relations of
power no longer dominate. Second, the criteria for assessing collective
interventions must be determined in response to the specific relations of
domination which need to be overcome. For Esping-Andersen, the
requirements for freedom and the functional requirements of the market
and state will only be known when we act on behalf of those that are
dominated, in the interests they have in attaining equal freedom.
Habermas would agree that equality of power and of material resources
must be established, that this is necessary if the equal neutral respect
required for rational activity and normative progress is to be ensured.
However, Habermas argues that equality cannot be attained through
State-directed activity and enjoyed as a normative basis created within the
market. This can be seen to follow from Habermas' argument that the
nature of justification does not vary depending on the substance of
current relations of domination. Rather, it is determined by a process of
"rationalization", which is neither class- nor gender-specific. This process
has not only created the universal conditions for rationality, but the
ability to justify universalizable claims. It has made possible the
interaction of the life-world, and the ability there to justify social norms
which reflect the general interest. Not only is it possible and necessary to
justify rights to needed resources according to the interests all can
legitimately hold to, regardless of their class or gender position. This is
also only a possibility in a life-world which is distinct from the State and
market.73 Further, critical reflection can and must justify the universal
claims which identify the material and interactive requirements for the
emancipation and enlightenment of all. From an "observer's
perspective", rather than from the interests of the dominated, the
universal possibilities of freedom from domination can be specified.74
73 Habermas, J., (1990) "Morality and Ethical Life", pp. 325-6.
74 Habermas, J., (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian
Lenhart & Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 135 ff.
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For Habermas, the social theorist must specify the requirements for
rationality which follow from the modern process of rationalisation.
From their place within power relations, individuals develop
perspectives on social interaction which are relevant to the justification
of social norms. However, the requirements for rationality are not
determined by the interests subordinate groups have in a condition in
which their freedom from domination is secured. Rather, they will only
be known from the observer's perspective, which the rational potential of
the life-world as such enables us to take. Habermas argues that, unlike
Kant's subject-centred rationality, his philosophical reflection is itself a
possibility of modern intersubjective life-world integration.75 Through a
"methodological objectification" of the rational potential of the life-
world, critical theory broadens its perspective to incorporate an
"observer's external point of view."76 The observer's perspective enables
critical theory to "reconstruct" science so as to analyse the rational bases of
all knowing, speaking, and acting.77 It can then specify the potential for
"communicative action." This is the potential to abstract from
inappropriate presuppositions, to symbolically reproduce the life-world,
and thereby attain, as "the project of modernity", the normative goals of
emancipation and enlightenment.78 However, it also identifies how this
potential is itself limited due to the dualistic nature of reality.
The integration of "systems", which achieves material reproduction, is
distinct from the symbolic reproduction of the life-world.
Communicative action is excluded from systemic integration, which
instead is integrated by the "steering media" of power and money in the
systems of administration and economics.79 Habermas argues that the
differentiation of systems from the life-world, and the rationalization of
the life-world itself, both pose problems for modernity which only a
critical theory can identify and solve. Systemic imperatives have a
75 Habermas, J., (1994) "An alternative way out of the philosophy of the subject", pp. 295-
6; (1995) "Discourse Ethics", pp. 62-3.
76 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, p. 374.
77 Habermas, J., (1994) "An alternative way out of the philosophy of the subject", pp. 312-
6.
78 Habermas, J.,(1990) "Morality and Ethical Life", pp. 322-3.
79 Habermas, J., (1994) "An alternative way out of the philosophy of the subject", pp. 315-
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tendency to create "crises" within material reproduction and to impose
themselves on and "colonize" the life-world. At the same time, the
specialised forms of argumentation of the life-world also tend to split off
as elite expert cultures, thus resulting in the "cultural impoverishment"
of everyday practices. Systemic crises not only lead to "disequilibria" in
material reproduction, but also affect the symbolic reproduction of the
life-world. The colonisation of the life-world by systems creates the
"pathological" danger of the loss of freedom through "reification." The
rigidity of life-world structures in such situations creates the further
pathological danger of a loss of meaning through the "fragmentation of
consciousness" caused by cultural impoverishment.80
A legitimate collective intervention is justified in the life-world, and it is
from the life-world alone that it can be identified with as legitimate. It
will acknowledge that colonization occurs when the systems of the State
and market are extended into the life-world. It occurs through both the
extension of capitalist markets, but also through the extension of the
administrative techniques of the welfare State to compensate for market
disruptions to life-world reproduction. For critical theory, the loss of
freedom and meaning now must be overcome, and they only will be
overcome through a learning process made possible by egalitarian
measures. However, they cannot be overcome by following the
presuppositions of justification determined by the specificity of the
experience of class or gender domination. Nor can they be overcome
through the extension of the State's agencies into the life-world to secure
a "de-commodified" equal status. Rather, Habermas argues, processes of
learning are needed which overcome the effects of domination and
reification, yet conform to the universal requirements for freedom and
insight which follow from rationalisation.81 The legitimate collective
intervention respects the limits of the life-world. It in turn enables the
life-world potential to progress, to harness technological developments so
as to ensure that systems function, and to overcome the pathological
effects of colonization on our rational potential.
80 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2., p. 181 ff., p. 389.
81 Ibid., p. 313 ff..
3.2. Progress and the life-world potential for legitimacy.
Habermas rejects Esping-Andersen's egalitarian intervention whose
legitimacy relies on the attainment of de-commodified relations.
Habermas will also reject the intervention of a hermeneutic social
citizenship, whose legitimacy relies on the attainment of a practically-
derived insight in traditional and ethical relations of social equality.
Habermas develops Hegel's argument that rational capacity is enabled
through relations of mutuality, on whose bases alone legitimate
interventions can be identified.82 Unlike Hegel, however, Habermas
gives a formal and dualistic account of our necessary mutual relations,
which neither develops with systemic change, nor is reliant for its
justification on the substantive presuppositions of historical
communities. He argues, against Gadamer, that the mutual requirements
for our capacity are not solely traditional and, therefore, do not continue
to "unfold" with tradition.83 Habermas limits hermeneutics for the
further reason that the dual and formal nature of communicative action
is also negative. It is normatively justified only by the principle of
freedom from interference, while in such rational action we must abstract
from ethical commitments to identify the general interest. This is the
universal intersubjective rational potential to interact without a
commitment to any specific life-world content as our normative goal.84
Habermas restricts the scope of hermeneutic understanding by adopting
the external perspective of critical theory. For Habermas, only then can
we know how legitimate interventions will be identified and, therefore,
analyse how progress is possible. Further, Habermas defines the
universalizable measure of progress as the capacity to exclude
hermeneutic reasoning from moral, scientific, technical, and critical
rational activity. For critical theory, a learning process can overcome
82 Habermas, J., (1993) "Morality and Ethical Life", p. 329.
83 This critique is put forward in: Habermas, J., (1967) On the Logic of the Social Sciences,
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen & Jerry Stark (Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press).
Gadamer responds in: Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique
of Ideology", trans. Jerry Dibble, in The Hermeneutic Reader. Texts of the German
tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present, ed. K. Mueller-Vollmer (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986). Habermas responds again in: Habermas, J., (1970) "On Hermeneutics'
Claim to Universality".
84Habermas, J., (1993) "Morality and Ethical Life", p. 327, p. 329.
crises and pathologies, but only if the conditions of learning are in accord
with the universal process of rationalisation. Although our capacity is
only realised in a specific life-world, the universalizable requirements for
life-word reproduction are determined, and can be specified,
independently of our contextually specific life-world commitments.85
Habermas argues that Gadamer's embedded learning process cannot
recognise universal standards of progress but must be committed, in a
culturally conservative way, to the tradition it studies. Further, Habermas
argues that, as hermeneutics can not take the formal external perspective,
it will not be aware that our rational capacity emerges not only in social
relations of mutuality but in systemic relations of power and control as
well. For Habermas, Gadamer's account of learning is therefore also
linguistically ideal, as it cannot account for how strategic action and
power relations affect our rational capacity.86
Habermas argues that progress is evident where our normative rational
capacity emerges, and where it is realised according to its universal
requirements and limits. He argues that relations in which a "post-
conventionalist ethics" is ensured represent an enlightenment measure
of normative progress: it is the attainment of the reflective capacity to
take "the moral point of view", where reason abstracts from shared
presuppositions to assess norms according to the universal criterion of
Tightness.87 The egalitarian rights to the material and interactive
requirements for our rational capacity must express the general interest
alone. They must, for that reason, be justified in the ideal speech
situation, where we can abstract from our ethical interests in our own
good life.88 Although our capacity is realised in the pursuit of the good
life, unlike hermeneutics, Habermas argues that the ability to identify
justified norms is independent of these commitments. Habermas also
argues that, as hermeneutics presupposes that bases for justification are
established in relations of authority, it cannot recognise the normative
85 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p. 313 ff..; Habermas,
J., (1985) "Neo Conservative cultural criticism in the US and West Germany", in The New
Conservatism: cultural criticism and the historians' debate, trans. Shierry Weber
Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), p. 44.
86 Habermas, J., (1970) "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality", pp. 315-17.
87 Habermas, J., (1990) "Morality and Ethical Life", pp. 325-6.
88 Habermas, J., (1990) "Morality and Ethical Life", p. 325; (1994) "An alternative way
out of the philosophy of the subject", pp. 229-300
significance of post-conventionalist relations. Habermas claims that his
own non-hermeneutic study has identified a potential for progress, one
that is realised where the legitimacy of collective interventions is
determined increasingly through consensual mechanisms.
Critical theory is also to specify how the ideal speech situation is impeded
by attempts to extend normative and dialogical rational activity to
spheres of life which are governed instead by systemic imperatives.89 On
that basis Habermas would re-evaluate the "stages" of Marshall's
citizenship according to the emergence and subsequent development of
the normatively significant rational potential of modernity. What
Marshall defines as "civil" citizenship is, for Habermas, superior to the
"social" stage. Civil rights are a "freedom-guaranteeing juridification" in
so far as they ensure the demands of the life-world against systemic
colonization. Social rights, although they appear to be a bulwark against
capitalist relations of inequality, are in fact a "restructuring intervention
in the life-world of recipients."90 Although civil rights can ensure equal
freedom, they can also have negative side-effects, such as the class-specific
way in which the freedom of contract is realised for the employee as a
commodified relation. But social rights are a form of juridification which
in themselves promote the disintegration of life-world relations. Social
rights separate interaction from consensual mechanisms of co-ordination
and govern them instead by bureaucratic power and the calculations of
financial compensation.91
The interaction appropriate to a post-conventional ethics can, Habermas
argues, only be realised in the equal relations of the ideal speech situation
and through the collective intervention it legitimates. Therefore, we will
only progress to the extent that the equal resources and power required
for our rational capacity in the linguistic dimension are ensured. In
89 In Habermas' earlier work, however, structural changes in interpretative systems
played a role in establishing the goal value and goal state of systems. Further, the
"functionality" and "equilibrium" of systems were measured in terms of the attainment of
Habermas' normative goal of the ideal of communication freed from domination and in
terms of the realisation of the Utopian anticipations of previously non-integrated forces:
Habermas, J., (1967) On The Logic of the Social Sciences, referred to in: McCarthy, T.,
(1978) The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 220-6.
90 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, pp. 361-362.
91 Ibid., p. 360, p. 363.
contrast, Habermas' position will characterise the interventions of
Marshall's social citizenship as "one-sided developments" of our
capacity.92 They develop the purposive rational aspect of our capacity,
threaten the life-world with pathologies and crises, and so hinder our
ability to learn from, and overcome, these conditions. For Habermas, it is
only by abstracting from hermeneutical understanding, and then also by
taking the critical external perspective, that we can distinguish between
processes of integration and assess the universal significance this
distinction has for emancipation and enlightenment. Where
hermeneutics is universal, these distinctions between rational activities
are effaced. As a "linguistically ideal" hermeneutics cannot account for
the concrete structure of life, neither can it identify justified relations of
power, non-objectifying relations of technical and strategic action, and the
conditions in which a fragmentation of consciousness can be avoided .93
Habermas would reject Marshall's argument that intervention is to be
legitimated by the practical excellence attained in social equality. Not only
are such relations traditionally embedded and ethically motivated, but
they are only ever partly autonomous from the inequalities of class,
status, and power in the division of labour. For Habermas, the
requirements for our rational capacity do not vary with the specific
relations of class, status, or power. It is only the consequences of
reification and fragmentation of consciousness which may vary,
depending on one's position in exchange relations between subsystems
and the life-world which are regulated through the roles of employee,
consumer, client, and citizen.94 For instance, clients of the specific
bureaucratic services of means-tested and work-related welfare will be
exposed to a particular experience of the debilitating effects of
colonization.95 Further, as the insight of Marshall's practical excellence
cannot identify the universal requirements for rationality, then the
interventions it will legitimate will result in reification. Even where the
goal of social citizenship is not specifically a redistributive one, all
individuals will suffer a loss of freedom and of meaning where collective
92 Habermas, J., (1994) "An Alternative way out of the Philosophy of the Subject", pp.
315-6.
93 Habermas, J., (1970) On The Logic of the Social Sciences, pp. 171-4 .
94 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, p. 356.
95 Habermas, J., (1994) "Struggles for Recognition", pp. 115-116.
intervention extends bureaucracy and therapeutic services into the life-
world. This will be the case in education, if consensual agreement
between students and teachers, and between staff, is increasingly replaced
by administrative rights and duties and therapeutic expertise.96
Habermas will reject the argument that collective interventions are to be
legitimated by Marshall's account of the practical insight realised in
valued practices and social equality. For Habermas, such a position cannot
safeguard the requirements for rationality, justice, and social functioning
as it will assume that they are established in justified work relations.97
The intervention of social citizenship will lead to economic crises in the
attempt to direct the system of the market according to normative criteria,
while, as a State-directed intervention, it will open the life-world to
systemic colonization. Nor will it foster the egalitarian life-world
relations of the ideal speech situation necessary for legitimacy but will,
rather, perpetuate pre-given class- and gender-based relations of power
and evaluations of the division of labour. Further, for Habermas,
Marshall's professionals who deliver services, and determine the public
interest, will be "elite" experts who perpetuate both the fragmentation of
consciousness and the juridified reification of bureaucratic clients.98 The
attempt to ensure a social measure of equality as the goal of citizenship
and the basis for citizenship intervention both creates crises and
undermines the potential of communicative action to overcome them.
Legitimate collective interventions will be identified with when, as Hegel
argues, they arise from the potential for solidarity of civil society.
Habermas rejects social citizenship on that basis. The pursuit of social
equality is incompatible with the purposive rationality of the market, the
communicative action of life-world politics, and the private pursuit of
human flourishing. As with the radical commentators, Habermas argues
that the welfare State intensifies domination. However, unlike the
radical, Habermas identifies domination with a universal account of the
96 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, p. 369 ff..
97 Ibid., p. 117.
98 Habermas, J., (1976) Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (London:
Heinemann), p. 36 ff.; (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action vol. 2, pp. 369-372. For
a similar argument see: Offe, C., (1984) Contradictions of the Welfare State, ed. J. Keane
(London: Hutchinson), p. 156.
potential of our rational capacity, which is attained in the equal relations
safeguarded by civil rights." Habermas also argues that, as hermeneutics
does not acknowledge its own dualistic limitations, hermeneutic
reflection itself must be treated with suspicion. We cannot be sure that
reification, strategic interests, or fragmented consciousness do not lie
behind the claims to traditional authority, ethical goodness, and aesthetic
authenticity. This does not entail that suspicion itself must be the
permanent critical perspective, or that freedom will be realised in radical
transgression.100 Rather, the universal enlightenment criteria of validity
of our rational faculty enable us to identify valid presuppositions of
justification, because they allow us to escape the lack of certainty of
hermeneutics caused by the concealed, prejudicial basis for hermeneutic
rationality.
Habermas argues that rational and normative progress in the "project of
modernity" is itself only possible through the empirical findings of a
research programme. However, for Habermas, this normative goal and
the external critical perspective of critical theory could never be falsified
by such findings and so shown to be merely contextualist prejudices.
Habermas thereby safeguards his formal, dual, and negative conception of
rational capacity as an unfalsifiable thesis of critical theory which can only
be "indirectly tested" by findings.101 This is the "quasi-transcendental"102
claim that a measure of progress can be applied in a non-prejudicial way
from within the bases for justification of modern society. Habermas does
argue both that the perspective which can articulate the universal
standard of progress is constituted through socialisation and an historical
rationalization process, and, in opposition to Hegel, that this is not a
teleological account of historical and personal development.103 However,
the question still remains whether a formal, dualistic, and negative
account of rational capacity and of equality can be given. If not, then
Marshall's social dimension cannot be excluded from an egalitarian
" Habermas, J., (1994) "Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again",
The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity. Tivelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence
(Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 289-90.
100 Ibid., pp. 285-6.
101 White, S., (1988) The recent work of Jurgen Habermas, p. 131.
102 Rasmussen, D., (1990) Reading Habermas, (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 94.
103 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2, p. 174.
commitment. Rather, normative commitments of rationality will be
substantive, the distinct forms of integration will only emerge within a
hermeneutic dimension, and the potential for advance will unfold with
tradition.
§4. Citizenship as a hermeneutical learning process.
In this section I argue that Habermas' suspicion, that reification or the
fragmentation of consciousness may be expressed in prejudicial
reflection, does not justify the claim that historically shared
presuppositions must be abstracted from in rational activities. Rather,
only a hermeneutic capacity can both critically assess accepted
presuppositions and understand and direct power relations and social
systems. Hermeneutics must therefore pursue the continued learning
process concerning how collective interventions can be justified and
identified with as legitimate. In this section I attempt to overcome
Habermas' objections to a hermeneutic citizenship. Habermas argues that
the rational reformulation of life-worlds can only have a normatively
negative justification. Only then will we avoid the culturally
conservative assumption that contextualist normative commitments are
justified by the necessity of our historical life-worlds. Habermas also
argues that the dualism of symbolic and material reproduction must be
acknowledged. It is only then that linguistic idealism will be avoided and
the concrete structure of society critically grasped. Finally, philosophical
statements must be formal, Habermas argues, if our account of the
substantive differences between historical life-worlds is not itself to be
relative to such life-worlds.
In opposition to Habermas, I argue that an historically embedded and
ethically committed rational capacity is comprehensive. Further, this
corresponds with Marshall's account of the valued practical capacity,
which is made possible only in relations of social equality and in the
active direction of collective intervention to bring this end about. I argue
in this section that Gadamer's hermeneutics can be applied to
reformulate social citizenship. This reformulation is itself a learning
process which is to ensure a rational and normative advance in the
justification of, and identification with, legitimate collective
interventions. I argue that Gadamer's concept of the "worldview" can
account for the nature of the practical rational capacity required here. For
Gadamer, a worldview is the horizon of a finite and intersubjective
capacity. The concept of a worldview is developed by Gadamer from a
critique of Edmund Husserl's formal and universalistic account of the
rational capacity which reformulates the life-world. It is to Gadamer's
discussion of Husserl that I turn first, as this offers a means to criticise
Habermas' formal, dual, and negative account of the life-world rational
potential. Gadamer's worldview concept can then be developed by
thematizing its material and structural requirements, necessities which
social equality will ensure.
4.1. Life-world and worldview horizons.
Gadamer argues that our rational capacity is the potential of a
substantive, comprehensive, and positive "worldview." Therefore, this
opposes Habermas' account of the formal, dual, and negative nature of
the rational capacity to reformulate the life-world. Gadamer derives the
concept of the worldview from his critique of Husserl's
phenomenological account of the ultimate grounding of the formal and
subjective rational capacity of the life-world. Unlike Husserl, Habermas
argues that the life-world capacity is always both intersubjective and
finitely grounded. However, the problematic nature of Habermas' formal,
dual, and negative account will be brought to light in Gadamer's
discussion of Husserl. Gadamer and Husserl both reject dualism and
argue that there is an original correspondence between subject and object
in all activities. They also agree that the non-arbitrary reformulation of
the life-world and the understanding of another life-world must have a
positive normative commitment. However, Gadamer also rejects
Husserl's formal account of a pre-linguistic and subjective grounding and
argues instead that the universal correspondence of subject and object
remains linguistic, intersubjective, and historically variable. For
Gadamer, there is a mutual dependence between historical languages and
the world which emerges in them, and between both and our
intersubjective, historically realised rational capacity.
Husserl argues that phenomenological reflection abstracts from the
"natural attitude" of taken for granted bases for justification, so as to
reflect upon why we relate to objects in the way we do. This abstraction is
made possible because objects already correspond with the intentional
structure of the Transcendental Ego of every subject. This correspondence
can be studied by analysing the subject's abstract meaning entities and its
acts of positing objects as real.104 The universal nature of the signification
process can then be made an object of reflection. This is significant as
reflection in the natural attitude is unable to identify those commitments
which result from, and perpetuate, a distortion of the universal structure
of all experience. Husserl argues that the central cause of such distortions
is modern science, and the one-sided view it perpetuates of the
domination of the objects of experience. As phenomenology abstracts
from this one-sidedness, it opens up the potential of a projection of
meaning which is free from distortion.105 The meanings of any life-world
can, therefore, be increasingly determined through this
phenomenological re-interpretation.106
Gadamer's criticism of Husserl centres on the fact that the self-
consciousness of the phenomenologist must itself be the result of the
historical linguistic life-world, its ontological commitments, and the way
in which it enables inter-subjectivity.107 Husserl, however, articulates the
life-world "solely in terms of the epistemological schema", as that which
can be derived from the "ultimate data of consciousness."108 Conferring
consciousness with the capacity to abstract from and re-appropriate the
historical life-world is a real paradox. Phenomenological reflection
thereby alienates what it itself sees as reason's constitutive ontological
commitment in language. This in turn deprives language of its
constitutive quality, as it reduces the language of historical life-worlds to
a set of tools or signs that can be freely taken up and just as freely set
aside.109 Finally, the phenomenological reduction also abstracts from the
intersubjective nature of the life-world in which we come to
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consciousness, and thus finds that it must establish the other person and
the collectivity anew as other Transcendental Egos. At the level of the
understanding pursued between cultures as well, phenomenology
abstracts from the way the "Thou" is already given linguistically.
Gadamer and Husserl both assume that an original correspondence
between the subject and object can be identified which is not dualistic but
holds in all rational activity. However, Husserl assumes that it is within
the Transcendental Ego of the subject that this correspondence is
identified, and so it holds regardless of our historically variable linguistic
experience. For this reason, it enables the attainment of a non-linguistic
basis for the ultimate grounding of our reflection concerning the
ontological commitments expressed in language. Gadamer criticises
Husserl, however, for giving a primacy to the knowing subject which
could only be justified if the true nature of our experience of the world
was not linguistic.110 This ignores the distinctiveness of the human
experience of "world" from the animal experience of "environment." For
humans, Gadamer argues, a speculative linguistic experience of world
cannot be overcome. The correspondence of subject and object is
therefore mediated continually through the worldview given us by
historical language. This is a mutual dependence of language and world,
and a dependence of both on our language-use. There would be no
language without "factualness", without this world which already
emerges in it, but this world in turn depends on that language for its
emergence in our use of words, in our understanding an experience "as-
something."111
There is no non-linguistic experiential basis for the knowledge which, in
turn, can provide the basis to freely redefine the words of our language to
indicate and point to the correct nature of our experience. Historical
languages cannot be treated by the phenomenologist as a system of signs
or as an aggregate of mere tools. We are prevented from doing this by the
fact that words have meanings only as parts in relation to the whole of an
historical language. The valid meaning of a word cannot, therefore, be
determined by separating it from its context, because in this word, or
110 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "The Phenomenological Movement", p. 171.
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"part", the "whole" of the historical language is already expressed.
Furthermore, our own analysis must continue to use the words of this
historical linguistic whole. As it must continue to be presupposed, the
phenomenologist cannot abstract from, so as to freely re-constitute, this
linguistic whole.112 Gadamer's argument reformulates Hegel's account of
speculative reason. For Hegel, through our finite rational capacity is
expressed the infinite 'whole' of the final synthesis of the rational and
the real attained in pure self-consciousness. For Gadamer, historical
language is the whole; an infinite, because open-ended, possibility of
meaning. It is continually mediated by individuals with a prejudicial
consciousness, individuals who must presuppose this whole as they
extend and refine it in their use of words.
The speculative nature of our linguistic experience not only brings the
world to understanding, but our intersubjectivity as well. Husserl's
phenomenological reduction, on the contrary, must attempt to establish
the other "Thou" and the collective "We" from within self-consciousness
only as other Transcendental Egos.113 For Husserl, we apprehend another
person first as an object of perception, and only then, through an
"empathy oriented to the interiority of self-consciousness", does this
object become a Transcendental Ego, another subject like me. For
Gadamer, this entails that the "immanent data of reflexively examined
consciousness do not include the 'Thou' in any immediate and primary
way" for Husserl.114 I argued in Chapter One Section 2.1., that the
prejudicial nature of reflection has a dialogical structure for Gadamer.
This entails that our constitutive experience is having being
differentiated as an addressee and as a respondent. It is therefore always as
a specific "Thou" that we can now address others. To understand another,
we must critically distinguish between our presuppositions, but we can
only do this from the prejudicial structure which enables our rationality
as such. We understand another from a worldview because we must
understand them as-something, but also because we can only
conceptualise a "Thou" from within a worldview.115
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Gadamer reformulates Hegel's speculative dialectic as a "circular" process
of returning to, and revising, our original assumptions of what would be
encountered in understanding. Therefore, the cultural objects of another
life-world can also only be understood by proceeding prejudicially. We
cannot, as Husserl claims, derive an ultimate grounding for our
knowledge here from the essential formal features of the processes of
handing down cultural objects in tradition.116 Rather, a supposedly
formal and pre-linguistic grounding for judgement will merely obscure
from view the continued effect of prejudice on our reflection. To
interpret another culture, reason must remain "committed" to its
worldview, to the extent that it must acknowledge its own prejudicial
nature. This entails also that it must accept that the validity of its
presuppositions will be consciously determined only in the dialogue
through which another worldview is to be understood. Our
understanding of what is to count as an advance in learning itself
emerges in the continued pursuit of a "fusion of horizons", which
characterises the process of learning itself.117 This is the pursuit of shared
presuppositions between factual, hermeneutically circular, and dialogical
worldviews. Through such a fusion of horizons the hermeneutic
dimension is built back up in new situations in all rational activities.
Gadamer's critique of Husserl also brings to light the problematic nature
of Habermas' formal, dual, and negative meta-theory. Habermas does
argue, in opposition to Husserl, that the individual's communicative
potential to symbolically reproduce the life-world is already present in
historical life-worlds. Habermas also rejects Husserl's project of a total
suspension of prejudice. He argues instead that it is possible to determine
the legitimacy of only certain shared meanings at any one time, and that
this occurs against the opaque background of the historical life-world.
This follows because the general structures of the life-world are
intersubjective. They are not given as necessary subjective conditions for
the experience of a concrete historical life-world.118 However, Habermas'
116 Husserl's arguments in The Origins of Geometry are discussed in: Kusch, M., (1989)
Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium, p. 122.
117 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 338-9.
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conception of the rational potential to reformulate the life-world is a
formally universalizable account of the potential of a formal faculty. It is
a rational potential which is only realised when reflection abstracts from
the world and intersubjectivity as they are given linguistically in the
historical plurality of life-worlds. Even though the suspension of
prejudices is achieved intersubjectively and finitely for Habermas, he will
still be unable to account for the continued historical belonging of
individuals in the life-worlds in which their rational potential emerges
linguistically.
Gadamer does accept Husserl's argument that a universal correspondence
of subject and object holds for all rational activities. It is on this basis that
the reformulation of presuppositions in the life-world can be pursued
with normative commitment. The world of scientific knowledge and
technical practices are therefore not dualistically separated from practical
reason. These worlds also become normatively problematic for both
authors when they infringe on the development of the universal rational
potential of actors, the Transcendental Ego of Husserl and the
hermeneutic insight of Gadamer. Where Gadamer departs from Husserl
is in arguing that this correspondence itself continues to emerge in
historical life-worlds, as do the bases for our normative commitment.
The dangers of the idealisation of scientific experience by the scientific
claim to universality cannot be overcome through a reflection which
relativises both the scientific and the non-scientific natural attitude.119
Husserl is therefore guilty of being overly pessimistic when he argues
that the rational capacity of everyday activities is unable to discern that
the scientific attitude is not in fact universal. Habermas, on the other
hand, is guilty of giving a dualistic account of the distinctions between
forms of rational activity in this everyday world. For Habermas, the
logocentrism of modern science and the colonization of the life-world by
systems result respectively from the claims of positivist science and
systemic imperatives to be universal, when in fact they are only one, but
one nonetheless, separate dimension of reality. Further, Habermas'
normative commitment to the project of modernity claims not to
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presuppose the ethos of any specific life-world, and so, as with Husserl,
will be unaware of its concealed prejudicial commitment. However,
Husserl also shows that the dualism Habermas' proposes is untenable
and, rather, that our normative commitments must be realised through
the direction we give to science, technology, power relations, and
relations of work. However, unlike Husserl, the normative commitment
with which the reformulation of presuppositions in all aspects of rational
activity can be pursued by hermeneutics must itself remain practically
derived. It cannot be given an ultimate grounding on presuppositions
which enable our abstraction from the linguisticality of historical
worldviews.
4.2. Learning through the historical project of social equality.
I argued in Section 2. that the reformulation of citizenship, which
Marshall calls for, can be continued by applying hermeneutic meta-
theoretical reflection in the project of social citizenship. A reformulated
social citizenship is to provide, in social equality, the bases for a rational
and normative advance in the legitimation of collective interventions.
From Husserl, we can see that this normatively committed project must
be pursued in all spheres of rational activity. However, it must also
proceed prejudicially, rather than from the pure self-consciousness of
Husserl's Transcendental Ego. From Habermas, we can see that the
legitimate collective intervention must arise from the identification
secured through relations of mutuality, so as to overcome crises in
integration. However, learning is not a formal, normatively negative,
and dualistic process. Rather, the hermeneutic dimension is
comprehensive, and so it is a prejudicial and open learning process
which must direct the technical aspects and the relations of power of the
State and market. This entails, however, that Gadamer's own meta-
theoretical reflection must proceed from such activity, so as to account for
how the State and the market are to be hermeneutically embedded.
Marshal can show that rational capacity must be established from within
these activities, due to their necessity for the social equality required for
practical excellence.
Habermas argues that a learning process must overcome both systemic
crises and the colonization of the life-world. For Habermas, the bases for
justification of learning are restricted by the universalizable conditions of
possibility for emancipation and enlightenment, which the process of
rationalization has determined. I argued in Section 4.1. that our
conditions of possibility emerge as a worldview. Therefore, the
appropriate bases for justification continue to unfold in tradition. This
entails that a substantive progress in our normative bases for justification
is possible and should be pursued. This takes us away from the
deontological basis of Habermas' formal and negative ethics, so as instead
to focus on the normative duties to enable the conditions of possibility of
a substantive and positively justified good life.120 Further, a substantive
progress of this sort must also be possible in the bases for justification of
the rational activity of, and our social theoretical knowledge of, the State
and market. The distinction of the life-world from systems cannot hold,
precisely because Habermas' arguments, and the findings of Kohlberg and
Elder which he invokes to support them, express unacknowledged
prejudices.121 Progress will only be possible for a rational capacity that
acknowledges and assesses the prejudices from which it proceeds.
Marshall describes the capacity which is to direct this learning process as
"professionalism." It is a cultural phenomenon, but it is both enabled by
class relations in the division of labour, and is itself a feature which
distinguishes social strata.122 As Esping-Andersen argues, the substance of
inequality continues to effect both the conditions of possibility for
rationality and the criteria with which to assess social functioning.
However, Marshall argues that the cultural nature of rationality gives it a
certain autonomy from the material relations in which it emerges.
However, although this capacity can only be secured when collective
intervention restricts class inequality, practical rationality cannot finally
abstract from the continued effects of power relations, whether in the
legitimation of collective interventions or in the status which is to be
enjoyed as social equality.123 For Gadamer, professionalism is the capacity
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to both rise above one's specific interests, and to be open to learn from
others about one's own presuppositions.124 However, Marshall shows
that practical capacity will only be enabled in relations of social equality by
the collective interventions of citizenship. To arrive at a basis for
justification in learning requires a shared status with a certain autonomy
from the factors which make it possible: the requirements of State and
market functioning, and relations of inequality.
For Marshall, the valued capacity is ensured in the interaction which
comes to a shared understanding of the "public interest" and the "social
efficiency" of State and market functioning. Social equality, measured in
terms of this capacity, is also both the goal which a socially efficient State
should pursue, and is itself realised in the productive practices of a
socially efficient market.125 As I argued in Chapter One, Gadamer's
concern has been to point out the dangers which features of collective
intervention pose for the hermeneutic capacity. However, for the
reformulation of social citizenship, collective intervention to ensure the
valued practical capacity as a measure of social equality is a necessary
feature of the hermeneutic rational capacity itself. Although strategic
interventions must not undermine the "effective reflection" of the
unfolding of tradition, social citizenship must mediate strategic and
technical criteria. Bureaucratic power and criteria of efficiency must not
replace the traditional bases of authority, but State services must be
directed by a professional understanding of social efficiency. And
although economic criteria of rationality and class relations must not
abrogate valued productive practices, collective intervention is to foster
the capacity which can attain the valued goals and appropriate insight of
practices within market and class relations.
The dimension which hermeneutic learning builds back up in all
rational activities is historical, as the revision of prejudices requires both
an understanding of tradition and of one's self as a member of it.126
Hermeneutic learning must also guide the scientific analysis of social
functioning. As Imre Lakatos argues, each science decides what "hard
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core" of presuppositions cannot be falsified by evidence, and so it is with
hindsight alone that the better theory falsifies the previous theory, and
what it took to be unproblematic background knowledge.127
Hermeneutics shows us, however, that science must proceed from within
a worldview.128 The presuppositions of justification of a science's "hard
core" can only be assessed within the historical language which provides
the medium for all traditionally meaningful assumptions concerning the
nature of the world and our reasoning. This does not reduce science to a
linguistically ideal basis. Rather, as Gadamer's critique of Husserl shows,
language and world are mutually reliant. The factualness of material and
structural objects of analysis must always emerge in language.
Hermeneutics therefore calls for a learning process within science
concerning its prejudicial direction.129 For instance, the sciences which
Habermas reconstructs must acknowledge that their conceptions of moral
or linguistic development are historically motivated, and can be
substantively improved upon.
Social science can only analyse the world of power, class, and social
systems in the way in which their factualness is given in language.
Therefore, scientific knowledge of objects is never achieved by abstracting
from historically shared presuppositions and experiences. Hermeneutic
science will conceive of material needs and relations from a prejudicial
perspective and in terms of the potential of humans for prejudicial
understanding. However, hermeneutics must be consistent concerning
the mutual dependence of language and world, the dependence of
language on the world which emerges in it. It must acknowledge the
significance of the fact that the world studied in social science is brought
to language, that the linguistic medium of tradition will be altered as a
result. Gadamer argues that social systems and relations of power and
technology are the "dependencies" which compound tradition, and are
part of the "concrete" features which go to determine the
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"conditionedness" of our insight.130 However, unlike Gadamer, I argue
that the study of social functioning, and the integratory process itself of
the State and market, must be given a positive significance for our
capacity. Hermeneutic science must account for the progress of a tradition
to which it belongs along with the hermeneutically mediated material
and interactive relations it studies.
I argued in Chapter One that changed circumstances entail that some of
Marshall's proposals concerning a practical capacity must be
reformulated. Further, the hermeneutic account of learning will indicate
how this reformulation can ensure the practical and interactive
requirements of a valued capacity. First, Marshall argues that only a
"semi-professional" status could be achieved in largely functional
occupations.131 Second, Marshall argues that the relations in an organised
professional practice are such that the authority of a professional can
preside over the ignorance of a client.132 Third, Marshall assumed that a
"national heritage" must be shared in social equality.133 Fourth, although
Marshall conceives of parenting as a practice of socially expected
behaviour within status differentiations, he does not go on to conceive of
it as a professional practice.134 In Chapters Three and Four, I argue, first,
that social efficiency requires the pursuit of professionalism equally as a
measure of social equality; second, that just power relations must also be
those of mutual learning; third, that mutual learning between cultures
must also be pursued; and fourth, that in recognising the professional
value of practices such as parenting the material and cultural features of
unjust power relations can be overcome.
For hermeneutics, the valued capacity can only emerge through mutual
learning, both in practices where an authoritative insight is developed,
and in the mutual relations between practices. I argued in Section 2.1. that
Gadamer reformulates Hegel's dialectic as an open-ended learning
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process. However, Gadamer does so without giving a positive
significance in this dialectic to Hegel's concern, namely: that collective
intervention is necessary to ensure the capacity realised both in central
life activities and in relations of solidarity.135 When Gadamer's
hermeneutic account of the nature of justification is reconnected to the
Hegelian theme the reformulation of social citizenship can be pursued as
an open-ended dialectic. From a substantive, comprehensive, and
positive basis it will pursue the collective intervention to enable the
capacity realised in the good life, one's central life activity, and in the
mutual recognition of social equality, the relations of solidarity. This
open-ended dialectic is substantive, and open to otherness; it is
comprehensive, and accounts for the material requirements of
rationality; and it is positive; and committed to mutual learning. As
Gadamer argues, the "freedom of all" is the goal and normative
commitment of modernity which can not now be reneged on, but one
also about which we can not cease to learn.136
Conclusion.
I have argued that social citizenship is not justified teleologically but
rather through an open learning process within tradition, concerning the
application of its principles and forms of rational activity in the present.
Further, the legitimate collective intervention of social citizenship is to
ensure the status of social equality. It is also in this status that the practical
excellence required for the legitimation of social citizenship can be
enabled. The required equal status cannot be ensured in an
enlightenment sphere of de-commodification which is distinct from the
market, as Esping-Andersen argues. Nor can egalitarian intervention be
legitimated from within Habermas' account of the formal, dualistic, and
negative potential and limitations of life-world integration. Rather, the
insight required for legitimation is realised in all spheres, on the
historical basis of a shared tradition, and with a positive commitment to
pursue the good life. In turn, the State and market can be said to
"function" to the extent that this valued capacity is realised here equally.
Further, for both Marshall and Gadamer, this capacity must be realised in
relations of mutuality where, in Gadamer's terms, mutual learning is
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pursued. The mutuality required by a hermeneutic social citizenship will
be discussed in Chapter Four, in terms of relations of mutual recognition,
and in Chapter Three, in terms of the good life of practical excellence
achieved through mutual learning.
I argue in Chapter Three that the normative commitment to enable
rational capacity as the good life must be a commitment to enable it
equally in relations of mutual learning. While Marshall's proposals fall
short of this goal, I argue that the concept of social equality can be
reconceived, and therefore retained, by hermeneutics. Chapter Three will
develop this position with the help of Emile Durkheim's arguments and
in contrast with two distinct enlightenment conceptions of the goal of
distributive justice. John Rawls' account of the primary goods which can
be distributed as an ethically neutral right to all will be discussed. In
Rawls we can still see Habermas' commitment to a conception of the
rational action of the good life which is normatively justified in a
negative way and which, because of this, can be prescribed as the
universally formal account of all rationality. By contrast, Martha
Nussbaum has formulated an enlightenment account of the rational
capacity of the good life which is not formalistic, negative, or dualistic.
Nussbaum rather argues that our rational capacity, developed as
capabilities, itself is always normatively motivated by a positive
contextually derived commitment. While agreeing with Nussbaum in
her rejection of the formal, dual, and negative conception of rational
capacity, I argue that human capabilities must be reconceived from
within conservative meta-theory if they are to be enabled equally.
Chapter Three: The Good Life of Practical Capability.
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Introduction.
In Chapter Two I argued that hermeneutic and enlightenment positions
will give different accounts of how the goals of citizenship are to be
legitimated. However, these positions can agree that the legitimate goal of
collective intervention is to ensure that the fundamental needs of
individuals are satisfied so that their rational capacity can be developed in
full. They can agree that citizenship is to enable the good life of citizens.
In agreeing that the goal of collective intervention is to ensure the good
life, they share certain assumptions about the nature of justification in
the pursuit of the good life and the legitimation of collective
intervention. They agree that the good life is neither self-sufficient nor a-
social in nature, but requires social resources enjoyed only in a
community and through its interventions of social justice. The rational
capacity both to pursue the good life and to legitimate these collective
interventions of social justice relies on the satisfaction of fundamental
needs and the enjoyment of social resources. However, for the
enlightenment, these are the requirements which secure the capacity of
the individual's power of reason in itself. By contrast, for hermeneutics,
they secure the capacity whose nature cannot be separated from the
practices in which it emerges as individual excellence. In this chapter I
explore the nature and significance of this crucial contrast.
In this chapter I defend Marshall's argument that the goal of social
citizenship is to ensure the good life, both by meeting fundamental needs
and by enabling a practical capacity which is realised only in relations of
social equality. I also argue that, as Marshall proceeds from a meta-theory
which corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics, he assumes that his
specific proposals for social citizenship would have to be revised in new
circumstances. Further, I argue that hermeneutics will identify what
features of Marshall's account are problematic, and how they can be
reformulated. In applying hermeneutics to the concerns of social
citizenship, Gadamer's conception of rational capacity can again be
distinguished from an authoritarian, ethnocentric, atavistic, and
linguistically ideal conservatism. I argue that a hermeneutic social
citizenship will enable diverse conceptions of the good life as processes of
mutual learning, and that it will eliminate the suffering which affects our
fundamental needs. This chapter also explores the relation between
enlightenment meta-theory and substantive theories, in particular in the
work of Martha Nussbaum. From Nussbaum, I derive an account of the
practical capabilities of the good life. However, unlike Nussbaum, I argue
that capabilities are hermeneutically embedded, and will only be realised
within practical relations of social equality.
In this chapter I argue that the good life which can be enabled equally, and
whose insight can legitimate the rights of social justice, is the
hermeneutic conception of the historically embedded and ethically
justified rational capacity. In Section 1. I briefly introduce Marshall's
conception of an authoritative practical insight realised in relations of
social equality, and Gadamer's hermeneutic conception of an Aristotelian
good life realised in relations of mutual learning. I also discuss John
Rawls' enlightenment position. Rawls offers, from within the
enlightenment, an alternative to Habermas' dualistic concern with the
life-world. However, Rawls' position is still problematic. He argues that
the rational capacity of social justice and of our good life has a formally
subjective and negative nature. Rawls assumes that the insight of any
subject in the "original position", where knowledge of, and interests in,
one's own good life are abstracted from, will identify the legitimate
collective intervention. Further, to be legitimate, collective intervention
must be composed of the impartial rights which ensure the resources
required for the pursuit of any and all conceptions of the good life. I argue
instead that historically variable and ethically significant intersubjective
conditions must be given a positive role, both in the enablement of the
good life and in the rational assessment of collective interventions of
citizenship.
In Section 2. I discuss Martha Nussbaum's conception of social democracy
which, although it is based on an Aristotelian conception of the good life,
proceeds from an enlightenment meta-theory. For Nussbaum, the
rational capacity of the good life is developed within valued activities
where fundamental needs are met and practical capabilities are enabled. It
is this capacity which can, in turn, identify with the legitimate
intervention to enable the good life as a right of social democracy. For
Nussbaum, the good life has a substantive, comprehensive, and positive
nature. An emotive and practical rational capacity is to be enabled in all
aspects of rational activities. Further, the good life is not the possibility of
a formal power of rationality, but an emotionally discerning and
practically embedded rational capacity. It is also always developed as a
positive form of evaluation. This is the evaluation which is directed
outwards towards what is desired, towards external objects which satisfy
the needs of a good life, and towards practical activities in which rational
capabilities can be developed. However, Nussbaum remains within
enlightenment meta-theory, and so assumes that an historically
embedded shared understanding of the good life is not possible. Rather,
she argues that the separateness and vulnerability of the individual's
good life, which follows from its emotive and practical characteristics, has
a context-specific nature, and so will only be understood through an
empathetic identification.
In the third section I argue that, for Nussbaum, a hermeneutic social
citizenship must be rejected, as it does not conceive of the individual, in
its practical and emotive separateness, as analytically and normatively
prior to practice. For Nussbaum, it will lead to an intellectually justified
normalisation of the subordinate, an idealist concern with meaning
rather than with the seriousness of suffering, and a contextualist,
condescending response to the diversity of the good life and the
seriousness of suffering. I also argue that similar shortcomings can be
identified in Marshall's specific proposals concerning the good life of
professionalism: as he assumed that authority was enabled only in a
shared national heritage and in deferential relations, and that it could not
be enabled in full in all practices. However, I argue that what this
indicates is that the hermeneutic account of the necessity of mutual
learning for the good life must be followed more consistently in the
reformulation of social citizenship. Further, although Nussbaum's
account of capabilities indicates the significance of emotive and embodied
requirements for the good life, and the possibility of practical excellence
in all valuable activities, I argue that capability must be conceived as
hermeneutically mediated and must be realised from within the practical
relations which enable individual separateness.
In Section 4. I propose a hermeneutic alternative to Nussbaum's
enlightenment Aristotelian Social Democracy. As Nussbaum argues, the
good life is the rational capacity which is dependent on the practical
constitution and satisfaction of certain fundamental needs. It is also the
capacity whose insight is enabled in practices. This capacity is only
fostered in specific activities but is also always developed in all spheres
and as a positive form of evaluation. The good life is, therefore,
substantive, comprehensive, and positive. However, Nussbaum's
enlightenment position must be criticised for being unable to provide a
shared understanding of the value of a good life and, therefore, of the
nature and normative significance of the satisfaction of human needs.
For hermeneutics, the good life remains embedded within an historical
medium where a shared understanding of its requirements must always
be actively pursued. This will always be a prejudicial understanding, but
one which is open to reformulation where the good life is enabled in
relations of mutual learning. As the hermeneutic experience of art
shows, such relations of historically embedded mutual learning are
possible within partly autonomous practices, where the requirements can
be ensured for the capability of practical excellence, the "authoritative"
capacity of Marshall's "professional."
§1. Human needs and the good life of rational capacity.
In this section I introduce the argument that a legitimate collective
intervention of citizenship must enable the good life. The good life is the
rational capacity which can both be enabled as a right of social justice and
can, in turn, identify with this collective intervention as legitimate. In
this section I introduce briefly how this argument will be developed by
conservative meta-theory, both in Marshall's account of a professional
capacity realised in relations of social equality, and in Gadamer's account
of an Aristotelian good life realised in relations of open-ended mutual
learning. I then turn to the enlightenment development of this
argument, and focus on John Rawls' account. For Rawls, the good life is
the rational capacity which must be enabled in all spheres of life and
which the State as a collective agent is to enable. Therefore, Rawls'
position does not share Habermas' dualistic distinction of systemic
considerations and activity from a life-world sphere, where alone the
rights of social justice can be enjoyed and legitimated. However, Rawls'
position will reject both social citizenship and hermeneutic meta-theory.
He argues that, if the satisfaction of humans needs is to be an
unconditional right, then collective intervention must enable a formal,
subjective, and negative conception of the good life.
1.1. The good life as the rational capacity of citizenship.
The hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship will be legitimated
by, and will seek to enable, the insight of a practically derived rational
capacity. I argue that Marshall's conception of the good life, as a practical
capacity realised in relations of social equality, can be reformulated by
following Gadamer's reading of the Aristotelian good life, in which the
practical reason of "phronesis" is fostered.1 For Gadamer, human needs
must be conceptualised in terms of a practically realised good life.
However, unlike Aristotle, for Gadamer, the good life is a potential rather
than a necessity of our rational capacity. It is also a potential whose
content is not pre-determined, but continues to develop as part of a
practical and mutual learning process. Therefore, the rights of a
hermeneutic social citizenship must prejudicially presuppose how the
satisfaction of needs will enable the good life. However, this intervention
will only be justified and identified with through the continued pursuit
of an historically embedded mutual learning process which it enables as
the good life.
I argue that the hermeneutic learning process, in which the good life is
enabled, and from which it can be known, will only be secured in
relations of social equality. For Marshall, social equality can only be
ensured by limiting class inequality, so as both to extend the area of
common culture and enrich the universal status of citizenship. However,
class and status stratification also enable the emergence of valued
productive practices in the division of labour. Therefore, relations of
inequality can never finally be excluded from the practices in which the
valued capacity can be enabled. Marshall uses the concept of
"professionalism" as a generic term for the valued capacity enabled in
productive practices. It is also used to refer to the specialised practices
which deliver essential services such as education and health care. The
1 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 307 ff..
rights of social citizenship must enable the good life of practices. They
therefore must enable professionalism in the generic sense, as is the case
with the "professionalisation" of practices which previously did not
attain this standard. Further, through the "socialisation" of the
professions within a universal welfare State, essential services can be
delivered to "clients" as "citizens." In both instances, a shared status of
social equality is to be attained, and will enable the pursuit a shared
understanding of the nature of, and requirements for, the good life.2
For both Gadamer and Marshall, the rational capacity of the good life is
that which is enabled, both according to the considerations which are
appropriate to a specific community, and according to what are
considered here the possibilities for a life of excellence. The hermeneutic
account of the good life of social citizenship must be defended against the
enlightenment objections to it. The enlightenment positions I discuss in
this chapter also argue that social justice is to enable the good life of a
rational capacity. They do not reject the concept of the good life as such,
but the hermeneutic version being proposed here. The issue is not
whether normative rights can be derived from either consequentialist
calculations of the good they bring about or communitarian
commitments to a collectivity as a good. The discussion here assumes
instead that the legitimacy of rights depends to some extent, but not
exclusively, on their effects on the good life. At the same time, the
enlightenment critique of hermeneutics will turn on an opposing
account of how a life led in community is necessary for the good life. For
the enlightenment, it is the power of reason in itself which elicits our
respect in communal interaction. The considerations which are
appropriate to distinguish a good life must express the equal respect due
to each instance of it, independently of our own communally specific
conception of practical excellence.
The concept of the good life can incorporate Habermas' formal, dualistic,
and negative conception of emancipation and enlightenment. For
Habermas, as we saw in the last two chapters, this is the potential for
communicative action. A formal account can be given of the
2 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", pp. 163-4.
intersubjective and material requirements for this capacity. These are the
requirements which ensure that each individual can participate as an
equal within the ideal speech situation so as, in turn, to legitimate rights
which ensure the material and intersubjective requirements for the good
life of all. However, the enablement of our rational capacity must,
Habermas argues, only occur in the life-world interaction of
communication. The material reproduction achieved through systemic
integration is a necessary requirement for our capacity, but is antithetical
to the good life as such. Life-world interaction must be protected from
systemic encroachment, and so the legitimation of collective
intervention can not be determined systemically, whether with
considerations of efficiency or through relations of power inequality. The
normative justification of the satisfaction of human needs excludes these
considerations. Further, the capacity of communicative action which is to
be enabled, is the ability to legitimate intervention without presupposing
a positive commitment to the valued ends of life derived from one's
own interests or community belonging.
This chapter will explore the enlightenment position further through the
conceptions of social justice and the good life which John Rawls and
Martha Nussbaum propose. Rawls and Nussbaum give a non-dualistic
account of both the nature of need and the means to overcome
deprivation. However, the enlightenment characteristics which
Nussbaum and Rawls share with Habermas must, I argue, also be
overcome. The enlightenment assumes that the presuppositions of
justification are not those of a shared tradition, and so can not be made
commensurable at the level of justification. I argue that, as they do not
proceed from a shared basis of understanding, the enlightenment
positions are unable to account for the value of the good life and, where it
is absent, the seriousness of human suffering. However, within the
enlightenment position, we can make some important distinctions. From
Rawls, we can see that a comprehensive account of the good life should
be adopted over Habermas' dualism. However, Rawls must also be
criticised for paying too little attention to the intersubjective conditions of
the good life. Further, Nussbaum's account will be of special interest as it
is neither formal, dualistic, nor negative. In Section 2. I return to
Nussbaum's practically embedded, emotive, and positive account of
"capabilities." Before that, I discuss John Rawls' comprehensively realised
subjective and formal good life.
1.2. John Rawls' formal, subjective, and
negative rational capacity.
I turn now to discuss John Rawls' enlightenment account of social justice
and the good life.3 For Rawls, the human characteristic expressed in the
good life is the power of reason in itself. It is the ability to abstract from
shared historical presuppositions in rational activity generally, and in the
pursuit of the good life specifically. Therefore, an account of how the
satisfaction of need also enables this rational capacity must itself be
formulated independently of historically variable presuppositions
concerning the good life. It is only then that it will be universalizable. For
Rawls, this is also the account of the good life which any person would
give. Any account which rests on an assumed authority of insight into
the nature of need will, in fact, only express the partial interests of some
in the attainment of their own valued aims.
As is the case with Habermas' conception of emancipation and
enlightenment, Rawls' conception of the good life claims to be a formal
and negative account of our rational capacity. However, Habermas goes
on to argue that unconditional rights of social justice will be identified
with as legitimate by the rational capacity which they enable only if they
respect the dualism of integration. By contrast, Rawls attempts to give a
non-dualistic enlightenment account of the unconditional rights of social
justice, and of the rational capacity they are to enable. Rawls argues that
distributive rights can only satisfy the needs of the good life equally when
they attempt to enable the formal, subjective, and negative characteristics
of our rational capacity which can be known universally. Unconditional
rights of social justice will also only be identified with as legitimate
through a normative reflection which itself is formal, subjective, and
negative. The good life is the rational capacity which can be achieved in
all aspects of social relations. It can be known regardless of social relations
because of its formal, subjective, and negative nature.
3 Rawls, J., (1971) A Theory of Justice. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Rawls argues that a valid conception of the good life must be formal, and
must be known subjectively, and independently of any positive
commitments to the good life. It will be arrived at only through a
complete reflective abstraction from both the ethical and strategic
considerations of practice. An account of the resources any one
individual would need to pursue any conception of the good life can then
be given. These "primary goods" will satisfy the needs of all individuals.
They are the equally distributed goods of liberty and opportunity, income
and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.4 They embody the self-
interest of each and every individual to be able to pursue their own
conception of the good life.5 From this subjectively known interest, a
negative justification of social justice can be derived. The unconditional
rights which ensure that each citizen can enjoy such resources will
embody the principle of fairness, as they enable the good life regardless of
its content.6 The rights which ensure these goods for each individual's
needs will then also be identified with as the legitimate rights of
distribution by each individual, regardless of their own conception of the
good life.7 As the requirements for each individual's rational capacity are
neither practically nor ethically determined, then nor can the rational re¬
organisation of social relations demanded by justice be limited by
considerations arising from practical interests and the practically justified
value of their attainment.
The good life will only be pursued by using social goods in social
interaction, and principles of social justice will be fair only if they enable
individuals with divergent conceptions of the good life to live in
community together. Nevertheless, Rawls excludes all historically and
socially variable presuppositions from what can count as normative
considerations. For Rawls, our rational capacity is subjective, to the extent
that it does not rely in any fundamental way on intersubjective relations.
It is also formal, to the extent that it is defined by the ability to abstract
completely from the presuppositions of historical situations. We cannot
abstract from the principles of equality and liberty in normative
4 Ibid., p. 63, pp. 424-5.
5 Ibid., p. 397.
6 Ibid., pp. 30-1.
7 Ibid., p. 5.
reflection, but we must abstract from our positive commitment to our
own conception of the good life. This is achieved in Rawls' hypothetical
"original position." It is here that, as rational agents, we can throw a "veil
of ignorance" over the ends which we do value, and the goods needed to
achieve them. From our self-interest in ensuring our own good life,
whose content we do not know, we will identify the formal and negative
requirements both of any good life and of a fair distribution of needed
resources.8
The formal nature of the good life which is identified in the original
position is the rational capacity to plan one's own life. It is the capacity to
plan so as to ensure one's continued capacity to freely pursue the good
life. It is also the capacity to secure the life which is judged to be good
according to one's own subjectively derived criteria of value. The capacity
to plan a life does entail the ability to make means-end calculations with
the information available of how best to achieve one's own valued ends.9
However, it is also the ability to give priority to those objectives which
will help secure one's more significant ends. Rawls argues that the
significance of an end is determined by the extent of its generality and
permanence, while the most general and permanent of all ends is that
which enables one to plan and pursue the good life.10 The plan of a good
life will therefore give priority to those objectives which ensure that the
primary goods necessary for any good life will still be available to the
individual in the future.
From his account of the primary goods which all individuals do need,
Rawls formulates an index of well-being to measure inequality.11 An
account can then be given of the situations of greatest need, where the
enjoyment of primary goods will have the greatest normative
significance. It does not require the authoritative insight of Marshall's
"professional" to determine in each instance what needs must be satisfied
to enable the appropriate good life. However, Rawls does place
expectations on how the primary goods which can enable his conception
8 Ibid., pp. 136-142.
9 Ibid., pp. 411-2.
10 Ibid., p. 410, 423.
11 Ibid., pp. 90-2.
of the good life are to be deployed. The good life must pursue what it is
rational for the individual to find valuable, given their specific situation
and nature. It must also be planned rationally, so as to ensure that a life
remains open to the pursuit of new aims. However, Rawls' concern here
is not to determine how to enable the insight which is considered of
value in any specific practice. Rather, for Rawls, the abilities to evaluate
and to plan a good life are formal and negative powers of each subject's
rationality. Neither our knowledge of what any other individual does
need, nor of what we would need in our life, are justified with criteria
which only the valued insight of a specific practice can identify. These are,
rather, the judgements which any one individual could make, but they
will only be made and acted on when resources are first distributed fairly.
The universal account of our rational capacity must not presuppose a
positive commitment to specific conceptions of the good life. It is possible
to specify why a life could be good, and should be enabled, without also
presupposing value commitments which will not be appropriate in every
life. Rawls argues that we can know that another life is good when it
fulfils the formal and subjective requirements of all good lives. Rawls
adapts the Aristotelian argument that, as one's happiness is increased by
attaining standards of excellence in action, one feels compelled to develop
further these valued practical capabilities.12 For Rawls, the modern
application of this principle must acknowledge that it is rational only to
adopt standards of excellence which enable the development of
capabilities which best express one's specificity. However, Rawls argues
that his conception of the good life, and his account of the intervention to
enable it, are still valid where the Aristotelian disposition is absent. For
Rawls, a life is good if it is rationally planned. It can also be rationally
planned even when an individual does not pursue activities that grow
ever more complex and develop our capabilities. For instance, for
someone who takes great pleasure in counting blades of grass, the good
life will be planned so as to secure this end.13
12 Ibid.,pp. 426-430, pp. 440-445.
13 Ibid., p. 432, p. 441.
Irrespective of the possible example of the individual to whom the
Aristotelian principle does not apply, intersubjective relations and value
commitments have no fundamental significance here for the evaluation
of our rational capacity. An obligation to treat another life with equal
respect is legitimated independently of our social understandings of its
worth. This individual is also correct to feel a sense of self-respect solely
because a plan is possible and worthwhile according to formal and
subjective criteria.14 It is the "social bases of self-respect", rather than the
capacity of self respect itself, which can be distributed as a right.
Nevertheless, the individual rightly feels a sense of self-respect in the
socially defined condition of self-reliance, as it is here that the individual
still has access to the primary goods required for any good life.15 It is not,
for Rawls, that the nature of our rational capacity is determined by the
intersubjective relations and values of a practice. Rather, it is that, within
our mutual dependency, we want others to have the Kantian
characteristics of moral autonomy, and it is these which primary goods
can enable.16 The fair rights of justice will be identified as legitimate from
the rational capacity which they enable, and this capacity is enabled when
it both ensures its own self-respect and social-respect and confers respect
on others when appropriate.
Rawls will reject Marshall's and Gadamer's conception of the good life.
For Rawls, the good life is not a practically embedded capacity which rises
to, and is enabled by, an authoritative insight. The characteristics of the
good life can not be specified as that which is an achievement, and
according to the members of a specific community, as this would of
necessity be an exclusive category. Rather, the characteristics to be enabled
as a right must also be the universal characteristics which each has a
deontological duty to ensure for others.17 Primary goods will be
distributed to all equally without assessing the value of the life they are to
enable. On the other hand, Rawls does not assume Habermas' dualistic
14 Ibid., pp. 440-1.
15 As Sen has argued, Rawls does not maintain a clear distinction between "self respect"
and "the social bases of self respect." Sen's argument is that Rawls must attempt to justify
negatively, as a social basis, or primary good, what is in fact a positive capability, the
capacity entailed in self-respect: Sen, A., (1985) "Rights and Capabilities", p. 142.
16 Rawls, J., (1972) A Theory of Justice, p. 445.
17 Ibid., p. 30.
limitation of normative considerations. The universal account of the
goods which are needed for the rational capacity of each individual can
therefore provide a normative standard with which to judge the market
and the State. These forms of integration will be justified only to the
extent that this distribution is ensured here, and is determined by
normative considerations alone.18 However, Rawls has attained this
critical standard of social justice only by jettisoning the social and political
concerns which, as Habermas rightly points out, are necessary for a truly
critical insight. We should, rather, acknowledge with Habermas that
legitimate projects of social justice cannot be identified with
independently of the intersubjective relations of an historical life-world.
Habermas argues that the formal requirement of universalizability
cannot by itself justify rights which reflect the general interest. Rawls'
account of the reflection of the original position must, therefore, be
reconstituted as an actual discourse.19 As rights must be agreed to in
relations between individuals, the different substantive interests which
individuals actually have must be taken into consideration. The technical
conditions and power relations between individuals must also be such as
to enable our rational capacity. It is only then that legitimate rights of
social justice will be identified with by the reflection of the good life they
enable. Rawls' subjective position must be rejected therefore. Instead we
must account for the intersubjective nature both of our rational capacity
and of our understanding of this capacity and its needs. However,
Habermas' formal, dualistic account of the nature of intersubjectivity also
fails, as I argued in Chapter Two Section 4.2.. It cannot account for the
historical and traditional nature of intersubjectivity and, as a result, for
the positive and non-dualistic nature of our rational capacity. However, a
non-formal, non-dualistic, and positive account of our rational capacity
can also come from an enlightenment position. Yet, as it will not
conceive of practical intersubjectivity as traditional and historical, it will
remain distinct from hermeneutics.
18 Ibid., p. 7, pp. 265-284.
19 Habermas, J., (1990) "Morality and Ethical Life", p. 322.
§2. Martha Nussbaum: generous reading of capabilities.
Martha Nussbaum's enlightenment account of rational capacity and
social justice is neither formal, dualistic, nor negative. Nussbaum also
argues that her account can provide the required intersubjective basis for
Rawls' theory of justice. Nussbaum rejects the formal account of rational
capacity, and argues that it arbitrarily excludes the emotive and practical
aspect of capabilities. Nussbaum also argues that, whether or not it is
dualistic, a formal account will be unable to identify and overcome the
conditions which undermine the good life. The nature and causes of
suffering must be identified in the emotive characteristics of our practical
activity in all spheres. Nussbaum's conception of capabilities is also
positive, as the discernment of what is of value to the good life is a
necessary aspect of rationality. Nussbaum argues that, on this practical
and emotive basis for understanding, the collective intervention which
takes the form of rights to the resources needed for the good life can be
legitimated. The situation of suffering can be understood, and our
normative obligations to enable the good life can be legitimated, only by
the empathetic identification, which is made possible by the context-
specific nature of our capability, and which accounts for the context-
specific nature of the requirements for this other good life.
Nussbaum will take us some way to the hermeneutic conception of the
rational capacity which is both the goal of social justice and the insight
which legitimates collective intervention. As with Gadamer, the
experience of art indicates for Nussbaum that the nature of rational
capacity is substantive, comprehensive, and positive. However, from her
enlightenment meta-theory, Nussbaum assumes that rational activities
can be assessed according to the universal requirements for the power of
reason. The practical needs of another person can only be understood at
the level of translation. As they are also emotive in nature this entails,
for Nussbaum, that they can only be understood empathetically. As I will
argue in Section 3., Nussbaum would reject the hermeneutic
reformulation of social citizenship. She will reject the hermeneutic
conception of a shared authoritative insight as both an idealist concern
with cultural meaning, over that of the pre-cultural requirements for
capability, and as an illegitimate reduction of the presuppositions of
justification to those of an intellectual and traditional rational capacity,
over that of the emotive capacity to empathise with others. For
Nussbaum, hermeneutics will always proceed with an unacknowledged
idealist interest in a reductive conception of the good life.
2.1. The fragile good life of capabilities.
Nussbaum's critique of formalism can be discussed first. For the formal
account, the good life is a condition of rational self-sufficiency. It argues
that the attempt to derive presuppositions of justification from practical
activities will undermine this self-sufficiency. In such a condition, our
rational capacity is made vulnerable to contingent practical changes.
These changes will not only destroy the external objects which are
considered to be a part of the goodness of a life, but they will also disrupt
what is taken as the source of rational certainty. The formal account
argues that a dependent and vulnerable life cannot be distinguished from
one which is heteronomous and normalised. In the formally conceived
good life, individuals accept responsibility for their own criteria of value
and place value either alone in their internal experiences or else in
external goods whose availability they can rationally control.20 Rawls
does assume that the good life will only be enabled by social resources,
and that just relations are those which enable the pursuit of divergent
conceptions of the good life in a community. However, Nussbaum sees
the formalist assumption of self-sufficiency in Rawls' account of the
subjective power of reflection in the original position, where all
practically and emotively related concerns are excluded from what can
count as a normative consideration.21
Nussbaum argues instead that our rational capacity itself can only be
developed in interaction with others. For that reason, it remains
211 Nussbaum, M., (1995) "Emotions and Women's Capabilities", in Women, Culture and
Development. A Study of Human Capabilities, ed. Martha Nussbaum & Johnathon Glover
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 367.
21 Nussbaum has altered some aspects of her position since her discussion of Rawls in:
Nussbaum, M, (1980) "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity", in Essays on Aristotle's
Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (London: University of California Press), pp. 400-4;
(1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", in Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglas,
et al., (London: Routledge), pp. 209-13. She now distinguishes Rawls' liberal theory of
justice from his formal and subjective conception of the good life. She argues that a non-
formal conception of the good life of each person can be achieved with his redistributive
theory: Nussbaum, M., (1999) "The Feminist Critique of Liberalism", in Sex and Social
Justice (Oxford University Press), pp. 65-70.
necessarily dependent on what is external as a source both of valued
things and of the capacity to value. It is, therefore, only right to value
practical activity, both as a necessary aspect of the goodness of a life and as
a source of criteria of goodness.22 Nussbaum points to the differences
between Plato and Aristotle on this question, so as to take up an
Aristotelian alternative to formalism.23 For Plato, the good man cannot
be harmed, as the goodness of his life is determined from within his soul,
which itself is inviolable. In contrast, Aristotle argues that the
psychological and social aspects of practical activity are of fundamental
significance to the goodness of a life. The good characteristics of a life and
our understanding of goodness are dependent on the necessity of practical
life. They are, as a result, also vulnerable to the disruptions to practical
life.
Nussbaum argues that the good life cannot be formal, but is the potential
to arrive at what Aristotle called well-being. Well-being is the ethically
valued condition which can be achieved for the rational capacity which
always proceeds from within the "appearances." The appearances are the
ways in which experiences have entered into language as belief. They are
also the only way experiences can continue to enter a language, as they
provide the necessary means by which we can see or "take" the world.
We must always proceed from, so as to revise, or "save", or "order", the
shared beliefs and criteria of our appearances. Within the appearances we
must distinguish between shared beliefs and the "basic" ways we
empirically observe and conceptualise the world. However, although
these appearances are more "basic", or significant, they still do not
constitute what Plato considered to be a formal knowledge of what is real
against which "mere" appearances are contrasted.24 They do, however,
enable us to come to a rational agreement between cultures. This cross-
22 Nussbaum, M., (1995) "Emotions and Women's Capabilities", p. 376 ff.
23 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philsophy (Cambridge University Press), Ch.'s 8, 9, 10.
24 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 247-9. In Nussbaum's more recent
work she argues that Socratic self-examination and logical argument must provide the
basis to assess the shared beliefs of a community. Nussbaum's focus has not turned away
completely from Aristotelian ethics in her later work, as the Socratic logical self-
examination she describes plays the same role as her earlier account of the "basic"
Aristotelian appearances: Nussbaum, M., (1997) Cultivating Humanity. A Classic Defence
of Reform in Liberal Education (London: Harvard University Press), pp. 15-51.
cultural "saving of appearances" will have the greatest significance for
our understanding of the nature of the good life, as it will attempt to
account for the well-being of all humans.25
Nussbaum argues that Aristotle's account of reasoned-desire, or
"prohairesis", is both the capacity to pursue the good life and the capacity
more generally to save the appearances. It is the rational desire for
external sources of value, which accounts both for the nature of human
need and for how the satisfaction of need always aims towards the
attainment of the good life.26 This discernment of what is of value has a
common order between cultures, which Nussbaum calls the
"constitutive circumstances of the human being."27 Humans must react
with discernment to such circumstances if their rational capacity
generally, and that of the good life specifically, is to be constituted.
Human needs will be satisfied only by both engaging and developing our
practical and emotive rational capacity. Nussbaum refers to this capacity,
which remains tied to the emotional and practical nature of prohairesis,
as our "capabilities."28 As Amartya Sen has argued, the concept of
positive freedom should be defined in terms of a capability to function.
What is of significance to freedom is not material resources as such, but
what a person can or cannot do or be with these goods.29 For Nussbaum,
capability is the capacity to both correctly evaluate and pursue what is
good. Due to the emotive and practical way in which needs are satisfied,
the good life is always realised as a dependence of our rational capacity on
what is external.
A plurality of features go to make up our constitutive circumstances.
They include our nourishment, health, sexual relations, physical
mobility, early infant development, and our relations with other
humans, animals, and the environment. This plural nature of human
need is also a plurality of possibilities for capability. However, our diverse
25 Nussbaum, M., (1993) "Non-Relative Values: An Aristotelian Approach", in The
Quality of Life, ed. Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 261
ff.
26 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 285-6.
27 Nussbaum, M., (1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", p. 219 ff.
28 Ibid., p. 224.
29 Sen, A., (1985) "Rights and Capabilities", pp. 135-9.
capabilities must also express the "ubiquitous and architectonic" features
of all good lives, both our practical reason and affiliation. Our practical
reason is our ability to conceive of and pursue the good life, and our
affiliation is our desire to live with and for others.30 Our capabilities,
guided by our practical reason and affiliation, will not be developed in
isolation, but in "grounding conditions" where we must chose and act.
Included within these conditions are rational activities.31 The potential
for capability is always developed within specific activities according to
their standards of excellence or "good functioning."32 The activity and its
criteria of value become that which is both rightly valued and the
medium in which valued capabilities are developed. Although practically
dependent, the good life is freely chosen and fosters the capacity to act
with discernment. It expresses the rational desire to develop one's
capabilities according to chosen standards of good functioning.33
Nussbaum argues that her conception of capabilities is potentially
universal, precisely because it gives a "generous reading" of the rational
capacity of the good life. A reading is "generous" when it acknowledges
that the standards with which the goodness of a life can be judged are
those which are appropriate to the emotional and practical context of this
life. It will not judge this life with a supposedly more exacting formal
criterion of rationality or of subjective evaluation. A generous reading
also acknowledges that the good life is dependent upon practical
conditions to constitute both its capacity to value and its fundamental
needs. The generous reading does not assume that capability is
fundamentally autonomous, and that suffering is only that which
obstructs this self-sufficiency. Rather, the suffering which is serious,
which others should feel duty-bound to aid, results from situations
which disrupt our dependence on valued objects.34 From the basic
assumptions that the good life is practically dependent, and that serious
30 Nussbaum, M., (1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", p. 226.
31 Ibid., p. 225.
32 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 292-3.
33 Nussbaum, M., (1995) "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings", Women, Culture
and Development. A Study of Human Capabilities, ed. Martha Nussbaum & Johnathon
Glover (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 80-1.
34 Nussbaum, M., (1995) Poetic Justice. The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston:
Beacon Press), p. 38 ff.
suffering is the disruption caused to this dependence, Nussbaum derives
an account of the rights of social justice. An "Aristotelian Social
Democracy" will legitimate rights to the resources required by each
individual, in their specific constitutive circumstances, to develop the
capabilities appropriate to that context.
Nussbaum claims that she can adapt Rawls' liberal theory of primary
goods, and ensure that it will enable the good life of each person equally,
by rejecting its formal and subjective features.35 A formally subjective
account will be indistinguishable from the "mean-spirited" view in
utilitarian welfarism, which does not ascribe any normative significance
to the specificity of an individual's practical activities. It will not account
for what is of value. For welfarism, external objects can have value only
as a means to satisfy our desires or realise our preferences. Therefore, it
will only see our dependence on external objects which we cannot control
as a lack of freedom and, as a result, will not recognise the seriousness of
the suffering caused by disruptions to such features of life. Nussbaum
also criticises Plato's dualistic attempt to secure the invulnerability of the
good life by making it antithetical to the passivity of desire and to
relations of necessity with the world of objects.36 As we saw, Habermas
also argues that, although systemic functioning is necessary for the good
life of the life-world, the two can and must be kept separate so as to avoid
suffering. Nussbaum argues instead that the good life is realised in
productive activities in the continuing development of our reasoned-
desire. It is in disruptions to this source of value, and of our capacity to
value, that suffering must be identified.
As necessary sources of value are external, both they and the good life can
be disrupted. As these are disruptions to our rational capacity itself, the
"fragility" of the good life can never be overcome. Nussbaum agrees with
other enlightenment theories that the bases for justification of the good
life can only be made commensurable at the level of translation.
However, this translation cannot hope to be based on a formal or
dualistic abstraction, which itself identifies the formal or dualistic
35 Nussbaum, M., (1996) "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion", Social Philosophy and
Policy, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 28.
36 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, p. 264.
requirements for the goodness of a life. Rather, it must account for the
context-specificity which is required of our rational capacity in a
dependent and vulnerable good life. First, the practical contexts in which
alone the good life is attained are themselves ongoing. The rational
capacity appropriate to this mutable or unfixed good life will be an
improvisatory one. Second, the contexts of the good life are complex and
various. An indefinite or indeterminate good life must therefore develop
the rational capacity of responsiveness. Third, these contexts are made up
of experiences, such as those of the family, which are particular and
unrepeatable. The rational capacity of the good life must include the
partiality which acknowledges the serious ethical weight due to the
experiences of love and fellowship.37
The potential of all lives for serious suffering follows directly from the
necessarily fragile nature of the good life. The fragility of life already
demands much from our rational capacity. However, the required
improvisation, responsiveness, and partiality can themselves be
undermined by certain practical contexts. Nussbaum argues that material
and psychological hardship can generate the emotional dispositions of a
"brutalised identity", which prevent the individual from developing
valued capacities and the capacity to value.38 These dispositions are
evident where individuals positively value activities and achievements
which fall far below what they are capable of. From our intersubjectively
shared values concerning what activities are worthwhile, we can identify
where an individual's sense of self-respect in such a situation is
groundless. However, the generous view does not take these dispositions
at their face value. Rather, it assumes that individuals will often
accommodate their expectations and desires to a situation where a valued
life seems unattainable. Nussbaum, therefore, rejects Rawls' assumption
that subjective evaluations can be independent of practical conditions
and are, therefore, the only indicator we have of what an individual
needs.39
37 Ibid., pp. 302-4.
38 Nussbaum, M., (1996) "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion", pp. 31-2.
39 Nussbaum, M., (1980) "Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity", pp. 401-2.
Nussbaum argues that her Aristotelian Social Democracy can legitimately
intervene to enable the good life, without being guided primarily by the
preferences of those who are suffering. This intervention will entail a
strategic form of action and the deployment of technological methods,
and is to be judged by the extent to which it brings about the good life.
Strategic and technical action are not dualistically divided from emotive
and practical features of our capacity. They are, rather, basic appearances,
and so they do not provide a basis for reflection which is external to the
world of the good life. Unlike Habermas, an ethical understanding of the
good life must guide "material reproduction" if it is to ensure our basic
needs. The nature of the good life itself also entails that we can not take
an external view of it. Our emotive practical relations with the world of
objects is a sphere we actively constitute as part of the good life. There is,
therefore, no causal law of reasoned desire which can be discovered to
explain each good life. When another person is unaware of the needs of
their good life, neither the social scientist nor the moral theorist can
supply this knowledge. Rather, an intervention will alleviate suffering
only when it enables the capacity of the individual within their
dependence on a practical, specific context to constitute their own needs
and the satisfaction of those needs.
2.2. Empathy and the good life of another.
Nussbaum argues that a normatively positive account must be given of
both the rational capacity of the good life and the rights of social justice
which are to enable it. The rational capacity of the good life can only be
developed from within the reasoned-desire which is already fostered in
discerning what is of value. This capacity which is developed can only
then be known as that which is already committed to specific conceptions
of the good life. Nussbaum argues that we will only make the good life of
another person commensurable through a generous reading. This is a
form of reflection which presupposes what can be expected from others in
regard to the nature of their positive commitment to the good life. From
this generous reading we can then specify the nature of the good life
which is to be both the legitimate goal of social justice and the insight
which will identify with these rights of social justice as legitimate. The
generous reading which motivates the rights of social justice is the
"compassion" which does not condescend but, rather, sees in the
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condition of suffering the potential for the positive conception of the
good life.
Nussbaum argues that Rawls is right to insist that a life can only be good
when it expresses that individual's own life plan. On this point Rawls'
position is distinct from the mean-spirited view in welfarism, which
equates goodness merely with an end-state, regardless of the role the
individual played in bringing it about. Nussbaum's generous view places
value instead in the "separateness" of persons, which is realised in the
capacity to plan one's own life and the satisfaction of its needs.40
However, for Nussbaum, Rawls' account of rational planning is
insufficient. It does not acknowledge the need for a positive conception of
the good life, and does not specify the perfectionist requirements of
rationality.41 As Rawls cannot give a non-subjective account of the
"character" and "intellect" required for the good life, he cannot finally
identify a life which is either rational or qualitatively good. This will not
be avoided by Rawls' attempt to derive the requirements of a life plan
from a formal account of the resources necessary for any plan. This
account of the formal usefulness of goods cannot finally be distinguished
from the welfarist attempt to reduce all qualitative judgements to
calculations of benefit. It would also undermine the practical emotive
basis of the good life. It controls as a means what we must instead remain
dependent upon as the source of value and the ability to value.42
Nussbaum argues that in family relations the emotional and practical
presuppositions of the good life are formed by the romantic love between
partners and the partial commitment of parents and children to ensure
each other's well-being.43 Further, the nature of the good life will also be
distinguished between ethnic cultures, as rational capacity will only be
developed here in ways that are appropriate to the specificity of this
context.44 A positive conception of the good life is therefore required
40 Nussbaum, M., (1995) Poetic Justice, p. 14, p. 25, p. 38.
41 Nussbaum, M., (1980) "Shame, Separateness and Political Unity", pp. 402-403, p. 424.
42 Nussbaum, M., (1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", pp. 209-13.
43 Nussbaum, M., (1995) "Emotions and Women's Capabilities", pp. 368-70, pp. 381-5.
44 Nussbaum, M., & Sen, A., (1989) "Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions",
in Relativism. Interpretation and Confrontation, ed. Michael Krausz (University of Notre
Dame Press), p. 313.
which will account for its lack of fixity, its complex variety, and its partial
particularity. In contrast, the mean-spirited view will treat familial and
ethnically distinct activities in a biased way. It can only justify rights
which enable what it takes to be the rational capacity of the good life. It
can, therefore, only aid those who can control their emotive and practical
context and use it as a means to some other end.45 The mean-spirited
view will, therefore, have inegalitarian consequences. The capacity for
discernment which it considers formal, and therefore universal, is in fact
developed primarily in the social categories of the male middle class
majority culture. The mean-spirited account implicitly confers legitimacy
on the desire to control as it is established as a social phenomenon.46
Nussbaum needs to show how her generous reading will in fact give a
more adequate account of the human needs which must be satisfied to
enable the good life. On that basis, the intervention called for by an
Aristotelian Social Democracy can be identified with as legitimate by the
capacity it is to enable. She argues that the generous reading which
identifies the vulnerability of the good life can be justified as an "insight"
of "practical wisdom."47 This is the capacity formed from a long
experience of a life led in practical activities. From experience, an
awareness is developed that the good life is vulnerable and, therefore,
that the good life of another cannot be reduced to a measure of its formal
rationality. The good life of another can only be understood through the
"imaginative identification" which "empathises" with the fragility which
all good lives share. However, to acknowledge that another life is fragile
is also to accept the fundamental separateness of the other person.48 The
practical insight is aware that the separateness of another is mutable,
complex, and particular in nature. It also attempts to understand the good
life of another through improvisation, responsiveness, and an awareness
45 Nussbaum, M., (1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", pp. 209-13.
46 Nussbaum, M., (1995) "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings", pp. 100-2.
47 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 302-6. Nussbaum's more recent work
is influenced as much by Rousseau, Kant, Rawls and Adam Smith as it is by Aristotelian
ethics. This is reflected in the use of the term "imaginative identification" now in place of
the previous "insight" of "practical wisdom." However, both refer to the same emotional
or desiderative disposition to empathise with the other life by seeing in its separateness
the shared characteristics of the fragile life: Nussbaum, M., (1995) Poetic Justice, pp. 19-
20.
48 Nussbaum, M., (1996) "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion", pp. 34-5.
of partiality. Nussbaum argues that this practical excellence required to
understand the good life of another can also be learned from artistic
experience.
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Nussbaum argues that to understand literature an interpretative act of
imaginative identification is required on the part of the reader with the
intentions of the author and the situations of the characters. This has an
immediate relevance for ethical reflection, as the work of literature
expresses the good functioning of the writer. It expresses what Walt
Whitman called the ability to "see eternity in men and women" by
representing to the reader the complexity of human agency.49 To correctly
determine the value of this work of art the reader must attempt to
understand this intended artistic representation. This is an intention
which is expressed within the specific activity of literature, where alone it
could have the meaning it does for the reader. As with any other
contextually specific activity, it offers its own criteria of choice and value
for the reader.50 The subject matter which is represented here and which
we attempt to understand is, along with its complexity, the mutability
and particularity of human agency. Nussbaum argues that in literature
this subject matter is presented within the lives of fictional characters.
We will, therefore, understand the author's artistic representation of
human capability only through an empathetic identification with the
characters in which this intention is made manifest.51
The meaning of a novel such as Dickens' Hard Times can only have
significance to the extent that the reader empathises with its characters.
The reader will have to see in the characters' lives the fragile and separate
nature of the reader's own life. Nussbaum argues that Bitzer's cold-
hearted instrumentalism in Hard Times personifies the effects which
mean-spirited practices of education can have. These are educational
practices which teach children to reduce all knowledge to observable facts,
and to reduce the value of all practical involvements to their strategic
usefulness.52 Such practices will stunt both the ability to empathise with
49 Nussbaum, M., (1997) Cultivating Humanity, p. 96.
50 Nussbaum, M., (1995) Poetic Justice, p. 7.
51 Nussbaum, M., (1997) Cultivating Humanity, p. 90 ff.
52 Nussbaum, M., (1995) Poetic Justice, p. 30.
the humanity of others and the emotional discernment necessary for the
goodness of one's own life. We will only understand Bitzer's situation as
one of serious suffering if we empathise with his experiences as an
orphan educated according to the mean-spirited view. We will also only
empathise with the fictional character of Bitzer if we recognise how such
suffering could arise in the practical situations in which we live. On that
basis we can, moreover, judge that the nature of the good life and its
requirements in practice will never be accounted for through the mean-
spirited view.53 A formal and negative conception of the good life will
never enable us to make the diversity of the good life commensurable at
the level of translation.
Nussbaum argues that compassion is the basis on which to legitimate
collective intervention. From a generous reading, we can appreciate that
the suffering of others is serious and should be pitied, and that it could
just as easily descend upon our own fragile life, and so from our self-
interest we can develop an interest in egalitarian measures. This is, she
argues, a positively justified "emotional analogue" of Rawls' original
position.54 The insight into the good life is fostered as a capability in
rational activities, including the activity of art. These are the activities
which foster intersubjectively recognised standards of excellence in action
and reflection. However, persons with insight do not attempt to
understand with the standards which are appropriate to their own
activities those experiences which are, rather, of another person in
another situation. From the positive commitment to one's own good life,
and an awareness of its context-specific nature, can be developed an
awareness of the fragility and separateness which will also characterise
this other good life. It is the awareness that this good life is fragile due
both to its irreconcilable plurality and its vulnerability to practical
disruption.55 An enlightenment reflection must abstract from
inappropriate presuppositions in understanding the other, but the person
of practical insight does so, Nussbaum argues, so as to empathise with the
other in the separateness of their fragility.
53 Nussbaum, M., (1997) Cultivating Humanity, pp. 30-4.
54 Nussbaum, M., (1996) "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion", pp. 36-7.
55 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, p. 301.
The practical insight fostered in specific activities can therefore give the
generous reading which is required of the nature of capabilities
themselves. It is also this generous reading which legitimates our
normative duties to aid the good life of another.56 The understanding we
can have of the requirements for the good life in another situation can
only ever be empathetic. The normative principle which obliges us to aid
the other person cannot displace the practical insight with which alone
we can identify what is called for in this situation. The considerations
which justify our actions here can not be derived from a basic moral
premise, such as the requirements of fairness. Rather, universal rules are
posterior to particular judgements, while the good judgement "is
concerned with the apprehending of concrete particulars, rather than
universals."57 The appropriate normative principle can only ever be a
guide. It is an outline which past wise insights, or "authoritative
judgements", provide of the normative obligations which follow from
the fragility of the good life. Each new authoritative judgement of the
normative requirements in any situation is an empathetic understanding
of the nature of the good life, which itself can "supplement" the principle
as yet a further past wise judgement.58
Nussbaum's conception of the good life will positively value the
capabilities realised in activities throughout social relations. As the good
life must give a central place to the unrepeatable particular experiences of
love and friendship, the family role of parenting can be shown to be
worthwhile. The capabilities which are of value for the parent will be
contextually specific to this activity, but will also represent a development
of the constitutive circumstances of the human good life. Further, as we
come to understand the good life through art, the development and
training of artistic capabilities can also rightly claim to be an aspect of the
good life. This does not devalue everyday roles, by contrasting them with
the autonomy of art and the creativity of artistic experience. In fact, it is
the experience of art, especially in reading the modern novel with its
democratic concerns for everyday life, which confirms for us that an
insight of practical wisdom is necessary for each situation, and must be
56 Nussbaum, M., (1995) Poetic Justice, pp. 8-9.
57 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 300-1.
58 Ibid., p. 301.
suited to each situation.59 Through an empathetic understanding, made
possible by these activities, we can specify the context-specificity of the
good life and of the suffering caused by its absence. From this insight, the
collective interventions to enable the good life as an unconditional right
can be legitimated.
§3. Hermeneutic circle of appearances.
There is a close correspondence between Nussbaum's position and the
hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship which I propose,
concerning the valued capacity which is to be enabled as a right and
which itself is to identify with this legitimate collective intervention. For
Nussbaum, the valued capacity remains practically derived due to the
comprehensiveness of its substantive and positive features. For both the
hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship and for Nussbaum,
collective interventions must respond to the ever changing practical
requirements of the good life and, also, the ever present practical dangers
which lead to suffering. However, these two positions will give opposing
accounts of a rational and normative advance in the good life, with
regard both to our understanding and enablement of the good life. This
opposition can be analysed by returning to the specific rational and
normative advance which is the concern of this thesis, namely: how
Marshall's conception of social citizenship can be reformulated.
I argue that there are certain shortcomings in Marshall's treatment of the
good life which can be overcome when a more consistent hermeneutic
line is taken. I criticise his arguments that the authority of practical
excellence is established over those that are ignorant, that the good life
cannot be enabled in full for all, that the status of social equality is based
on a national heritage, and that parenting can be excluded from the
category of "professional" practices recognised in citizenship. I argue that
these features of Marshall's position are antithetical to both the
hermeneutic account of a freely and rationally conferred authority and to
the hermeneutic commitment to enable the capacity for learning in
others. By contrast, Nussbaum's position will see these shortcomings as
arising from conservative meta-theory itself, from the fact that it does not
59 Nussbaum, M., (1995) Poetic Justice, pp. 33-5.
respect the enlightenment conception of the power of reason by
acknowledging that the individual is analytically and normatively prior
to practice. For Nussbaum, a hermeneutic social citizenship will always
be unable to identify suffering, and will be unwilling to ensure the good
life for all equally, because its bases for justification do not enable either
the empathetic transcendence of traditional commitments to specific
good lives or the specification of the pre-cultural requirements for the
good life of each individual.
3.1. Shortcomings in Marshall's account of professionalism
In Chapter Two Section 4.2. I indicated four shortcomings in Marshall's
proposals which I elaborate on here. First, Marshall argues that an
authoritative insight into the nature of needs can be developed as a
rational capacity within professional practices. Flowever, for Marshall, the
basis for this insight and the power relation of this practice contrasts the
"authority" of the professional and the "ignorance" of the client. Second,
Marshall argues that the rational capacity of the good life is compatible
with the skilful deployment of techniques appropriate to a practice and
the bureaucratic intervention of the State to enable practices to attain the
status of professionalism. However, he also argues both that the technical
nature of certain practices require only the ability of a functionary and so
inhibit the development of this valued capacity, and that the State cannot
freely intervene in the division of labour to ensure instead the full
measure of social equality. Third, although the shared status of social
equality is to recognise status differences of other forms, Marshall
assumes that it must be based on the unified civilization of a national
heritage. Fourth, Marshall excludes the practice of parenting, which
requires an appropriate insight and entails a social status, from the
practices whose professional status is considered a right of citizenship. I
argue that these proposals fall short of ensuring the basis required to
legitimate collective intervention, namely: the practical excellence which
is fostered in, and constitutes the substance of, mutual relations of social
equality.
The first shortcoming concerns the nature of power relations and the
basis for justification in the delivery by professionals to clients of a service
which is essential to the satisfaction of needs. The professional's claim to
an authoritative insight must be justified, while this entails that the
identification of the client with the legitimacy of this insight must be
secured. Marshall argues that, as the satisfaction of any one individual's
needs relies upon the activities of others, and in turn affects others, a
social measure of need and its satisfaction is required. It is also only the
professional who can adopt a disinterested yet insightful perspective to
determine what an individual's socially conceived needs are. For this
reason, the standards to measure needs, and assess in what way they
should be satisfied, can only be developed and deployed by professionals
within the appropriate professional practices.60 Individuals turn to the
professional practice to have their needs met because its standards are not
available in everyday interaction. However, professional standards are
only ever correctly deployed through the judgement of an individual
with the personal qualities of discernment which could be fostered only
in this professional practice.61 The professional practice is unique, as here
alone certain needs can be met, but this uniqueness will only be
maintained if, Marshall argues, the authority of the individual
professional can be contrasted with the ignorance of the client.62
I argue that, while this is unacceptable, Marshall's own basic premises
point to a different conclusion. Marshall's description of how a
professional's insight itself is developed can be characterised as a
Gadamerian mutual learning process. It is only through individual
qualities of discernment that professional standards are made
meaningful, yet such discernment could only have been fostered in a
professional practice.63 At the same time, the goal of professional service
is to enable the rational capacity of civilization for the client. Thus,
medicine is to instil an "education in the art of life." Its goal is to enable
the clients' authoritative insight into their own and others' human
needs, a practical capacity which has all the features of a professional
insight.64 Therefore, I argue, the nature of the service delivered to a client
should itself have the quality of a professional practice, a continuous
60 Marshall, M., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 156.
61 Ibid., pp. 154-5.
62 Ibid., p. 156.
63 Ibid., p. 155.
64 Ibid., pp. 165-6.
mutual learning process. The rational capacity not only of the client, but
of the professional as well, must be conceived as dependent on this
learning process. As Gadamer has argued, both the power relations and
bases for justification of an authoritative insight must be derived from,
and conducive to, mutual learning rather than an unreflective
obedience.65 In this way, it is possible to counter the prevailing concerns,
which Habermas expresses, that professionals are merely disengaged
elites.66
The second shortcoming concerns Marshall's argument that, although
the good life requires a professional status in practices which develop an
insight into human needs, only a semi-professional status could be
ensured in practices where, instead, the qualities of accuracy and
efficiency are appropriate.67 Therefore, the extent to which the good life
can be enabled through rational re-organisation is limited, as collective
intervention must not undermine the existing class relations and
contractual market integration in which valued productive practices can
emerge.68 However, a different, Gadamerian, conclusion can be reached
from Marshall's own basic premises. As I argued in Chapter Two Section
4.2., Marshall in fact argues that we must continue to assess the
conditions of possibility for the good life, and do so from the
commitment to ensure it as the basic element of the status of social
equality. This is the case as the nature of practical capacity, and the
relations of social equality which are its necessary bases, have a certain
cultural autonomy from relations of inequality and the technical and
strategic features of integration. From the practical insight we do have, we
must continue to assess when collective intervention and market
integration enable the good life, and when instead they lead to suffering;
and when stratification is compatible with the emergence of valued
practices, and when instead it results in domination.
65 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 279-280.
66 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology", pp.
285-6.
67 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 168.
68 Ibid., p. 153, p. 156.
When practices remain at a semi-professional status, then Marshall falls
short of ensuring the shared basis of social equality that is necessary for
the good life and for the justification of social rights. This is the case also
in the third and fourth shortcomings I pointed to, where Marshall
assumes that social equality relies on a unified and national heritage,69
and when practices which are socially valued, such as parenting, are not
also recognised as instances of professionalism which the rights of
citizenship are to foster and ensure. Again, Marshall's basic premises
point to a different conclusion. Marshall gives a positive justification of
the good life. The satisfaction of human needs is understood in terms of
the ethical value of the good life which this can enable, while appropriate
criteria of ethical value are identified from within valued practices.70
However, this positive conception can only have legitimacy if it based on
a continuous Gadamerian mutual learning process. This follows, from
Marshall's own arguments, for the delivery of services to clients, which
should enable the good life mutually, and for the collective intervention
to enable professional practices, which must respond to changed
opportunities and requirements. Marshall assumes that a shared mutual
basis of understanding is required for cross-cultural interaction, but does
not see the need for such a basis in the justification of State
intervention.71 Marshall also argues that parenting is a productive task
requiring practical insight and entailing a social status, but does not
include it as a practical capacity recognised within citizenship.
3.2. Nussbaum's critique of traditionalism, intellectualism,
and idealism.
I have outlined above how Marshall's conception of the good life can be
reformulated. I argued that his substantive, positive, and comprehensive
account will be consistent and can be defended when it is re-conceived
according to the requirements for a Gadamerian mutual learning process.
This is intended to overcome Marshall's account of practical relations of
authority, which fall short of the requirement of mutual learning, and
his account of collective intervention, which falls short of securing social
69 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 85-6, pp. 124-5.
711 Ibid., p. 114, p. 118.
71 Mrshall, T. H., (1959) "International Comprehension in and through Social Science", in
Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays (London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 47 ff..
equality as its justified goal and as the required basis for the legitimation
of this goal. As we saw, Nussbaum also argues that the bases from which
to both identify the legitimate collective intervention and pursue the
good life are substantive, positive, and comprehensive. However, the
specific way in which Nussbaum realises the enlightenment position in
an emotive conception of practical rationality ensures that she will reject
the proposed hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship. For
Nussbaum, a hermeneutic understanding will not specify the pre-
cultural requirements for the power of reason, and nor will it enable us to
empathise with the context-specific way in which it is realised. It cannot,
therefore, specify the requirements for the rational capacity of the
individual over and above traditional interests in specific good lives, and
nor can it specify the fundamental and diverse requirements to overcome
suffering.
First, Nussbaum would reject the hermeneutic critique of formalism. For
Nussbaum, the good life has a fragile nature due to its emotive and
practical characteristics. However, these characteristics also ensure that
the individual is normatively and analytically prior to practice.72 Just as
the emotive characteristics of the good life are derived from pre-cultural
constitutive circumstances, so too they enable the empathetic
identification with another in the context-specificity of their separateness,
over and above the practical or traditional horizon of their specificity. For
Nussbaum, hermeneutic understanding will remain tied to traditions
whose scope are limited. It will be unable to conceptualise the universal
nature of the good life, and will be unable to empathise with the
separateness of the individual, precisely because it does not leave
traditional horizons behind in understanding another culture or
activity.73 Further, Nussbaum argues that the value of a capability can
only be accounted for by the reasoned-desire which is appropriate in
specific grounding conditions. It, therefore, cannot be "reduced", by those
who claim a superior insight, to its supposedly shared hermeneutic
meaning. Therefore, Nussbaum would reject hermeneutics as being an
72 Nussbaum, M., (1997) Cultivating Humanity, p. 37; (1999) "The Feminist Critique of
Liberalism", p. 62.
73 Nussbaum, M., & Sen, A., (1989) "Internal Criticism and Indian Rationalist Traditions",
pp. 315-316.
intellectualist concern with meaning. In the same way that Plato
prioritises the rational aspect of the soul, hermeneutics will not
acknowledge the incommensurable plurality of the desiderative nature of
the good life.74
Second, Nussbaum would also reject the hermeneutic claim to have
overcome Habermas' dualism. Nussbaum argues that only a reasoned-
desire which is directed to the external world will be aware of the more
"basic" nature of some appearances, such as empirical experience and
deductive logic.75 In contrast, hermeneutics will be seen as idealist, as a
reduction of all appearances to those of cultural beliefs. Therefore, for
Nussbaum, hermeneutics will be unable to give a direction to science. It
will be unable to ensure that science both enables the good life, to the
extent that this is possible, and does not itself undermine the good life
and cause suffering through a technological objectification of human
relations. Nussbaum argues that suffering can only be accounted for by a
reasoned-desire which also assumes that the good life has a practically
emotive nature. The shared basis for the good life and for our knowledge
of it is derived from the "pre-cultural" overlap of emotive and practical
human grounding conditions. It is only when the significance of this
overlap is acknowledged that we will be able to account for serious
suffering, whose locus is in our grounding conditions of mortality,
embodiment, pleasure and pain, infant development, practical reason
and affiliation. For Nussbaum, hermeneutics will be unable to account
for the suffering which is more basic and fundamental than that caused
by disruptions to our cultural self-understanding.76
Third, Nussbaum would also reject the hermeneutic positive conception
of the good life. For Nussbaum, the good life is mutable, indeterminate,
and particular. The diversity of good lives, and the fragile nature of each,
entails that there can be no one correct interpretation of a good life which
expresses either the intellectual certainty of the interpretation of texts or
the certainty of a life led within a tradition which is shared.
74 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 272-3.
75 Nussbaum, M., (1986) The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 247-9; (1997) Cultivating
Humanity, p. 36 ff.
76 Nussbaum, M., (1993) "Non-Relative Values: An Aristotelian Approach", pp. 263-4.
Hermeneutics will be seen as both traditionally embedded and
intellectualist. For Nussbaum, it will be unable to adopt appropriate
emotive presuppositions to understand others empathetically. It will not
only reduce the separateness of individuals to their practical horizon, but
will reduce the goodness of their lives to the traditional and ethical
validity of their beliefs. For Nussbaum, hermeneutics will also be unable
to account for the normative significance of suffering where the good life
is absent. Nussbaum argues that it is as a consequence of "brutalising
conditions", which strip persons of the necessary external requirements
of humanity, that an individual's ethical self-understanding will be
distorted. For Nussbaum's position, hermeneutics could only be aware of
the fact that the individual now gets it wrong in their traditional and
intellectual reflection. It will always be a condescending response to
suffering, an offer of aid which assumes the inferiority of the recipient's
perspective.
Nussbaum would assume that hermeneutics cannot overcome the
shortcomings I have criticised in Marshall's work. For Nussbaum, a
hermeneutic authoritative insight must be premised on a superiority
measured in terms of greater intellectual certainty. A hermeneutic
professional will always presuppose the ignorance of the client, a
subordinate for whom a conception of the good life can be ascribed.
Nussbaum will also characterise hermeneutics as idealist, as it does not
distinguish between the interpretation of meaning and the formulation
of scientific truths and the implementation of scientific findings. For
Nussbaum, hermeneutics will be unable to pursue a rational re¬
organisation which both enables the good life and avoids the
perpetuation of suffering in the process. Nussbaum would also argue that
hermeneutics will be unaware why it will not recognise and enable the
diversity of the good life. It will be unaware that it is tied to a traditionally
specific and intellectualist conception of human need, which prevents it
from acknowledging the significance of different good lives, such as that
of parents, of minority cultures or in unorthodox family forms. It is these
characteristics which will also, for Nussbaum, prevent hermeneutics
from understanding the diversity and significance of human suffering,
the context-specific way in which the locus of suffering is sited within
human grounding conditions.
3.3. Hermeneutics, professionalism, and mutual learning.
In Section 4. I attempt to overcome the critique of hermeneutics which I
have ascribed to Nussbaum. However, in that section I also give a
hermeneutic account of Nussbaum's argument that capabilities are the
necessary features of practical excellence. Before arguing that
hermeneutics can be defended, and is necessary for any commitment to
ensure capability, I criticise Nussbaum's account by pointing out the
problems which follow from her enlightenment meta-theoretical
position. For the enlightenment, rational activities are incommensurable
at the level of justification. An enlightenment position will determine if
a rational activity is acceptable, but only by assessing whether it expresses
the power of reason over and against the force and the authority of others
and the dissimulating nature of accepted traditional truths. For
Nussbaum, the power of reason is an emotive and practical capacity.
Acceptable bases for justification can be made commensurable at the level
of translation, but only through an empathetic identification with the
context-specificity of activities.
Nussbaum argues that we can only have knowledge within the
"appearances." However, we must abstract from the appearances to
empathetically understand the context-specificity of the good life. For this
reason, the insights which identify our authoritative obligations to the
good life of another must "supplement" the normative principle. It is an
empathetic insight into the nature of the good life and into its normative
significance. Nussbaum also claims to have distinguished this insight of
practical excellence from the reflection of the brutalised identity.
However, Nussbaum cannot account for this as an enlightenment
distinction between the presence and absence of the power of reason.
Rather, Nussbaum's concern with the brutalised identity is the quality of
its presuppositions concerning the nature of the world and of reflection,
of what activities are both possible and worthwhile. This a distinction in
the substance of the presuppositions of justification, and can only be
made where the presuppositions of both perspectives are mutually
assessed. By contrast, Nussbaum's empathetic identification of the
brutalised identity does not allow the perspective of the compassionate
observer to be questioned. Instead, I argue, a hermeneutic reflection
which remains embedded within the appearances is required to identify
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both the legitimate intervention and the nature of the valued capacity to
be enabled.
Due to her enlightenment position, Nussbaum is also unable to account
for the process of learning through which an excellence in practical
reason is developed. Nussbaum assumes that we proceed from
"constitutive circumstances" to develop "good functioning", but she also
assumes that we abstract from the appearances in doing so. The good life
is fragile, she argues, as there is no shared basis on which each context-
specific aspect of an individual's own good life, or the lives of different
individuals, can be made meaningful. However, Nussbaum's position
therefore offers no way to account for the basis for understanding which
is required either to enter an activity and develop its good functioning, or
to specify what the good functioning of another activity is and whether it
should be enabled through intervention. Nussbaum's emotive
discernment of what is of value to one's own life, and her empathetic
understanding of another good life, both abstract from the "appearances"
which are necessary if we are to see or take the world in these activities.
Hermeneutics, on the contrary, argues that it is possible to recognise the
potential worth of a capability developed in an activity because it is
always necessary to come to a shared historically embedded
understanding of it, an understanding within the appearances. It is only
then that we could establish what value capabilities such as parenting and
art have, and why they are good lives which should be enabled as an
unconditional right of social justice.
For Nussbaum's positive account of the good life, the individual is not a
self-contained, self-sufficient, or harmonious unit, as individuals remain
practically and emotively dependent on external sources of value.
Nussbaum also argues that a life is only good when the separateness of
the individual is ensured, when the individual actively plans their life
according to acceptable criteria of rationality and value. However, for
Nussbaum, the practical basis of the good life is not a necessary
hermeneutic dimension, but a series of appearances from which we must
be able to abstract. Therefore, separateness is ensured only where the
individual is conceived as "analytically and normatively prior" to
practice. This leads to the argument that the good life in its diversity will
only be enabled and pursued when resources are distributed in a
Rawlsian manner, to ensure the freedom and equality of individuals
independently of their membership of practices. However, what this then
overlooks in the legitimation of rights are the practical requirements of
Nussbaum's own conception of capabilities. I argue instead that the
plurality of the good life can only be known from practical bases for
understanding, specifically the bases established in the shared status of
social equality. Social equality must also be the goal of intervention, and
must be constituted by the hermeneutic mediation of what Nussbaum
has called capabilities.
For the hermeneutically reformulated social citizenship, valued practices
must provide the bases from which to pursue the good life and legitimate
collective interventions to enable the good life. I argue in the coming
section that the valued capacity can only be developed by individuals in
partly autonomous practices and relations of social equality which,
however, proceed from power inequalities and social and economic
functional requirements, as well as shared normative commitments. For
Gadamer, a mutual learning process creates the hermeneutic dimension
which enables practices to have a certain autonomy, but only by also
connecting what does occur here with its social and economic
background.77 For the reformulated social citizenship, the partly
autonomous status of social equality required for the good life can only be
maintained by determining what limits must be placed on social and
economic features which could undermine the good life. For
hermeneutics, although the valued capacity will only be enabled in an
historically embedded mutual learning process, this does not make the
individual "secondary" to practice. Rather, the shared hermeneutic basis
is only significant because it enables, for the sake of the individual, both
the good life and our shared understanding of the legitimate collective
intervention.
77 Gadamer, H.-G., (1976) "What is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason", pp. 81-3.
§4. Hermeneutic capability and practical insight.
In this section I attempt to overcome the shortcomings in Marshall's
account concerning the nature of the valued capacity and the shared basis
required to understand and enable it. I argue that, in its hermeneutic
reformulation, social citizenship must be legitimated through the mutual
learning made possible in relations of social equality where a
hermeneutic capacity is enabled in full. I also defend this hermeneutic
account of capacity against the criticisms I ascribed to Nussbaum's
position so as, in turn, to hermeneutically conceptualise the capabilities
of practical excellence. I argue that hermeneutics can reject formalism by
showing that a shared basis of understanding is given and rationally
determined again within history and tradition. This is not an intellectual
basis, but is the medium which constitutes our fundamental needs and
our emotional dispositions of learning. Nor is this a basis which is
traditionally bound, but enables the insight which must both proceed
from a horizon and transcend this horizon in the understanding of
another. Further, this basis for the good life can be attained only where,
unlike Marshall's proposals, this mutuality is a requirement of practice
and ensured equally. I argue that a hermeneutic conception of capability
and authoritative insight will be enabled by a mutual learning process
and committed to ensuring this capacity for others.
I also argue that hermeneutics is not an idealist concern with meaning. A
comprehensive hermeneutic dimension can provide the bases for
justification required to understand suffering, both at its most
fundamental level and in the diverse ways in which this is manifested.
Moreover, it can guide strategic and technical activities so as to both
enable the good life, where this is possible, and avoid the suffering
brought about through objectification. On this basis, the rational re¬
organisation to ensure the good life equally can be pursued in social
citizenship. Finally, I argue that rational capacity must proceed with a
positive commitment not just to the content of a good life, but also to the
value of learning. Although the enablement of the good life must
proceed from a prejudicial commitment, it must also entail a mutual
revision of the positive conception of the good life and justification of
social rights. Moreover, an interest in aiding others can be fostered only
from an awareness that the rational capacity of each is hermeneutically
finite, or reliant on mutual learning. Unlike Nussbaum's account, a
shared basis in practice is required for the pursuit of the capabilities of the
good life, while, unlike Marshall's proposals, this shared basis must be
established by ensuring social equality in full.
4.1. The hermeneutic authoritative insight of phronesis.
A hermeneutic conception of social citizenship will share some basic
premises with Nussbaum's Aristotelian Social Democracy. Both positions
argue that our rational capacity and its needs are constituted in a
fundamental way by the practical activities in which we live. The
intersubjective nature of our rational capacity remains embedded within
practice, in its plurality and variability. The correct conception of the good
life will, for that reason, be non-formal. For hermeneutics, however, this
does not entail that each aspect of our rational capacity is emotive and
context-specific. Instead, it is as an historically embedded mutual learning
process that our practical capabilities are extended towards an insight of
practical excellence. The distinct aspects of our capabilities, and the
distinct ways in which we can develop them in responding to the world,
must be potentially meaningful to this one individual and to others, and
so must be potentially commensurable at the level of justification. This
shared basis for understanding is not intellectualist, but rather mediates
our reasoned-desire. Although this basis is prejudicial, it is not
contextually specific, but opens reason to the necessity of pursuing a
shared understanding. This hermeneutic account can be seen in
Gadamer's reading of Aristotle, which differs from Nussbaum's
significantly.
Gadamer's conception of the good life gives a central place to "phronesis"
rather than "prohairesis" within Aristotle's discussion of practical reason.
While prohairesis is the capacity for voluntary choice and action,
phronesis is the capacity for ethical insight which is fostered through a
life led in a community.78 Phronesis is "a determination of moral being
which cannot exist without the totality of the 'ethical virtues', which in
turn cannot exist without it."79 The principles of a community are
78 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "On the Possibility of Philosophical Ethics", p. 368; (1989)
Truth and Method, pp. 312-3.
79 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 22.
legitimate only when they are applied, and the insight of phronesis is
fostered only through the continuous efforts to apply them correctly.
However, the capacity which does attain excellence and the application
which is authoritative are not, as Nussbaum argues, context-specific.80
Gadamer argues that the necessity of application in phronesis entails that
it has a temporal nature which Aristotle does not thematize.81 The bases
for justification of phronesis must be established as a continuity of
meaning in the present with the tradition of past applications which has
authority for us. This in itself requires a process of mutual learning. The
presuppositions of justification for phronesis, the basis on which to
legitimate an authoritative application, must be formed through a
mutual assessment of our presuppositions now and those of the tradition
to which we and the principle belong.82
A hermeneutic capacity is not contextually bound. It must continually
form the bases for justification through a mutual learning process
between its horizon now and that of the principle and its tradition.
Practical excellence is the capacity to pursue mutual learning, and the
awareness which results from learning.83 Further, this is not an
intellectualist capacity, but is necessitated by, and in turn mediates,
capabilities arising from our emotive and practical nature. Our reasoned
desire is made possible by the abilities, possibilities, and circumstances
that precede us and are not simply at our disposal.84 However, as features
that we necessarily share with others, they enable a capacity for insight
which is realised only in pursuing a potentially shared basis for
understanding. For Gadamer, the pursuit of this potential shared basis is
a mediation of what Nussbaum conceives as context-specific: our desire
for what is of value and the rational development of our desires in
capabilities. As Gadamer's prejudicial understanding has a dialogical
structure where we are constituted as a specific addressee, reasoned-desire
will be mediated with a dialogical, prejudicial insight. In turn, for
hermeneutics, the emotional dispositions of character required for
80 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "On the Possibility of Philosophical Ethics", p. 368; (1989)
Truth and Method, p. 315.
84 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 312.
82 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "On the Possibility of Philosophical Ethics", p. 368.
83 Ibid., pp. 370-1.
84 Ibid.,
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practical excellence in judgement are expressed in a desire to be open to
learn from what is other.
For Gadamer, and also for Marshall, insight is possible in practices which
rely on and enable excellence in practical reason, or "professionalism."
These practices are partly autonomous from everyday interaction. They
both place their own requirements on practical excellence and enable the
participant to intervene in society in a distinctive way. An horizon, or
"standpoint", can be developed here which also makes it possible to rise
above this specificity and attain a shared basis of understanding.85
However, Gadamer argues that the autonomy of valued practices is only
maintained where the hermeneutic dimension is actively built back up
as, and through, dialogue. The capacity for insight relies on the continued
pursuit of a shared basis for understanding, while dialogue is the means
to continually establish this shared basis. A genuine conversation opens
one's own horizon to the potential insight of others, as it seeks to reach
agreement on a subject matter, rather than to merely find the meaning of
another's views in the supposed separateness of his horizon from our
own.86 A person and an insight cannot have authority over those
considered ignorant, as Marshall claimed. Rather, to be open is to accept
that insights which are authoritative may be plural and competing; while
openness can only be ensured when relations of power do not stifle, but
derive their legitimacy from, the plural insights of participants.87
The valued practice corresponds with what Gadamer calls the game of art,
and the experience of art will also confirm that insight relies on an
openness to the historical potential for shared understanding. The
"beautiful" in art does present itself and command our acknowledgement
as if it were unmediated, and as if no reasons could be given for it.
However, this experience will arise from our efforts to "read" the
meaning of a work and, therefore, to arrive at a basis for understanding
it.88 The plurality of such efforts is what constitutes the game of art
85 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 293-4, p. 302.
86 Ibid., p. 303.
87 Ibid., p. 307 ff.
88 Gadamer, H.-G., (1977) "The Relevance of the Beautiful", in The Relevance of The
Beautiful and Other Essays, trans. Nicholas Walker, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 39.
which, pace Nussbaum, is not a context-specific world entered into
through empathetic identification. Rather, art is a tradition we participate
in as historical perspectives, and the insight attained here corresponds
with, and brings to realisation, the prejudicial nature of all capacity. Art
requires a distanciation from everyday activity. In art, we must not view
time as measurable units, but instead allow ourselves to adopt the pace
and tempo which the work of art itself has.89 However, this willingness
to spend the time required for a painting to have meaning is already the
requirement of dialogue. We can have meaningful experiences with
another person by giving ourselves over to the flow of the conversation,
while this specific tempo follows from the prejudicial divergence of our
perspectives on a subject matter which we must be open to learn from.
Although Marshall fails to acknowledge its status as one of the
professions to be recognised in citizenship, the hermeneutic conception
of partly autonomous practices can account for the value of parenting and
its appropriate capability and insight. As Nussbaum rightly argues, in a
situation such as parenting, it is correct both to proceed with criteria of
value which are not appropriate elsewhere and to give a partial priority
to the needs of family members.90 However, the "moral particularism"
called for here is not, as Nussbaum argues, justified by conceiving of the
individual as prior to practice. Rather, and as Durkheim argues, it is
justified by the requirements of practical functioning, which itself is
conceived in terms of the freedom of the individual which it is necessary
for.91 To justify deploying the standards of excellence of a practice, and
valuing the capability ensured here, requires a practically derived
understanding of their appropriateness. The appropriate considerations
in parenting are not determined simply by an emotional response to the
unrepeatable features of a context-specific life. Rather, it is only from the
insight enabled by the practice which precedes us that we can determine
the requirements of good functioning here. Only on that basis can it be
determined when partiality is appropriate, and what is called for in such a
disposition.
89 Ibid., pp. 42-3.
90 Nussbaum, M., (1995) "Emotions and Women's Capabilities", pp. 381-2.
91 Durkheim, E., (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, pp. 3-5, p. 30.
As Nussbaum argues, the rational capacity which is the goal of collective
intervention is not formal, but continues to emerge in practice and in the
development of our capabilities towards good functioning. Therefore, the
basis from which to legitimate collective interventions also is not formal,
but is an understanding pursued in practice. However, I argue both that
the reasoned-desire of our capabilities is always mediated by a
hermeneutic insight, and that this prejudicial perspective must be open
to pursue a shared understanding. The basis to identify the legitimate
collective intervention is determined through a prejudicial fusion of
horizons, and not through an empathetic abstraction. It is also through
the pursuit of this shared understanding that the necessary basis for our
rational capacity is determined. Separateness does not, pace Nussbaum,
place us normatively and analytically prior to practice. As can be seen in
the example of parenting, it is not a rational power prior to practice which
determines the substance and value of the capabilities developed here.
Rather, individuals can only proceed as parents by both acknowledging
the authority of this practice and establishing their own authority
through the dialogical, plural application of its presuppositions of good
functioning.
4.2. Comprehensive hermeneutic capacity.
The hermeneutic rational capacity is not intellectualist or bound to
traditional horizons. It incorporates reasoned-desire in a prejudicial
constitution which has a dialogical structure. I argue here that rational
capacity is not dualistic. However, I also argue that the comprehensively
realised capacity has a hermeneutic, but non-idealist, nature. Suffering is
not that which undermines pre-cultural constitutive circumstances, by
removing what is believed to be, on the basis of reasoned desire,
necessary for capability. It is, rather, that which undermines the potential
an individual has to develop capabilities towards a hermeneutic insight,
and must be understood from a shared hermeneutic understanding.
Further, scientific, technical, and systemic aspects of rational activity can
not be accounted for on the basis of "basic appearances", and nor can a
contextually specific empathy direct such activity to ensure the good life.
Rather, practical insight is enabled by the dialogical relations which build
the hermeneutic dimension back up in all activity, and it must, in turn,
guide that activity to ensure a hermeneutic conception of good
functioning. On a hermeneutic basis, the collective interventions to
eliminate suffering can be legitimated, and Marshall's problematic
assumption can be overcome, that only a limited possibility exists for the
rational re-organisation to attain social equality.
As is the case with Nussbaum, hermeneutics embeds rational activities in
the direction given to them by a practical understanding of the goal of the
good life. However, for hermeneutics, this basis for understanding is not
arrived at empathetically, or by saving the more "basic" appearances
which specify pre-cultural constitutive circumstances. Rather, a
hermeneutically mediated phronesis must both guide rational activity
and be the legitimate object of collective intervention. Gadamer has been
concerned primarily to distinguish Aristotle's phronesis from "techne",
the tool-like skill to attain pre-given ends of craft production.92 Gadamer
points out that the communal and ethical phronesis is the capacity to
understand and reformulate valued goals. It is neither a method that can
be learned and forgotten nor merely a strategic ability to ensure desired
outcomes.93 However, as hermeneutics is comprehensive, as all technical
activity proceeds from traditional presuppositions concerning the nature
of the world and reflection, then Gadamer should also thematize the
necessity of technical activity for the hermeneutic capacity.94 This will
ensure both that hermeneutic understanding does not have a merely
ideal basis, as Habermas argues, and that, in the reformulation of social
citizenship, the necessity for our capacity of technical activities in the
collective intervention of justice can be acknowledged.
For the hermeneutic account of the nature of justification, the
hermeneutic dimension must be built back up in modern science,
technology, and strategic and administrative action. Gadamer's argument
is that, as they proceed with historical presuppositions, a hermeneutic
understanding alone can ensure that technical and strategic activities
92 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Practical Philosophy", p. 90, pp. 91-2;
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94 The historical aspect of Aristotle's techne is analysed by: Dunne, J., (1993) Back to the
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succeed on their own terms. Further, such activities must be guided by an
awareness that normative considerations are appropriate to them.95
Hermeneutics will not make normative prescriptions for an activity, but
will "give an account" to it of its normative nature.96 Normative
principles will only be applied appropriately by the insight of those
within practice. This calls for phronesis and, therefore, the historically
embedded dialogue which, however, the increasingly symbolic language
of technology claims to have abstracted from. Gadamer argues in
response that even a purely symbolic language is always a derivative of
natural languages.97 The hermeneutic dimension can be built back up
here if we reject the argument, accepted by Romantics and the
Philosophes, that historical and methodological bases for reflection are
antithetical.98 Rather, it is not the heightened self-conscious abstraction of
technical and strategic activity which is problematic, but the attempt to
monologically exclude historical dialogue from rational activity.
Methodological abstraction and technological terminology do not
overcome the need for individuals to understand what they are doing in
historical and ethical terms. This also indicates that the methodological
basis of technological practice does not overcome the historical nature of
human experience. It is the continued effect of this experience which will
also disrupt methodological certainty. However, experience does not only
falsify a theory, but can also problematise our hermeneutic self-
understanding.99 For Gadamer, beyond the certainty offered by method,
the "immediate living certainty" of a life led in community has greatest
significance, and it is in its disruption that serious suffering is evident.100
However, hermeneutics must also distinguish between more and less
serious suffering, if it itself is to avoid existential impotence in the face of
life's dangers.101 From Nussbaum, we can see that serious suffering
95 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 324.
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undermines the requirements for our capabilities, and is understood
from a practical understanding of its significance. However, unlike
Nussbaum, these capabilities should be conceived as possibilities for a
hermeneutic insight and as an object of a shared hermeneutic
understanding. Further, it is the hermeneutic conception of social
equality which must ensure the shared basis which eliminates suffering
and enables the understanding to identify with this collective
intervention as legitimate.
Gadamer argues that the experience of the beautiful in art indicates to us
the nature of all understanding. Understanding is experienced both as an
event, a disruption of our shared horizon, and as an immediacy of self-
presentation, where the tradition of which we are a part is expressed in
the words we use in understanding.102 However, just as art continues to
be historical and practical, nor does hermeneutics conceive of art as the
essence of meaningful experience against which everyday life is
contrasted.103 For hermeneutics, technical and strategic activity are
neither a mere distortion of a fundamental experience which is artistic,
nor a dualistically separate sphere from meaningful experience. As
hermeneutics is comprehensive, I argue, it can account for the
hermeneutic nature of all activity and of the seriousness of suffering.
Hermeneutics is not a merely cultural understanding over which more
"basic" appearances enable us to identify and eliminate serious suffering.
Rather, pace Nussbaum, scientific objectivity will only be ensured
through the establishment of the hermeneutic basis within science which
is required for success on its own terms. Further, what Marshall should
acknowledge is that social equality is a possibility whose realisation in full
we can always strive towards. The continued pursuit of social equality is
also necessary for the legitimation of social citizenship intervention in,
and understanding of, the good life in practice.
102 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 485-490.
103 Ibid., p. 70.
4.3. The hermeneutic positive conception of the good life.
I argue here that hermeneutics will help overcome the shortcomings in
Marshall's account. Hermeneutics will show how an understanding of
the possibilities for the good life can be derived from the potential now
for shared understanding so as, in turn, to legitimate the attempt to attain
social equality and acknowledge the value of diverse cultures and of
practices such as parenting. This understanding must, as Nussbaum
argues, proceed from the awareness that a lack of self-sufficiency
characterises our capabilities and insight. However, I argue that the
individual's good life is not, as Nussbaum claims, analytically and
normatively prior to practice, while the shared understanding of the good
life must be established in practical relations of social equality. From a
practical awareness of our mutual dependence in the division of labour,
we can identify the potential for the good life; and from practical interests
in the value of mutual learning, we can derive the motivation to aid
others. I noted in Section 3. that Nussbaum would reject hermeneutics as
traditionalist, intellectualist, and idealist, as being only able to offer a
contextualist, condescending response to suffering. I argue that
hermeneutics can overcome this critique if, in reformulating social
citizenship, it accounts for the capacity which proceeds from specific good
lives in relations of inequality but attains a shared and critical insight into
the equal potential for the good life.
Nussbaum argues that a positive commitment to our good functioning
enables us, through empathy, to feel pity for the context-specific suffering
of others. The emotion of pity is non-condescending when it understands
the brutalised identity on the basis of her human needs and rights,
irrespective of the worth of her insights. Nussbaum would argue that a
hermeneutic basis for the emotion of pity will also entail a condescension
arising from prejudice. Pity can only be legitimated with an account of the
pre-cultural needs abrogated in suffering, while empathy is only possible
when we leave behind our horizons, with their inappropriate criteria and
commitments. However, Gadamer's positive conception of the good life
does not entail condescension, and precisely because it requires a shared
basis for understanding between practical perspectives. For hermeneutics,
the person motivated by sympathy, or "sunesis", will seek a fusion of
horizons, as in this way he "thinks along with the other from the
perspective of a specific bond of belonging, as if he too were affected."104
This can be combined with an analysis of a practice in terms of its nature
as a game that "plays" us, an analysis of the insight which could be
attained.105 A critical analysis of the potential for the good life is possible
here, but only if a commonality is established between perspectives
through an ongoing mutual assessment of prejudices.
A critical, sympathetic, but prejudicial perspective can understand
practices which threaten the good life, which reduce activity to the
"adaptive power" of the "functionary" at the expense of the "creative
power of practical reason."106 As practices are hermeneutically mediated,
we can pursue a shared understanding of the practical requirements for
the valued rational capacity. In contrast, although Nussbaum argues that
capabilities can only be developed in activities, she insists that activities
are of secondary significance for rational capacity. In her earlier work, she
did argue that worthwhile relations of production are a requirement for
the good life and a right of social justice.107 By contrast, more recently she
has argued both that individuals do not have a right to specific practical
conditions and that individuals are "normatively and analytically prior"
to practice.108 However, there is a consistency here with her earlier work.
Her earlier argument, that worthwhile practical conditions are necessary,
was a minimal specification, that which could only be ensured below a
threshold of what was instead a freely, rationally, and individually
chosen good life.109 The conditions of activities have the same
significance as all resources, a significance determined by the separateness
of the individual which they ensure.
Collective interventions which are to ensure the good life can only do so
by enabling what is already a potential, and according to an
understanding projected into the future of how this can be realised.
Hermeneutics can show us that this projection can not be legitimated
104 Ibid., p. 323.
105 Ibid., p. 100.
106 Gadamer, H.-G., (1976) "What is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason", pp. 73-4.
107 Nussbaum, M., (1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", pp. 230-1.
108 Nussbaum, M., (1995) "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings", p. 85; (1999) "The
Feminist Critique of Liberalism", p. 62.
109 Nussbaum, M., (1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", pp. 229-230.
empathetically. Rather, it is the presuppositions which distinguish our
standpoint that enable us to come to a shared understanding with
another perspective concerning their potential good life. Through
hermeneutics, we can pursue a shared understanding with the other
person and an uncertain future. The hermeneutic response to human
need is not contextualist but, rather, enables us to transcend specificity
and understand the potential for good functioning. It also enables us to
transcend unjustified relations which constitute our standpoint.
Durkheim argues that occupations emerge in a mutually reliant division
of labour, and are distinguished by the extent to which practical excellence
can be fostered in them. For Durkheim, the obligation to aid others is
derived from our awareness both that their freedom will only be enabled
through the quality of their practices and that it is possible to accept a
collective responsibility for the distribution of this potential.110 The
potential for the valued capacity can, pace Nussbaum, only be understood
by beginning from the practices in which separateness is at all possible.
For hermeneutics, the motivation to enable the good life, and the content
of this conception of the good life, must both be derived from the fusion
of horizons. Gadamer argues that, as our prejudicial nature has a
dialogical structure, the "other" that we learn from is always already
present in a specific perspective. This is not an empathetic relation with a
context-specific other. Rather, we cannot chose not to learn, and nor can
we learn by abstracting from our horizon.111 Further, not only is it the
historicity of the other that we learn from, but this is the constitutive
requirement of each good life. Therefore, our self-interest in our own
good life already disposes us to ensure the good life of others as that
which we learn from. Nussbaum argues that, from our lack of self-
sufficiency, we can be aware of a self-interest to enable the plurality of
good lives. However, as reasoned-desire is mediated, then it is as finite
hermeneutic selves that we are dependent. Gadamer argues that, from
this dependence, we can be aware of the value of plurality, and realise
this as a commitment both to learn from others and to "strengthen" and
110 Durkheim, E., (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, pp. 3-7, 23, pp. 30-1, p. 46
ff., pp. 63-4, p. 69 ff., p 90 ff..
111 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 461 ff..
transform their standpoints into their "utmost possibilities."112 In the
reformulation of social citizenship, this positive commitment can be
adopted in the attempt to establish the shared basis for understanding
required for each good life and for the legitimation of collective
intervention.
Nussbaum justifies the obligation to aid others from the common
experience of a lack of self-sufficiency. However, for Nussbaum, this is
intended to justify the obligation to aid the separateness of others over
and against their context, and so the only valid normative considerations
are those which acknowledge that the individual is prior to practice.
What Marshall and Durkheim have emphasised instead, is that the good
life of individuals will only be secured when we intervene in the nature
of productive practices to enable practical excellence. In contrast, attempts
to enable the freedom of individuals in their isolation will fail, because
they conceive of freedom independently of practice. In the legitimation of
claims to rights and in the content of rights enjoyed, they do not
acknowledge or secure the necessity of practical conditions for
freedom.113 Marshall and Durkheim call for a specific intervention in
practice. However, they also assume that it will only be identified with as
legitimate when there is a shared awareness of the specific nature in
which the good life is realised through a mutual dependence. This is the
awareness both that the good life of individuals has practical
requirements, and that a mutual responsibility can and should be
accepted to secure these requirements.
As we saw in Chapter Two, Gadamer reformulates Hegel's dialectic as an
open-ended mutual learning process. I argue that this can provide a
model for the interactive relations Marshall and Durkheim call for, and
can show how an awareness of their nature can be fostered. For Gadamer,
dialectic proceeds from, and remains open to, a mutual dependence of
prejudicial perspectives for self-understanding. As a corollary to accepting
that our rational capacities are finite, it is rational to "hope" that we will
112 Ibid. pp. 367-8.
113 In the reformist policies of the civil-political stage of citizenship in Britain, which I
mentioned in Chapter Two Section 1.1., efforts to enable the practical requirements for
citizenship could not be included as a right, and so could not be securely ensured.
learn from others in the future.114 As hermeneutic beings already
engaged in dialogue, we are also obliged to continue this learning process.
However, individuals must be made aware of this mutual dependence so
that the obligations which come with it can be acknowledged. The nature
of understanding is analogous to moral I-Thou relations, where we treat
others as ends in themselves.115 It is only when we accept the possibility
that an individual's attitudes are worth listening to, and ask questions
which are not merely to elicit answers which confirm our
presuppositions, that an insight will be learned from. As a corollary to
this, normative interaction is conceived as a learning process. Only by
accepting the obligation to treat the other human as an end can we learn
both about the ultimate purposes we share and about the presuppositions
which distinguish our specific good lives.
Gadamer's reading of Hegel indicates how social equality can be identified
as the legitimate goal of intervention, from an awareness of its necessity
as the shared basis of understanding for the good life. The concerns of
social citizenship also re-connect Gadamer to one central aspect of the
Hegelian position: the argument that our rational capacity is developed
in central life activities, and in the legitimation of the collective
intervention through which they are enabled. For Gadamer, the dialectic
of learning is ongoing because it continues to be motivated by the
practical interests and concerns of our situation. In relations of social
justice, the good life will only be enabled for others when we also
acknowledge the specific interests which motivate us. However, we are
also motivated by a hope that what is valued, understanding, will be
attained here, and so we must also safeguard the possibilities of openness
and plurality.116 This hermeneutic position can be developed in social
citizenship to account for the open-ended dialectical relations of social
equality. Hermeneutics must account for how an understanding can be
attained in practice of the "interests" in learning, the "value" accrued
from the capacity of others, and the "hope" placed in this. To attain social
equality through hermeneutics, this understanding must be established
in situations with competing criteria of utility, profit, and power.
114 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 349-50.
115 Ibid., pp. 358-62.
116 Ibid., p. 294, p. 355.
The central concern of Marshall's social citizenship is how the
intervention of social justice can legitimately enable the good life. I have
argued that a hermeneutic conception of social citizenship can be
formulated which is motivated by the value of learning so as to enable
the good life of others. The rights of social citizenship must take as their
goal the good life in such practices as art and parenting. In turn, suffering
must be conceived as that which prevents the development of capability
and practical insight within these practices. What I have a partial interest
in need not be a good thing which social justice should enable. Parenting
and art will only be established as valuable when parents and artists
acknowledge the need to learn from what is other, and establish their
value judgement on a shared basis. It is only then that the worth of a
practice will be established with some autonomy from the demands of
monetary or strategic criteria so as, in turn, to be secured as a goal towards
which the market and the State should be guided to achieve. Learning
must entail making an advance beyond our initial presuppositions,
including those of social justice. In this instance, we must be open to the
possible need to reconceptualise why we think parenting and art are
valuable, and why legitimate rights of social justice will enable these
capacities.
The elimination of deprivation also calls for an active and anticipatory
intervention. It obliges us to discern what is as yet often only a possibility
of the good life which can be fostered with our help. We must therefore
be open to the possibility of learning in the sense that we must invest in
its future possibility. Hermeneutics does not attempt to determine in
advance how tradition can be mediated, and so, nor will it attempt to
close off the possibilities of learning.117 Gadamer's negative argument,
that our constituting prejudices can never be kept free from question, is
also put positively. As we can never specify in advance what will have
significance with regard to our self-understanding and our insight into a
subject-matter, we must invest in the future possibilities of learning. This
is the case in conversation, where we must strengthen the arguments of
others if we are to attain a shared understanding which enables us both to
117 Ibid., p. 295.
transcend the limitations of our perspectives. We should be open, as this
offers the potential of arriving at a shared understanding between
perspectives on our ultimate purposes. What needs to be understood is
how diverse forms of life can be pursued together, and how, in living
together, we can continue to learn about each other and our ultimate
purposes.
Conclusion.
I have argued in this chapter that hermeneutics can be reconceived to
account for the necessity of social equality for the rational capacity of the
good life which, in turn, is to legitimate the collective interventions of
social citizenship. I argued that John Rawls' enlightenment position is
superior to Habermas' dualism, and points to the need for a normative
justification for the State and market. However, Rawls' subjective and
negative formalism cannot account for the ongoing practical
determination of the good life. By contrast, Nussbaum's Aristotelian
conception of the good life attempts to account for the ongoing practical
and positive development of capabilities towards insight. However, from
an enlightenment commitment to the power of reason, Nussbaum
cannot account for the practically derived shared understanding required
to enable the good life and legitimate collective intervention. Instead, I
have proposed a hermeneutic account of the Aristotelian good life, as an
historically embedded and mutual learning process within partly
autonomous valued practices. This argument, supported by the
experience of art, is intended to overcome the shortcomings of Marshall's
proposals where relations of authority have a one-sided and deferential
quality, where only a semi-professional status can be enabled in many
social roles, where social equality requires a unified national heritage, and
where the valued practice of parenting can be excluded from the status
differences recognised in citizenship.
I argued in Chapter Two that, if Gadamer's hermeneutic account of an
open-ended dialectic is to be applied to the reformulation of social
citizenship, it must also be re-connected to the Hegelian argument:
namely, that the rational capacity which is to legitimate collective
intervention must be enabled both in central life activities and in
relations of solidarity between such activities. In this chapter I argued that
Gadamer's open-ended dialectic can account for the necessity for our
rational capacity of the shared understanding required for the pursuit of
the good life and for the legitimation of collective interventions which
enables it. I will argue in Chapter Four that Gadamer's hermeneutics can
account for the relations of mutuality which establish the shared
understanding required to socially constitute pursuits of the good life as
identities, or to recognise them. The interrelations required for
recognition must also be distinguished from ideological conditions which
dominate rational capacity and distort the constitution of identities. In
the reformulation of social citizenship, a hermeneutic critique of ideology
will have to account for the relations of inequality which could
undermine social equality. For Marshall, the socially equal status of
citizenship was to provide the basis from which status differences could
be recognised and stabilised. I argue that, by consistently pursuing
Gadamer's account of mutual learning, the shortcomings in Marshall's
own account can be overcome, and non-deferential, egalitarian, and
pluralistic relations of mutual recognition established.
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Chapter Four: Mutual Recognition and Critique of Ideology.
Introduction
The enlightenment and hermeneutic positions discussed in the last
chapter were in agreement that rational capacity is not self-sufficient. The
rational capacity both to pursue the good life and to legitimate projects of
social justice has certain requirements which must be secured. It not only
requires the satisfaction of fundamental needs, but this itself is only
possible with social resources and in communal relations. The previous
chapter analysed this lack of self-sufficiency in terms of the capacity
realised as a good life in practice. The implications of what that assumes
is explored in this chapter: that a lack of self-sufficiency entails a mutual
dependency between pursuits of the good life. This chapter explores how
interrelational requirements for rational capacity are to be secured in the
mutual recognition of each good life as an identity, and how critique of
ideology is to specify the requirements for non-distorted recognition. For
conservative meta-theory, critique must specify how rational capacity can
proceed from within an authoritative horizon and yet identify its
illegitimate relations and assumptions. For the enlightenment, critique
must specify how the interrelations of a community can be justified only
to the extent that they emanate from the power of reason. For the radical,
the subjugation of mutuality must be seen through and the necessity of
transgression made apparent.
In this chapter I argue that Marshall's conception of social citizenship can
be reformulated as a hermeneutic project of recognition. Marshall argued
that citizenship was to recognise certain status differences, but that it
could only do so by also both limiting material inequality and expanding
the area of common culture in which the practical excellence of valued
practices could be ensured. As I argued in Chapter Three, there are
shortcomings in Marshall's account which can be overcome. He assumed
that not all practices could enable the rational capacity required for
recognition, that the common culture required for recognition must be
derived from a national heritage, that parenting could be excluded from
the valued practices to be recognised, and that recognition could be
conferred in relations which had a deferential nature. However, I argue
that these shortcomings do not arise from the conception of social
citizenship itself. They can also be overcome by following consistently the
meta-theory which Marshall presupposes and which, as I have argued,
corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics. In this chapter I also defend
hermeneutics itself from, on the one hand, Foucault's radical
characterisation of relations of mutual recognition as forms of
disciplinary subjugation. On the other hand, I argue that Habermas'
criticism, that hermeneutics cannot be distinguished from cultural
conservatism, is a charge which, instead, is applicable to the Romantic
commitments in Charles Taylor's communitarian position.
In Section 1. I argue that the hermeneutic reformulation of social
citizenship can defend an account of the mutual recognition which is
realised in relations of social equality. I defend Marshall's argument that
practical excellence must be recognised within social equality. Alongside
this I defend Durkheim's account of corporately justified interventions
which are to ensure, in the market and elsewhere, the interactive
relations required for practical excellence. In the reformulation of social
citizenship, Gadamer's conception of the open-ended learning process
required for rational capacity must itself be reconceived. In line with the
Hegelian argument, hermeneutics must account for the necessity for
capacity of relations of solidarity secured through collective intervention.
Further, hermeneutic analysis will enable us to revise social citizenship
and reject Marshall's proposed recognition which did not acknowledge
the value of parenting or enable professional status equally, and which
also proceeded from a national heritage of deferential relations of
authority. As hermeneutic recognition and critique remain practically
derived as learning processes, we can not arrive at a final basis to justify
our knowledge of the requirements for recognition or of the criteria of
recognition. Therefore, we are obliged to continue to pursue a mutual
learning process in critique and recognition, a learning process which is
culturally plural, egalitarianly inclusive, and based on just power
relations.
In Section 2. I argue that many of the charges laid against hermeneutics by
critical theory are in fact applicable instead to Charles Taylor's
communitarianism. Taylor also proceeds from conservative meta-theory.
He agrees with Gadamer that the rational capacity of recognition is reliant
upon the interrelations which extend tradition. He also argues that the
material and structural requirements for recognition will only be
understood and ensured through a practically derived and ethically
committed critique. However, I distinguish Taylor's account from the
hermeneutic conception of practical excellence which, I argue, is to be
recognised in relations of social equality. Gadamer's recognition and
critique are processes of mutual learning through which shared
presuppositions of justification are applied in new situations. Taylor
proposes, instead, a Romantic argument that bases for justification arise
from an identification with one's collective subjectivity. I argue that since
Taylor's recognition and critique are not processes of mutual learning, he
is unable to distinguish, in a non-ideological way, the ideological
condition from relations of recognition. As mutual learning is absent
from his account of traditional relations of authority, Taylor's position
will tend to justify authoritarian, ethnocentric, and atavistic
interrelations.
Michel Foucault's radical position is discussed in Section 3.. For Foucault,
hermeneutic criteria can only be established through an arbitrary
evaluative exclusion of other ways of knowing and doing. Further, for
Foucault, the hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship, which
recognises practical excellence within relations of social equality, would
merely intensify the subjugation already characteristic of relations of
mutual recognition. Foucault argues that in place of mutual recognition,
"games of liberty" must be pursued which resist subjugation so as to
establish ethical practices of the self in regimes of the body. These are
relations of power and knowledge which minimise the subjugation of
the self. They do so, however, by violently rejecting the normative claims
of others, whether in relations of recognition and distributive justice, or
in the practices of technical experts where the goodness of a life is
assessed. I argue, however, that the radical project cannot be justified. It
assumes that acts of resistance can transgress both the requirements for
rational capacity and the necessity of relations of mutuality. I argue
instead that such acts can always be understood, that hermeneutics will
enable us to do so, and that this insight is possible only for practical
perspectives enabled in socially just relations of mutual recognition.
In Section 4. I return again to Habermas' position, and his attempts to
specify and secure the mutuality required in recognition. Habermas'
position is an advance on Taylor's inability to exclude ideological
conditions, and on Foucault's rejection of mutuality as such.
Nevertheless, Habermas' account of an egalitarian recognition would
reject my argument that the recognition of historically specific good lives
across all aspects of interaction is both possible and necessary. For
Habermas, recognition must be negative, pursuing the general interest
alone; formal, conferring recognition only on the characteristics equally
shared by all; and dualistic, free from the colonizing forces of systems.
Freedom from ideology is attained only to the extent that shared
presuppositions, unconscious motives, and social forces are made
increasingly transparent and assessed in relations of mutual reflective
abstraction. He argues that this is the potential for dialectic advance in
recognition and critique, and that it has been determined by the universal
process of rationalisation. However, I argue instead the dialectic of
critique and recognition must be substantive, comprehensive, and
positive, as it must be motivated by the partly concealed presuppositions
and interests we have concerning the enablement of practical excellence. I
also argue that the potential for this dialectic is only available to the
capacity constituted in the mutuality of social equality.
§1. The necessity of social equality for hermeneutic critique and
recognition.
In this section I introduce the hermeneutic conception of mutual
recognition, and the hermeneutic critique of ideology which is to specify
the requirements for recognition. I argue that hermeneutic relations of
mutuality are necessary for the development of rational capacity as an
identity of the good life. Hermeneutic mutual learning provides the
necessary basis to both legitimate the collective interventions of
citizenship and pursue the good life in practice. The concept of mutual
learning places certain requirements on interaction, on the role which
relations of power, control, struggle, and traditional authority can play.
Critique of ideology must, in turn, specify when a transgression of these
limits has occurred which undermines the requirements for recognition
and, thus, the rational capacity of individuals in interaction. I also argue
both that the hermeneutic position can be applied in the reformulation of
social citizenship, and that Marshall's conception of a socially equal
recognition can be shown to be necessary for hermeneutic capacity.
However, Marshall's commitments must also be revised. Unlike
Marshall, I argue that social equality cannot be based on deferential
relations within a national culture, where the valued capacity is not
enabled equally, and where socially valued practices such as parenting are
excluded. Rather, mutual relations of learning must also be culturally
plural relations of justified power and egalitarian inclusion.
1.1. Hermeneutic mutuality and the requirements for social
citizenship.
In Chapter Three I argued that the rational capacity of a good life could
only be enabled when certain needs are met through collective
intervention, including the need for, and the needs of, social interaction.
The reflection on recognition argues that these material and interactive
conditions will only enable this capacity as a good life if they also
constitute it as one identity among others. The good life is an identity, as
there must be considerations which are appropriate to determine
whether the way in which needs are satisfied can enable the outcome of a
good life. These must be considerations appropriate to understanding the
goodness of a life, rather than merely that of a situation. They are also
considerations which distinguish a good life from the other potentials of
a rational capacity. To distinguish a good life requires ethical
considerations which determine what significance is to be given to an
interest in the good life of others, and in what way the criteria governing
a life can be applicable to all good lives. Further, rational capacity can only
ever be constituted as the identity of a specific good life. The
considerations which distinguish a rational capacity as a good life must
do so for a specific identity, this specific psychological, physical, and
historical "I."
A rational capacity can only be constituted as the identity of a good life
when it is recognised as such by those who share this potential. It must be
acknowledged as an instance of the shared rational capacity, where the
considerations which can distinguish an identity of the good life will be
relevant. The way in which these relevant considerations are deployed
must also be acknowledged as being appropriate for the identity of a good
life. It is only others who share this rational capacity and pursue the good
life who can acknowledge an identity as a valid difference within what is
shared. However, recognition does not simply acknowledge differences,
but itself determines what considerations are appropriate here and,
therefore, actively constitutes the identity of the good life. For instance,
the considerations which are appropriate for the identity of a parent will
differ between practices, and precisely because the good life of the parent
has been constituted in different ways in these practices. Practices which
deliver services such as health care or employment rights to individuals,
on grounds determined by their being parents, are at the same time
determining what considerations go to constitute the identity of the good
life of a parent.
A good life is constituted as an identity in recognition according to the
appropriate application of the considerations of the good life. There must
therefore be criteria of recognition with which to determine when such
an application is appropriate. However, it must also be possible to assess
whether these criteria of recognition are themselves valid. A critical
reflection is required if we are to assess, for example, the constitution of
the parent's identity in health care services and employment legislation.
However, this example shows that the criteria of recognition will be
arrived at within ongoing interaction and will, in turn, be deployed in
the recognition of specific individuals in diverse practices. A critical
reflection must therefore assess this interaction itself. It must determine
the interactive conditions which can enable a justified process of
recognition. The interaction of recognition must itself express our
rational capacity. At the same time, the criteria of recognition which are
determined through this interaction must themselves be valid for the
constitution of the identities of our rational capacity. We must, therefore,
account for how this rational capacity required for recognition can be
secured within intersubjective relations against those features which
could distort or undermine it.
The radical, enlightenment, and hermeneutic positions each assume an
ideal in some form of the social interaction which is required for
recognition. The enlightenment and hermeneutic positions share a
commitment to "mutual" recognition. In Section 3. I turn to the radical
argument that mutuality itself is a site of subjugation which must be
overcome. In Section 4. I discuss Habermas' enlightenment account,
where mutual relations of the life-world are to ensure the equal respect
necessary for the enablement of the power of reason of individuals in
interaction. However, in this section I discuss the hermeneutic account,
where mutual relations ensure the rational capacity realised in self-
understanding within the progress of tradition.
For Gadamer, rational capacity necessarily requires conditions of
mutuality which treat each individual as an end in themselves. It is only
in these conditions that an individual's rational capacity will both be
constituted as an identity and determine valid criteria of recognition.
Mutual relations treat the individual as an end, and so power relations
must not either "dominate" capacity, by reducing the individual to an
effect of forces, or "normalise" identity, by imposing a good life on the
subordinate.1 Mutual relations also avoid technological objectification, as
individuals must neither be an object that is controlled nor a subject
whose sole interest is to control and predict the interaction with others.2
Mutual relations must also incorporate the forceful struggle to be
recognised, the conflict which all authentic dialogue requires as a
"standing up for" our projected self-understanding.3 Not only will
seemingly antithetical identities generate disagreement on questions
where agreement is considered important, but certain specific lives can be
characterised by conflict in themselves, such as the creative conflict
associated with an artistic life.4 Mutuality must also incorporate the
power relations structured through an unequal access to authoritative
insight. Such relations are mutual where authority is conferred freely and
rationally, rather than in blindly doing what another desires.5
A critical hermeneutic reflection must specify what presuppositions
which we hold are in fact invalid. Hermeneutic critique of ideology must
specify where disruptions to the recognition of our rational capacity
' Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 358-9.
2 Ibid., p. 358.
3 Ibid., pp. 260-1.
4 Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "The Phenomenological Movement", p. 139.
5 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 361.
explain our tendency to hold invalid presuppositions. Hermeneutic
rational capacity is enabled in all aspects of interaction, and so critique of
ideology must specify how it can be realised comprehensively. As I
argued in Chapter Three Section 4., the hermeneutic conception of
capacity mediates the reasoned desire of Nussbaum's prohairesis.
Hermeneutic critique of ideology must therefore account for those
material conditions, situations of serious suffering, which disrupt the
potential for self-understanding. Hermeneutic relations of mutuality
must enable the fusion of horizons between perspectives. Not only must
critique of ideology account for features of power, control, struggle, and
authority which may enable or hinder this. It must also account for the
potential for valued practices, which require a certain autonomy from
everyday purposive requirements. Finally, this shared understanding
must be attained between those with divergent partial interests in the
good life. Critique of ideology must not only account for how this
partiality can be compatible with attaining shared understanding, but also
for how it could lead to processes of normalisation in relations of
inequality.
In this chapter I attempt again to proceed from Gadamer's own
arguments so as to fully realise his hermeneutic position in the
reformulation of social citizenship. I argued in Chapter Two that
Gadamer's conception of an open-ended dialectic should be reconnected
with Hegel's concern, that rational capacity can only be enabled in central
life activities and in relations of solidarity, and in legitimating the
collective interventions which enable both. In Chapter Three I argued
that Gadamer's hermeneutic account of an Aristotelian good life could
incorporate Nussbaum's focus on the capabilities of good functioning. I
also argued that it should be conceived according to Marshall's ideal of
practical excellence which can only be realised in valued practices which
attain the status required for social equality. My discussion of
hermeneutic recognition and critique of ideology follows on from these
arguments. Hermeneutic critique and recognition must incorporate the
Hegelian argument that collective intervention is necessary to ensure the
solidarity required for our rational capacity. The mutuality required in
hermeneutic recognition to enable Aristotelian good functioning must
also be conceived in line with Marshall's social measure of equality. A
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practically-derived hermeneutic critique must continue to identify the
requirements for the recognition of social citizenship.
Marshall argued that the status of social equality must also recognise
valued social differences. However, the inequalities of income and power
must first be reduced sufficiently, Marshall argued, so that an area of
culture common to all classes and statuses could be extended. This would
be realised in the common enjoyment of essential services, such as health
care, housing, and education. It was also to be realised in a "sharing of
heritage" constituted by the shared experience of valued productive
practices in which practical excellence could be attained, the status of
professionalism.6 For Marshall, it was on this material and cultural basis
of social equality that the status differences between productive practices
could be recognised and stabilised. These were the differences ensured
through the fair wage, a socially just account of inequality which ensured
that differentiation could be contained and prevented from undermining
social equality.7 Marshall argued that the State was to be directed to attain
this end of social equality, and that the market was to be mediated
through this status. A shared understanding was, therefore, required of
"social efficiency" for the functioning of the State and the economy.
Practical excellence was to be recognised not only as a status difference
within social equality, but in legitimating the collective interventions to
bring this about.8
I argue, however, that there are certain shortcomings in Marshall's
account. Although Marshall was aware of the need to attain shared
understandings between communal perspectives in analysing social
interaction,9 he nevertheless argued that a "national heritage" was to be
shared in citizenship. This assumed homogeneity can no longer be
accepted as the basis for social equality, considering the culturally diverse
ways in which needs such as education are conceptualised. Marshall also
argued that social progress must provide an equal opportunity for
6 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", p. 121.
7 Ibid., p. 118.
8 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 169.
9 Marshall, T. H., (1959) "International Comprehension in and through Social Science", in
Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays (London: Heinemann, 1963), p. 46 ff..
women and the working class to attain valued productive roles.10 At the
same time, as we saw in Chapter Three, he conflated relations of
authority with those of deference. Within the division of labour,
deferential relations will have a class-specific authoritarian consequence,
as can be seen in the exclusion of many practices from the equal status of
professionalism. It will also have gender-specific consequences, as can be
seen in Marshall's exclusion of parenting as a practice from those statuses
recognised in citizenship. However, I argue that these shortcomings do
not follow from the meta-theory evident in Marshall's account of
recognition and, therefore, they are problems hermeneutics can help
overcome. If the ideal of mutual learning is followed consistently, then
the recognition pursued in social citizenship will avoid ethnocentric and
authoritarian conclusions.
This discussion reconnects hermeneutics with the Hegelian argument
that rational capacity is enabled by collective intervention and in
legitimating such intervention. This capacity is realised in an
identification with one's central life activity. However, it will also be
realised in relations of solidarity established between good lives. The
considerations which can go to constitute an identity must be derived
from the shared presuppositions of a specific community and its relations
of recognition. The reflection of recognition must proceed from the
presuppositions which are appropriate to the specific practice of the good
life in an attempt to understand the good life of another. Through
recognition, a shared understanding can be arrived at of the requirements
for our rational capacity and for the differentiations of identity. As Hegel
argues, an essential feature of recognition will be the communally specific
reciprocal relations between practices, corporate bodies, and State
agencies. The collective interventions of justice are to enable this rational
capacity and, therefore, must enable the pursuit of recognition between
practices. However, collective interventions can only be legitimated by
this practically-derived insight and, therefore, through the awareness
achieved concerning the requirements for recognition in relations of
mutuality between practices.11
10 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 155; (1949)
"Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 112-5.
11 See: Plant, R., (1983) Hegel. An Introduction, pp. 219-225.
Rational capacity both has material requirements and can alone be
developed within specific practical conditions. As a result, relations of
recognition can only be established when the material and interactive
requirements for the good life are ensured. However, the redistributive
intervention called for here cannot be justified separately from the
pursuit either of the good life or of recognition. Each identity is mutually
reliant on others for its recognition. The duty to recognise others
therefore also entails a duty to ensure the material and interactive
requirements for the good life of others. As I argued in Chapter Three, for
Gadamer, the rational capacity of the good life is substantive,
comprehensive, and positive. Gadamer argues that this capacity is
realised in a dialectic of recognition which is an open-ended learning
process. Therefore, for hermeneutics, we must proceed with prejudicial
conceptions of the criteria of recognition and the requirements for
recognition about which we continue to learn. In applying hermeneutics
to the reformulation of social citizenship, this open-ended learning
process must also justify the redistributive intervention Hegel calls for as
part of recognition. It is justified by an awareness of the requirements for
mutuality arrived at through a practically derived mutual learning
process which we are obliged to pursue.
1.2. The mutual practical relations of social equality.
I argue here that Gadamer's claim, that mutual learning is necessary for
our rational capacity, can account for the nature of recognition and
critique. For Gadamer, rational capacity is developed as a practical
excellence within partly autonomous practices, the "games" which "play
us." The appropriateness of considerations for the constitution of an
identity will be determined from within the hermeneutic horizon of a
practically derived reflection. Practices are also already structured by
relations of power, of technological control, and of unequal access to
authoritative insight. The hermeneutic nature of our rational capacity
prevents us from establishing criteria to assess interaction which are not
themselves derived from these features of practice.12 However, the
hermeneutic nature of our rational capacity also obliges us to continue to
12 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology", p. 284.
pursue non-arbitrary criteria of recognition and critique. It is because our
partly autonomous games are hermeneutically mediated that they can,
and must, be critically assessed.13 Judgements made within a
hermeneutic practice can only be justified with shared criteria. This is
because our rational capacity can never be contextualist. It can not limit by
fiat the other which addresses and informs it.14 Our criteria of
justification are, therefore, determined by the necessity of a hermeneutic
perspective to overcome the specificity of its constitution in games.
For Gadamer, a practice can only rationally and normatively advance if it
proceeds by building back up the hermeneutic dimension. The valid
understanding of how a practice can continue to enable rational capacity
must be derived from a shared understanding with other perspectives.
Further, the mutual learning required to build the hermeneutic
dimension back up is already a goal which the participants of a practice
are obliged to pursue in relations of recognition. Participants must be
mutually open to revise their presuppositions of justification. It is only
through the pursuit of a shared understanding with some other identity
that we can learn about the subject matter of recognition and, therefore,
constitute our identity.15 This must be the case when identities of
recognition are constituted at a political level. They are constituted in
Gadamer's Aristotelian relations of "friendship", which both make life
concrete and mediate between virtues and goods which exist only in
being shared. This relation of mutuality is also the basis from which to
legitimately intervene and enable relations of mutual recognition in
social interaction elsewhere, in different forms of "education."16
Recognition in politics, the intervention to enable recognition elsewhere,
and the recognition thus enabled, must all proceed as hermeneutically
embedded mutual learning processes.
Gadamer's argument, that mutual learning is necessary for rational
capacity, will also account for the nature of critique of ideology. For
Gadamer, a "limit situation of understanding", which obstructs mutual
13 Ibid., pp. 288-9.
14 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 462-3.
15 Ibid., p. 359.
1^ Gadamer, H.-G., (1963) "On the Possibility of Philosophical Ethics", pp. 371-2.
learning, also hinders the development of the rational capacity which is
reliant on that process. Hermeneutic practices are therefore antithetical to
relations of domination and normalisation, both because the latter are
relations of unreflective obedience and because this itself undermines
rational capacity. This is a practically derived meta-theoretical
understanding that mutual learning alone will enable rational capacity.
This forms the basis for a hermeneutic critique to identify ideological
conditions which either distort shared meanings or undermine rational
capacity.17 For Gadamer, critique can also proceed from the practically-
derived reflection of recognition itself, as this is the "continual definition
and redefinition on our lives."18 In practical reflection we continue to
assess our presuppositions of justification, which concern not only what
can be accepted as true, but why this is the case. As these assumptions are
thought to be necessary for the attainment of understanding in a practice,
they must remain open to the reformulation which learning requires.
However, such a reformulation is also a critical assessment of the
presuppositions which guide the course of a practice.
Hermeneutic critique will give a distinctive account of mutuality, and
also of how it is to be established. As the presuppositions of a practice are
also hermeneutically embedded, the prejudicial identity of a practice will
be constituted only in relations of mutuality with the identities of other
practices. As the prejudicial constitution of an identity is also dialogical in
structure, relations of mutuality will be hermeneutically embedded and
continuous learning processes. Relations of recognition must be
constituted by, and continue to pursue, shared presuppositions of
justification. This must be the case both for the political relations where
the rights of social justice are determined, and for the relations of civil
society and the family in which these rights are enjoyed. The interaction
of these spheres must be conceived as a practice, while this interaction is
also composed of divergent practices. The interaction of and between
practices must pursue a hermeneutically embedded mutual learning
process. They will proceed with presuppositions concerning the proper
limits of relations of power and control, of struggle, conflict and
17 Gadamer, H.-G., (1976) "What is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason", pp. 70-73,
pp. 78-80; (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Practical Philosophy", pp. 104-109.
18 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology", p. 284.
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prejudicial insight. The continuous practical constitution of identity
must, however, entail the mutual revision of these presuppositions.
For both Marshall and Durkheim, however, such an account of
recognition pursued within and between practices necessitates the
establishment of "corporate" bases for interaction and collective
intervention. I argued in Chapter Three Section 4. that, for Durkheim,
the standards of excellence of a practice can only be determined by
considerations of practical functioning. Durkheim also argues that the
good functioning of a practice must be ensured through secondary
groups, such as guilds and modern professional associations.19 An
association is to perpetuate a valued practice, by securing its
considerations from dissolution under the force of the price mechanism
in the market, by ensuring that State intervention is directed towards its
enablement, and by ensuring that participants maintain the standards of
excellence of the practice. There is a mutually sustaining relation between
the practice and the association. However, it relies upon a similar relation
between the State and the practices and associations from which the
identities of political recognition are derived. The enablement of the good
life as a practically constituted identity must be the subject matter of
political recognition. It is also collective intervention which recognizes
the identities of civil and familial relations with the status of practical
excellence, of "professionalism", as Marshall argued.
As Durkheim and Marshall argue, no final limitation of power relations
in practices can be formulated, as they can be justified only with criteria
drawn from the practice which continues to develop through such
relations. To pursue standards of excellence is also to struggle to be
recognised as having authority. However, to be recognized is to be
granted the authority to apply, or revise, the standards of excellence of the
practice.20 As Gadamer argues, domination continues to be a danger
where there is struggle, if one that is never realised in its totality.21
Within the continuous exertion of force within our practical horizon, the
19 Durkheim, E., (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, p. 24, pp. 37-40, p. 46, pp. 63-
4, pp. 81-4.
20 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 153, p. 156;
Durkheim, E., (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, p. 8, pp. 12-13, p. 29.
21 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 359.
practical insight must be developed which can in turn distinguish the
ideological condition from the relation of recognition. For Gadamer, the
exertion of power can be legitimate only if it is a moment of, and
conducive to, mutual learning. However, as Marshall argues, it is
necessary to intervene so as to create the conditions in which this insight
is possible. It requires a basis for understanding which has a certain
autonomy from the brute forces of inequality and power.22 However, this
partly autonomous status can also only be established by limiting power
so as to create the space of social equality. This is the space of mutuality,
in which considerations which remain practically derived are,
nonetheless, not derived from conditions of domination.
The mutuality of recognition established at the political level must
enable us to return and ensure the relations of learning required for the
identity of the good life. For Gadamer, in the "hermeneutic circle" of
dialogue, an advance must always be sought on the presuppositions from
which we had proceeded. We must proceed by projecting before us a
"fore-conception of completeness", the truth we assume can be attained
from this conversation, so as to come back and revise our motivating
presuppositions.23 Similarly, critique of ideology enables us to proceed
with a preconception of the hoped-for community of recognition, a
"utopia" whose presuppositions we will only assess when we apply it in
relations of recognition.24 Through Marshall and Durkheim we can
reconnect hermeneutics to the Hegelian theme, and in so doing specify
the prejudices we must proceed from in recognition and critique. It is the
shared status of social equality, necessary for the capacity of mutual
recognition and the critique of ideology, which must be the prejudicial
commitment of intervention. As a process of mutual learning, this
commitment must be revised in the changing relations between cultures,
genders, and classes. At the same time, it is in this active determination
of the requirements for social equality given new situations that the
hermeneutic capacity will be realised.
22 Marshall, T. H., (1953) "The Nature and Determinants of Social Status", pp. 188-9.
23 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 294 ff..
24 Gadamer, H.-G., (1976) "What is Practice? The Conditions of Social Reason", pp. 81-2.
§2. Romanticism and communitarian equal recognition.
I turn now to discuss Charles Taylor's communitarian position, which is
also derived from conservative meta-theory. For both Taylor and
Gadamer, it is the certainty of a life led in tradition which is sought, both
in critical reflection and in the recognition of identities. Bases for
justification must, therefore, be derived from a shared traditional
horizon which has authority for reflection, while recognition is attained
where rational capacity is realised as an identity in the continuity of
tradition. Furthermore, Taylor's goal is, in several respects, similar to the
hermeneutic social citizenship. Fie wants to account for the egalitarian
recognition of the plurality of cultural identities which, in turn, are
realised in "ordinary life" activities of employment and family life. I have
argued in Section 1. that Gadamer's hermeneutics can establish bases for
justification in recognition and critique because the prejudicial nature of
refection both enables and obliges the continuous pursuit of a mutual
learning process. However, this is distinct from Taylor's "Romantic"
account, where the presuppositions and commitments of practical
rational capacity arise from an identification with one's collective
subjectivity. Taylor's account of practically-derived recognition and
critique is problematic because its bases for justification are not
established through a mutual learning process.
In Chapter Three I argued that Gadamer's conception of the good life was
not an authoritarian account of relations of practical excellence, and nor
was it bound to closed horizons. This follows from my argument in
Chapter One, that Gadamer's hermeneutics can be distinguished from the
"cultural conservatism" of Heidegger and Romanticism, with its
tendency towards an authoritarian, ethnocentric, and atavistic conception
of rational capacity. In this chapter I make a similar distinction
concerning recognition between hermeneutics and Taylor's
communitarianism. Taylor's position does not assume that mutuality is
necessary for learning and just power relations. For that reason, I argue, it
is unable to pursue relations of recognition or to identify ideological
conditions in a non-ideological way. First, its account of a one-sided
authoritative insight cannot be distinguished from the ideological
condition of non-reflective obedience. Second, it cannot account for the
necessity to learn from divergent horizons, and so it will be unable to
pursue a traditionally embedded and committed recognition without
perpetuating a contextualist ethnocentric or atavistic normalisation.
Finally, it will be unable to identify the significance of the mutual
distribution of resources which enable relations of mutual learning. It
will therefore be unable to justify measures to ensure socially just
relations which enable an authoritative insight.
2.1. Collective subjectivity and the horizons of understanding.
From within conservative meta-theory, Taylor and Gadamer both argue
that rational capacity remains embedded within historical practice.25 The
identity of the good life can only be constituted where the criteria of
recognition are derived from the historically specific understandings of
individuals in the good lives they have an interest in pursuing.26 These
partial interests are not arbitrarily determined and justified. The specific
lives we have an interest in pursuing derive their normative significance
from the fact that they are necessary, in the interrelation with others, both
to constitute identity in recognition and to perpetuate the sustaining
dimension of tradition. Taylor's position also corresponds in an
important respect with our conception of social citizenship, as he argues
that parenting and paid employment can be recognised as identities of the
good life because of the value modernity places on such "ordinary life"
practices. Taylor and Gadamer also agree that the bases for justification of
recognition and critique are formed from traditional presuppositions
which have authority for reflection. They must be formed through an
"authoritative insight" into these shared presuppositions.27 As the
continuity of meaning in tradition is equally significant to each identity,
the authority of the socialised insight into the perpetuation of this shared
dimension must be acknowledged.
A distinction needs to be drawn, however, between Gadamer's and
Taylor's conceptions of a practical authoritative reasoning. Taylor argues
that a "higher-order preference" is the commitment against which all
other preferences should be judged. It is derived from an insight into the
25 Taylor, C., (1990) "Comparison, History, Truth", pp. 146-164, in Philosophical
Arguments (London: Harvard University Press, 1995).
26 Taylor, C., (1989) Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), pp. 19-20.
27 Ibid., pp. 82-3.
"moral sources" of one's practice, such as those which confer value on
"ordinary life" activity.28 To be successfully recognised, I must identify
with my higher-order preference and its moral sources.29 However,
Taylor assumes that some other person with an authoritative insight can
"second-guess" my higher-order preference, whether by specifying what it
is or that it should be acted on. This follows as, for Taylor, an
authoritative insight is derived from the "ad hominem" reasoning of
inescapable commitment to practical presuppositions.30 Taylor's
authoritative insight is not derived from a Gadamerian mutual
understanding with the other perspective. Rather, Taylor understands
the moral source by "bringing it close", rather than by assessing the
presuppositions of both his historical situation and his tradition.31 Taylor
also second-guesses the moral source of another's life, rather than
coming to a mutual understanding about the presuppositions of both
perspectives. For Taylor, mutual learning is not therefore essential for
authority nor, specifically, for the recognition of identities.
Taylor draws on Humboldt's and Herder's Romanticism here. He argues
that identity is constituted within the effort to attain the continuity of a
tradition through an "ad hominem" insight into our collective
subjectivity, or the moral sources of our group's "horizon."32 But
Gadamer's hermeneutics is distinct from this Romantic version of
conservative meta-theory. For Gadamer, the content of a tradition can
only provide a basis for reflection now if the presuppositions of
justification of both the tradition and the present situation are mutually
put at risk in understanding. An horizon can only be authoritative for
reflection if there is some way to identity and exclude its arbitrarily
derived or dissimulating aspects. We must determine what aspects of an
horizon can be applied, such that they have authority for us. However,
we must always pre-judge what does have significance for us, as it is
prevailing interpretations of this traditional horizon that go to form our
28 Ibid., p. 27.
29 Taylor, C., (1979) "What's wrong with negative liberty", in Liberty, ed. David Miller
(Oxford University Press), pp. 160-1
30 Taylor, C., (1989) Sources of the Self, pp. 92-3, 96-7.
31 Ibid., pp. 92-3.
32 Taylor, C., (1995) "The Importance of Herder", in Philosophical Arguments (London:
Harvard University Press), pp. 91-2; (1995) "Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian
Debate", in Philosophical Arguments (London: Harvard University Press),pp. 185-6.
worldview, which is "always already affected by history."33 The authority
of a traditional horizon can only therefore be established if we are willing
to assess both our understandings and this horizon itself.
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An ethical commitment can only be derived from our tradition when we
are open to learn. Any commitment we do derive must also be
accompanied by a normative obligation to continue to learn. Therefore,
communal considerations can only constitute my identity in the way in
which they are "applied" in the present situation. My identity is not a
standard with which to assess my life independently of this application.34
Further, the authoritative understanding of these considerations cannot
be established through my non-reflective obedience. Authority must
itself be freely and rationally conferred through a process of mutual
learning.35 An authoritative horizon can only emerge from mutual
learning. Therefore, what is taken to be an authoritative horizon must
not be the outcome or cause of ideological conditions. It must not merely
reflect, or help perpetuate, power relations which normalise our identity,
or dominate our rational capacity. Gadamer's account of freedom from
ideology is based on the model of a mutual learning process. Where this
is absent our rational capacity will be threatened. Mutual learning is also
itself the means by which a critical reformulation of our presuppositions
is possible. Therefore, Taylor's exclusion of mutuality removes the
means both to critically identify ideological conditions and to bring about
relations of recognition freed from ideology.
My criticisms of Taylor must be distinguished from those put forward
within enlightenment critical theory which are directed against
conservative meta-theory as such. Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth argue
that the certainty of recognition and critique can be ensured only by
securing the requirements for the power of reason in itself.36 These
33 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 300.
34 Ibid., p. 281.
35 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology", p. 285;
(1989) Truth and Method, p. 281.
36 Honneth, A., (1992) The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social
Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity Press), pp. 17-19, p. 25, pp. 172-3; Fraser,
N., (1999) "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and
Participation", in Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn, ed. Larry Ray & Andrew
Sayer (London: Sage), pp. 33-37.
universalizable requirements can only be specified formally and
negatively, without communally-specific presuppositions and
commitments. The capacity thus enabled is also the ability to reflectively
distance itself from the partial interests of a communally specific identity.
Through distanciation, we can make transparent to reflection the
presuppositions of justification of recognition and critique and,
moreover, ensure the formal and normatively negative requirements for
the constitution of any identity. For critical theory, conservatism will
inevitably lead to ethnocentric and atavistic normalisation. It does not
enable the universal capacity to rationally assess the worth of identities.
Instead, it is committed to constitute specific identities, and to do so
through relations of power whose bases for justification are concealed
from the reflection of subordinate, non-authoritative, groups.
Conservatism cannot, therefore, ensure that it will not enforce identities
on groups considered subordinate due to the marginality of their culture
or their traditionally subordinate role in the division of labour.
In Section 4. I discuss Habermas' critical theory, and will defend
hermeneutics there from the charge that it cannot account for recognition
or critique of ideology. However, in this section my concern is to
distinguish from Romanticism the hermeneutic development of the
conservative argument, that recognition and critique are forms of
practically derived authoritative reflection, reflection which proceeds
from concealment and commitment. I argue that it is only when mutual
learning is excluded from a practically derived recognition and critique
that it will be tend to perpetuate ideological conditions. Without mutual
learning, a traditionally-embedded and committed practical reflection
will lend itself to a normalisation of identity which is motivated by
ethnocentric and atavistic contextualist commitments. I argue that
Taylor's approach will suffer from these problems. However, this is not
because Taylor's conceives of recognition and critique as practically
derived processes of reflection. It is rather due to his attempts to base
practically derived reflection on the moral sources of a collective
subjectivity. A hermeneutic recognition and critique can avoid these
problems through its pursuit of a practical mutual learning process.
Gadamer argues that the recognition sought in political relations is a
shared status of "friendship" and "fellowship." This is both the active
sharing of the goods and values of political membership, and the active
participation in a learning process from which a shared understanding of
these goods and values is derived. This political recognition will also
have to account for the inclusion of new groups. In many situations it
will have to come to a shared understanding of "utopian"
representations of the hoped-for community of recognition. This must be
a mutual understanding where the ideal hoped-for recognition of diverse
groups is "applied" in the present situation. The pursuit of this shared
understanding also practically applies the ideal of mutual learning itself.
What each process of recognition must determine is how groups with
divergent conceptions of the good life can have a right to shape the public
interest and, in turn, to determine the distribution of the material
requirements for the good life in social interaction. The shared
understanding of recognition must determine in what way the learning
process of the good life, which attains the practical excellence of good
functioning, is to be enabled throughout social interaction. The
continuing process of recognition can avoid the danger of normalisation
through mutual learning and, therefore, by continuing to practically
apply the ideal of mutuality.
Taylor is also concerned with how a non-distortive recognition of new or
minority groups can be ensured, as in the struggle of the Francophone
Quebecois for cultural equality.37 He argues that critique must identify the
practical and ethical requirements for the constitution of the identities of
this group and the larger society. Taylor also argues that the subject
matter to be recognised is the way the groups' moral sources can be
realised as conceptions of the good life in practice. The cultural equality of
the minority group will only be ensured in the realisation of their moral
sources in modernity's valued "ordinary life" activities, such as
employment and parenting. The non-distortive nature of recognition
will be manifest only in the way in which it enables substantive
conceptions of the good life throughout social relations. Taylor's position
rightly rejects the arguments of critical theory here, that the material
37 Taylor, C., (1992) "The Politics of Recognition", pp. 25-73, in Multiculturalism and "The
Politics of Recognition", ed. Amy Gutmann (Chichester: Princeton University Press).
requirements for recognition can be specified formally and negatively.38
For Taylor, these material requirements will only be identified through
an understanding of, and ethical commitment to, the ways they can be
deployed in specific forms of life. Conceptions of the good life must
therefore motivate political recognition itself and the collective
intervention in social interaction, and they must also provide the
medium for the interaction of the family, the market, and civil
association.
For Taylor to justify this project of recognition, it must be shown that it
will avoid or overcome certain ideological conditions. Therefore, he
must be able to account for critique of ideology. This critique must
identify the conditions which undermine rational capacity and prevent
the constitution of the identity of the good life. It must also identify
conditions which generate dissimulating shared beliefs which conceal
from view the nature of interaction. Critique of ideology must also
account for how the rational capacity and shared beliefs established in
ideological conditions themselves perpetuate these conditions. Shared
beliefs which hide from view the worth of an identity can justify treating
a group in such a way as to undermine their rational capacity; while the
dominated capacity cannot be aware of what the requirements in
interaction are for the valid constitution of identities, its own and others.
Taylor's critique of ideology must specify what conditions will
undermine the capacity of the Quebecois, parents, and the employed. He
must also specify how to overcome the accepted beliefs which
undervalue the culture of another group and the life led in certain
practices. This will provide a basis to argue for a form of recognition
which also overcomes the power relations and material inequality which
were the cause of such domination and of the ideological distortion of
shared beliefs.
Taylor argues that recognition is a non-distortive understanding of
identity, and that this itself requires the attainment of a shared
perspective of understanding. The criteria for this recognition must be
based on mutual bases for justification and so, in the process of
38 Honneth, A., (1992) The Struggle for Recognition, p. 172; Fraser, N., (1999) Social Justice
in the Age of Identity Politics", p. 36.
recognition, each perspective must overcome its own specificity. Taylor
claims that this follows from Gadamer's account of a "fusion of
horizons" in genuine understanding.39 However, Taylor's "shared
horizon" is not formed from a mutual reconceptualisation of the
presuppositions of justification of both perspectives. It therefore remains
distinct from Gadamer's account in a crucial way. For Taylor, the new
horizon formed after the process of recognition includes the bases for
justification of both horizons as equally valid, but mutually discreet, bases
for judgement within a shared horizon. They remain discreet, as it is the
bases for justification of the group's horizon in its distinctiveness which
continue to provide moral sources for the collective subjectivity of its
members. At the same time, reflection can proceed from the new shared
horizon in understanding the other and ourselves. However, the
purpose of this shared horizon is to enable the "cultural survival"40 of
each group, or in other words, the survival of the collective subjectivity
of each.
Taylor's position does not pursue a Gadamerian mutual learning process.
However, he argues that his position will not lead to the anomaly where
atavistically regressive, ethnocentric, or merely partial judgements are
justified in recognition. He claims that his position will treat each group
equally, that it will assess the value of each horizon with shared criteria,
and that it will also only confer value on the traditional content of an
horizon which has a continued relevance. He argues that this will be
ensured by the conferral of a preliminary judgement of equal worth
which establishes an equal status between participants in recognition. The
equal value of a cultural horizon can be identified by the fact that it has
motivated a community over a long period, and is not now going
through a period of decadence and decline.41 Taylor's concern is not so
much with an analysis of decadence, and why it should be excluded. It is,
rather, to establish the equal potential worth of cultural horizons which
are distinct from those of Western society, and to do so on the basis alone
that they express a continuity of tradition. However, this is to establish
who the subject of recognition could be and, therefore, who must be
39 Taylor, C., (1992) "The Politics of Recognition", p. 67.
40 Ibid., pp. 61-2.
41 Ibid., p. 64, p. 66.
excluded from this category. For Taylor, this subject will be absent from
the decadent period as this is an era where the continuity of tradition
demanded by Romanticism is not secured, the perpetuation of a
community's moral sources through the obedience elicited by an
authoritative insight.
Taylor argues that he can identify freedom from ideology as the condition
where a culture can ensure its traditional continuity. He also identifies as
an ideological dissimulation the assumption that this culture cannot be
learned from. Taylor must also identify where the rational capacity
required for recognition can and should be enabled. However, for Taylor,
the collective interventions of justice are to enable the freedom from
ideology which ensures the Romantic continuity of a tradition. It is
therefore the reasoning of Taylor's strong evaluation that is to identify
the moral sources for distributive justice, both in the evaluative
commitments of modernity to "ordinary life" relations and of specific
communities to the goods pursued there.42 Further, redistribution is only
legitimate if rights are enjoyed in a way which is compatible with the
identity which follows for individuals from these moral sources. This
returns us again to the question of how the horizon of an identity is to be
determined, the horizon of recipients of rights, of the decadent period, or
of the period of cultivation. Taylor can only delineate these horizons
without distortion if it is the case, first, that the form of an horizon can be
separated from its content, and second, that the form of an horizon is
represented by the willingness of members to identify with their
collective subjectivity.
2.2. The hermeneutic mediation of tradition.
Taylor argues that a Romantic recognition can avoid ideological
conditions so as to constitute non-distorted identities. The non-
ideological character of Romantic recognition is also to be determined in
advance by the formal criterion which distinguishes the rational capacity
which can participate in recognition. However, these criteria are never
purely formal, as Gadamer argues in regard to the concept of the
42 Taylor, C., (1976) "The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice", in Philosophy and
the Social Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), p. 296; (1989) Sources of the Self p. 85.
"classical", and its use to designate a stylistic historical era between archaic
rigidity and baroque dissolution.43 The problem with formal criteria is
that their motivating presuppositions are not put at risk. To attain a
genuine understanding in recognition or critique it must be possible to
mutually assess the prejudicial motivations of our norms and theoretical
categories. This mutual assessment is necessary in a recognition which
can be distinguished from ideological conditions. It is also necessary in
theoretical critique, so that the ideological condition can be distinguished
in a non-ideological way. Further, the necessity of mutual learning is not
itself established by Gadamer as a formal criterion. What the learning
process both of critique and recognition must continually determine is
the requirements for our rational capacity. They must take the nature of a
learning process itself as their subject matter.
I argued in Chapter Two Section 4.1. that Gadamer's concept of the
"worldview" is derived from a critique of Husserl's formal and subjective
account of a life-world and the Transcendental Ego which provides an
ultimate grounding for it. Further, and in contrast to Taylor, Gadamer's
"worldview" is also derived from a critique of Herder's and Humboldt's
formal conception of linguistic horizons as the expression of a collective
subjectivity.44 Gadamer argues that horizons do not originate from, so as
to be reconstituted by, the collective subjectivity of a group such as the
nation. Rather, they originate from the continuous reflective and
prejudiced mediation of its content in practice. Further, the theoretical
reflection concerning our horizons of understanding is derived from
practice, to be returned to it in application. Theoretical critique will not
identify the formal structure of rationality, precisely because the criteria
which distinguish the necessary conditions for all horizons will
themselves be prejudicial. Theoretical criteria are established in the
practical mediation of horizons which is ongoing, and so to deploy them
is always to do so prejudicially, with an anticipation of the content of
valued horizons which must be mutually assessed in the ongoing
mediation of horizons. For Gadamer, the prejudices motivating our
theoretical criteria must be put at risk in understanding, both within and
between horizons.
43 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 285-290.
44 Ibid., pp. 438-42, p. 448.
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The absence of a mutual learning process entails that Romantic critique
and recognition cannot ensure that ideological conditions can either be
identified or avoided. The proper role of power in Taylor's recognition
cannot be distinguished from domination, as the reflective basis of
authority is not a mutual relation. Further, as Taylor's authoritative
insight can second-guess the other, he cannot ensure that mere partiality
and contextualism are overcome in recognition. Ffe cannot avoid the
danger of imposing a normalised identity on the subordinate group.
Romantic normalisation can express regressive attitudes concerning the
values of practices associated with subordinate groups in the division of
labour. It can also be ethnocentric, as the new "shared horizon" of
recognition does not arise from the reformulation of the presuppositions
of a culture in an attempt to learn. These possibilities of domination and
normalisation arise because the presuppositions of justification of
horizons are not put at risk in understanding the identity of another.
Romantic critique of ideology cannot distinguish the condition of
freedom from ideology. It also cannot distinguish the ideological
condition in a non-ideological way. The ideologically decadent condition
is excluded, by Taylor, without assessing the cultural presuppositions
motivating this categorisation of an identity.
For hermeneutics, critique of ideology must proceed from
presuppositions regarding the requirements for our rational capacity and
its non-distortive recognition. Not only must critique be open to
reformulate these presuppositions. The model for this learning process is
derived from the concept of the rational capacity which is to be enabled in
recognition, what Gadamer refers to as phronesis, the practical excellence
attained in valued practices. The goal of recognition is to ensure the
dialogical mediation of the content of tradition in the present situation.
For a tradition to be continuous, it must be both the space within which
reflection proceeds, and that which is itself mediated through this
reflection. Therefore, tradition is not an atavistic or ethnocentric
projection, a content projected into the future over and against the
demands of the present and of plurality. Rather, continuity is only
maintained where a plurality of perspectives reconceptualise the
presuppositions of tradition in new situations. However, Marshall's
commitment to enable social equality can, once again, be seen to be
necessary for hermeneutics. A hermeneutic continuity of tradition will
only be ensured where a diversity of perspectives are available for mutual
understanding. To distinguish hermeneutics from Romanticism will call
not only for the careful examination of our prejudices in pursuit of
understanding, but also for the active intervention which brings about
the capacity of mutual learning for subordinated groups.
Hermeneutic collective interventions of justice will proceed as part of the
open-ended mutual learning process of recognition. They must be able to
ensure the freedom from ideological conditions of subordinate groups,
such as single parents in poverty, or members of a marginal culture. The
normative principles of a community will have to be applied here
through a mutual understanding of the appropriate good life. We cannot
determine in advance whether this understanding will be possible to
achieve. This is the case because our communal presuppositions must be
problematised here, and so they do not provide the basis to determine
what the content of such an agreement should be. We cannot but
approach the situations of poverty and marginality with the assumption
that a shared horizon of normative evaluation will be difficult to
achieve. However, this expectation is the feature of all attempts to
understand which at first are problematic. It is also an expectation which
is always derived from a presupposition regarding the potential truth
content of the perspective of the other on a shared subject matter.
Therefore, it is only by pursuing a mutual understanding with regard to
this content that we can determine whether the expected obstacle to
mutual recognition can be overcome.
Gadamer argues that the mutual learning process which is a requirement
for certainty in normative reflection is also a requirement for non-
ideological relations of recognition. The self-understanding of an identity
will only be constituted in relations where we can learn from other
identities. This entails that the I-Thou relations of mutuality must
correspond to a Kantian model of moral relations, as the other identity
must be treated as an end in itself. To do so one must assume that the
truth of a subject matter will be learned from this other in interaction.
Recognition is therefore motivated by the desire to learn from the other,
rather than merely by a partial interest in one's own good life. It is also
motivated by the search for a shared basis to understand the good life
which, therefore, transcends the limited scope of any specific identity.
However, this motivation to learn is prejudicial, as reflection remains
derived from practice, from concealed and motivating presuppositions.
Relations of learning never abstract from the practical basis of reflection
in our partial interest in a specific good life, as these are the characteristics
which enable us to progress mutually in understanding. This mutual
progression is what Gadamer calls an open-ended prejudicial dialectic. It
must also characterise critique of ideology, in taking relations of
domination and normalisation as our subject matter.45
Critique of ideology must specify the "limit situations" of our capacity to
understand and to come to an understanding. These are the situations
which disrupt our capacity to mediate the content of tradition in the
present, situations of power which dominate, situations which objectify
the individual as a technical means, and situations which enforce a
prejudicial conception of the good life on others.46 Taylor argues that the
ideological justification of class inequality in the past, which created the
illusion that the working class were a valued part of a "society of work",
has itself become a moral source for us in the present which serves the
function of integration. As such, the moral sources of "ordinary life" are
no less legitimate now simply because they once served an ideological
function.47 However, because Taylor's moral sources are not applied in
the present he does not ask whether they are ideological now. He does
not ask whether our presuppositions regarding the work society do not
serve to hide from view now the domination and normalisation of work
practices, and the unjustified exclusion of groups from the status attained
in valued practices. Not only must such presuppositions be applied now
in our present situation of mutual learning, but the application of
45 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Practical Philosophy", p. 104; (1981) "The
Heritage of Hegel", p. 60; (1989) Truth and Method, p. 376-9.
46 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology", pp. 283-
4.
47 Taylor, C., (1971) "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man", in Philosophy and the
Social Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
pp. 45-7.
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presuppositions must critically identify the prejudices which disguise
ideological conditions.
As Gadamer argues, we are obliged to attempt to understand that other
whom we cannot help but encounter. Therefore, the assumption that
certain conditions are a limit situation for understanding has the nature
of a "question" which continues to be raised in a dialectical manner. In
Gadamer's revision of Hegel's dialectic, the pursuit of understanding
overcomes the limits to understanding which we have presupposed, the
limits which finite beings must presuppose if understanding is to begin at
all.48 Taylor's theory of recognition maintains Hegel's account that the
spirit of a community is expressed in its substantive distinctions, in its
"sittlichkeit." However, for Taylor, this content does not emerge
dialectically, but is "a source of meaningful differentiation" which can be
"recovered."49 Rather, as Durkheim argues, our understanding of the
universal conception of freedom progresses only as we develop specific
practices of the good life.50 It is our understanding of the normative
significance of individuals qua their humanity which is furthered by each
pursuit of the good life, while from every insight into our obligations to
humanity is derived an insight into our obligations to fellow community
members. We must continually decide again who the subject of
recognition is, because we must continually decide again what this
entails, what its content is and in what relations it will be ensured.
Hermeneutic phronesis is the ideal account of our rational capacity
whose conditions of possibility we can seek to explain theoretically. The
explanations of the social sciences and the therapeutic practices of medical
science and psychoanalysis must, however, be directed towards this object
by a practically derived reflection. We must decide what their objects for
inquiry should be on the basis of our pre-understanding of the nature of
recognition and, in turn, on the basis of our pre-understanding of its
limit situation: that which we presuppose must be accounted for by a
48 Gadamer, H.-G., (1961) "Hegel and the Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers", in
Hegel's Dialectic. Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (London: Yale
University Press, 1976), pp. 32-4.
49 Taylor, C., (1975) "Hegel: History and Politics", in Liberalism and its Critics, ed.
Michael Sandel (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 177, p. 196.
50 Durkheim, E., (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, p. 70, pp. 74-5.
science directed by the hermeneutic critique of ideology. This can be so in
our analysis of the conditions of psychological ill-health, which prevent
the individual from using the language of others in a way that enables
understanding to be achieved with one's self and with others.51 Freud's
own understanding of psychoanalysis, that the goal of its causal and
interpretative knowledge is to make motivations transparent to
understanding, can be replaced by our conception of the necessarily
prejudiced nature of rationality. This hermeneutic critical understanding
of the goal of science then becomes the assumption which we reassess in
the pursuit of recognition, while recognition is to realise a learning
process for the capacity which proceeds from the sustaining dimension of
prejudice so as to critically analyse the validity of its presuppositions.
§3. Radical transgression at the limits of rational capacity.
In Section 2. I argued that hermeneutic relations of recognition are
established as the learning process which mutually risks the partial
interests and presuppositions of identities. A hermeneutic critique of
ideology will, through its own hermeneutically applied learning process,
distinguish these relations of mutual recognition from the ideological
conditions which disrupt our rational capacity and generate distorted
identities. I also argued that this capacity of practical excellence itself can
be realised only through a collective intervention which is pursued by, so
as to enable again, the mutual relations of social equality. By
acknowledging the necessity of social equality for rational capacity, a
hermeneutic recognition that is distinct from Romanticism can be
ensured. However, as I discuss in this section, the radical meta-theory of
Michel Foucault will reject this hermeneutic recognition of social
equality. I argued in Chapter One that Foucault's rejection of humanism
could not be realised by Laclau and Mouffe in a radical citizenship, and
for this reason they fall back on enlightenment assumptions. In Chapter
Two I also rejected the radical argument that social citizenship is a
necessarily teleological project. However, I return now to the radical
critique that social citizenship will intensify subjugation. Specifically, I
discuss Foucault's proposed alternative to mutual recognition and
critique of ideology and assess its implications for social citizenship.
51 Gadamer, H.-G., (1981) "Hermeneutics as a Practical Philosophy", p. 108.
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Foucault argues that the prevailing "humanist" formulation of mutual
recognition and critique of ideology are implicated in projects of
subjugation. For Foucault, truth and liberty will only be attained instead
by resisting these relations of power and knowledge. A radical critique
must therefore transgress what is taken as necessary for the constitution
of our rational capacity. It can then account for how this subjugation can
be resisted in "games of liberty", the ethical practices of the self established
as regimes of the body. Games of liberty are relations of power and
knowledge which minimise the subjugation of the self. However, they
will only do so by rejecting what I have so far argued are the necessary
relations of a socially equal recognition. They will violently reject the
normative claims of others in recognition and social justice, and the
shared presuppositions on which authoritative insights can claim to
assess the goodness of a life. In response, I argue that the radical project
could only be justified if, first, it could in fact transgress the requirements
for our rational capacity and, second, if this transgression was necessary
for liberty and truth. I argue instead that such acts can always be
understood and assessed and that it is a hermeneutic understanding
which will enable us to do so within socially equal relations of mutual
recognition.
3.1. Games of liberty at the frontiers.
Foucault would agree with the hermeneutic argument put forward in
Section 2. which rejects the enlightenment assumptions of critical theory.
For critical theory, it is the power of reason in itself which we must
account for in critique and secure in recognition, and we will do so only
in the transparency attained through a reflective abstraction from
practice. For the radical and for hermeneutics, the considerations which
can constitute an identity are practically derived, and so express partial
interests and historically specific evaluative criteria. Further, the critical
assessment of conditions which could undermine our rational capacity is
also a practical reflection which does not abstract completely from these
conditions. However, the radical rejects the hermeneutic definition of
freedom from ideology. For the radical, the hermeneutic attempt to
specify the "limit situations" of understanding is a violent and arbitrary
evaluative exclusion of subordinate ways of knowing and doing. Further,
this evaluative exclusion must, the radical argues, also be perpetuated in
a hermeneutic recognition. For the radical, hermeneutics must consider
certain identities to be antithetical to the capacity required for mutual
relations, where we are obliged to treat the other as an end in itself. The
radical critique is to identify both the exclusionary process entailed here
and the need, in turn, to transgress what is necessary for our rational
capacity.
Foucault argues that hermeneutic sciences attempt to identify conditions
which distort self-understanding, so as to then exclude these "limit
situations" from hermeneutic practices where individuals can attain an
undistorted understanding. In the hermeneutic science of psychoanalysis,
the rational capacity of patients is ensured when they learn to interpret
their actions through the psychoanalytic framework, which distinguishes
pathological from normal sexual needs. Foucault argues that in a
successful treatment, the patient must exclude other ways of knowing
and doing and accept the doctor's authoritative interpretation. The
successful treatment creates a subject who disciplines itself by adopting
the professional's interpretative framework. However, this self-discipline
itself creates the openings which can undermine this constitution, as the
subjugated self does not finally exclude the "other" of pathological needs
but retains them as that which must be discovered and overcome.52
Foucault characterises this is an arbitrary subjugation, because it is both
attained through unacknowledged irrational means and undermines the
certainty it claims to offer. For Foucault, it characterises the modern
"humanist" pursuit of non-arbitrary critical knowledge and moral
relations, but provides the opening for the truth and liberty acquired
through transgression in the strategic playing of games.
Foucault conceives of radical critique as a transgression that can identity
the conditions of possibility for "games of liberty." These games are to
overcome the humanist pursuit of non-arbitrary criteria, both in critique
and in relations of mutual recognition. They are, therefore, distinct from
Gadamer's hermeneutically embedded and partly autonomous games of
mutual learning. For Foucault, games of liberty will only be attained
52 Foucault, M., (1976) The History of Sexuality Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (London:
Billing & Sons Ltd.), pp. 83-4, p. 117, p. 130.
when individuals also actively reject the shared presuppositions and
mutual expectations of a subjugating recognition. At the same time,
liberty is attained only for a plurality of "parodic" "others", and not for
the self of recognition, with its false seriousness and unity. These games
therefore reject Gadamer's pursuit of a shared horizon in which the
individual attains an authoritative self-understanding. Further, Foucault
argues that the identity of liberty is fostered in regimes of the body which,
as "practices of the self", minimise the subjugation of relations of mutual
understanding and recognition. Bodily experience is, therefore, not to be
hermeneutically mediated in a traditionally embedded authoritative self-
understanding, and so the autonomy of games does not itself presuppose
a common hermeneutic dimension of dialogue and understanding.
Foucault argues that his Nietzschean genealogical reflection is a
transgression of the requirements for rational capacity. Fie argues that it
undermines the certainty claimed for a humanist critique and
recognition. It is to show that the moral obligation to treat another as an
end in itself will, both as a universalizable law and as a relation of
mutual recognition, violently excludes "other" ways of knowing and
doing.53 Fie argues that genealogy is a transgression in the further sense
that it actively rejects the demands for mutual recognition which
perpetuate this subjugation. Genealogy is to "cut away" at the certainty
with which people assume that their own identities can be constituted
with considerations and interactive relations which are not violently
arbitrary. However, he also argues that genealogy does this when it
"occupies" the limit situations assumed in recognition and critique, and
so shows that the "others" were never finally excluded. For Kant, the
"mature" self relies on its reason alone by acknowledging its limitations.
For Foucault, the mature self relies on its capacity to transgress its
constitution and create, from these excluded others, its own values
without recognition.54 As in games of liberty we refuse to enter relations
of mutual recognition, the radical rejects Gadamer's I-Thou relations,
which claim to establish mutuality, and so treat the other as an end in
itself.
53 Foucault, M., (1971) "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", p. 95.
54 Foucault, M., (1984) "What is Enlightenment", p. 46.
Foucault argues that genealogy undermines the supposed unity of the self
as it uncovers the other ways of knowing and doing within one's
constitution. He argues that it also replaces the false significance of this
illusory unity with a radical awareness that the plurality of my potential
others do not themselves contain the truth of my self. Foucault argues
that liberty and genealogy must also ensure that the self is not reduced
again to any one potential other which claims to be an identity freed from
ideology. This plurality cannot be reduced to a shared basis of
understanding established within the horizon of tradition. Foucault
argues that to ascribe authority to tradition one must falsely assume that
there is an original meaning for words which can be discovered, a
meaning from which all understanding should teleologically unfold. It is
also to assume that the truth of our selves lies in our origins, that the
original meaning of words established in traditional contents has a
special significance for our identity. He argues instead that tradition is
established through subjugation, and is perpetuated by the hermeneutic
assumption that truth and identity can be discovered in traditional self-
understanding. In a transgressive response, genealogy is instead to
discover in our tradition a series of parts which can be performed as a
"parody" of the potential others one could have been.55
Genealogy is to make us aware that all activities are composed by a
relation of power and knowledge. However, Foucault's games of liberty
are not only to resist the power/knowledge nexus in which individuals
are constituted. Rather, they must be instituted as "regimes of the body."
Games of liberty are to be established by overcoming what Foucault sees
as the dominant presuppositions of the modern power/knowledge nexus
concerning the dichotomy of mind and body. He defines this as the
assumption that the universal potential of rational capacity will be
realised once bodily experience is freed from distortive conditions. For
instance, psychotherapy only considers patients to be free and aware
when they agree to control their bodies through an interpretation of
needs which follows from accepting the framework of psychoanalysis.
What Foucault calls the arbitrary exclusion of otherness to the "limit
situations" of understanding is, he argues, attained here through
55 Foucault, M., (1971) "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", p. 93.
techniques which discipline the body. As Foucault's games of liberty are
to be a project of resistance, they must be established at the frontiers of
practices such as these and, therefore, have as their goal a re-inscription of
the body. The "marks" of discipline are to be overcome through "ethical"
practices, where the self relates to its self with its own power/knowledge
regime centred on the body.56
Foucault argues that genealogical parody and ethical regimes of the body
are to continue to undermine the illusion of unity and certainty in
relations of recognition. As a transgression, radical practice operates
where shared presuppositions no longer have authority for the
constitution of the self. For Foucault, there is therefore no shared
hermeneutic dimension in which the bodily experience of a radical game
of liberty is mediated. This is the case for the irreducible plurality of each
self, and for the plurality of such ethical practices. Foucault argues that
radical games of liberty emerge by resisting attempts made to reduce this
plurality through relations of recognition. For radical followers of
Foucault, this resistance must also be directed to relations of social justice
which are to ensure the interactive requirements for recognition. As I
argued in Chapter Two Section 1.2., radical commentators characterise the
welfare State in terms of an extension of "technical practices" which
intensify disciplinary domination. As relations of recognition, they
extend process of subjugation to ever-more areas of the self, as technical
experts seek to define and meet ever-more aspects of human need. In the
efforts to enable "autonomy" through welfare measures the other of
"dependency" remains to undermine certainty.57 However, for the
radical, this is not an era of decline, but the site now for resistance, and
the only possible site we could have in which to define and pursue
liberty.
Foucault argues that we cannot hope to give a non-arbitrary account of
progress in the rational action of social justice and recognition. He argues
that such an account would have to exhaustively specify the
56 Foucault, M., (1984) The History of Sexuality Vol. 3., p. 133 ff.; (1984) "What is
Enlightenment", pp. 48-9.
57 Waxman, C., (1983) The Stigma of Poverty, pp. 87-9; Dean, M., (1991) The Constitution
of Poverty, pp. 13-14; Schram, S., (1995) Words of Welfare, p. 35 ff., p. 77 ff., p. 145.
requirements for our rational capacity as the goal towards which all social
action is to lead. It would also, he argues, have to assume that all social
groups have a real interest in attaining this ideal. For Foucault, this is
represented in the Marxist argument that a freedom from ideology will
emerge as a social condition when the opposition of class interests is
overcome through class dialectic.58 Foucault rejects what he sees here as a
Hegelian teleology, where the development and differentiation of
identity in recognition is to overcome the conflict of difference itself.59
Foucault therefore rejects any attempt to give what would be accepted as a
non-arbitrary account of the real interests of all identities in attaining a
specific ideal of rational capacity. He argues that this would necessitate an
extensive project of violent exclusion. For Foucault, we should instead
accept that critique and recognition can never be non-arbitrary, precisely
because they are always established through a partially motivated
evaluative exclusion of otherness. Liberty is possible, but only by
overcoming mutuality and only by doing so arbitrarily.60
3.2. The hermeneutic event of understanding in the dialectic of
tradition.
I argue here that Foucault cannot achieve what he calls the transgression
of our rational capacity. These acts, of resistance and of embodied self-
relation, in fact call for a shared understanding, and it is through this
understanding that the requirements for our rational capacity are
attained. Foucault argues that, by proceeding from its limit situations,
from the other of our rational capacity, a transgression undermines what
had been the requirements for our rational capacity. This transgression
does not establish a foundation outside the power/knowledge nexus, but
creates a new aspect of that dimension. It is not a subject of pure power or
knowledge which accomplishes this transgression.61 Foucault claims that
this transgression has both undermined the specific power/knowledge
nexus of the subject and yet is still meaningful. However, for this to be
58 Foucault, M., (1977) "Power and Sex", in Michel Foucault. Power, Philosophy, Culture.
Intervieivs and other writings 1977-1984, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed. Lawrence Kritzman
(London: Routledge, 1988), p. 123.
59 Foucault, M., (1971) "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" p. 83.
60 Ibid. pp. 87-8.
61 Foucault, M., (1977) "Power and Sex", p. 18; (1984) "The Concern for Truth", in Michel
Foucault. Power, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and other writings 1977-1984, trans.
Alan Sheridan, ed. Lawrence Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 255, p. 258, pp. 263-5.
the case, there must be a dimension of potential meaning which is shared
and which encompasses the transgressive act and the relation of power
and knowledge. This would explain why a self can never be a subject of
pure knowledge or power, and yet can revise the requirements for its
rational capacity in its specific interrelations. However, Foucault cannot
allow the necessity of such a dimension. It would entail that the act
which establishes a game of liberty is not a transgression which
undermines what is necessary for our rational capacity.
For Gadamer, in the good life and in mutual recognition, an immediate
living certainty is attained only in partly autonomous games of mutual
learning. Unlike cultural conservatism, hermeneutic practices cannot be
reduced to an horizon, but must remain open to learning, while learning
cannot be authoritarian, but must be a mutual relation of justified power.
This follows from the nature of the shared dimension which, pace
Foucault, does encompass each practice. For Gadamer, this is the
linguistic medium of experience.62 It is a dimension of potential meaning
but one that is only realised as the necessary requirement for rational
capacity in the mutual relations of learning in which it comes to self-
presentation. Although this dimension is only realised in the fusion of
horizons, this itself is the requirement for certainty as such. We can only
proceed with valid presuppositions of justification from an authoritative
self-understanding, from the shared understanding attained of these
presuppositions. The certainty attained in pursuing freedom and insight,
which is made possible by the partly autonomous nature of games, is
reliant on a shared horizon which has authority for it. The "fusion of
horizons" is disruptive, as an "event" of coming to understanding.
However, it is not a transgression, as it also brings our linguistic
dimension to self-presentation.63 The risk we run when we open our
prejudices to assessment enables a shared understanding which is
necessary for the constitution of rational capacity as an identity.
Hermeneutic critique argues that partly autonomous games of the good
life are established through relations of mutual learning. Mutuality can
therefore be shown to be necessary for the attainment of the goals we
62 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, p. 389 ff.
63 Ibid., pp. 485-6.
have partial interests in. From this partial interest we can foster an
interest in attaining mutual relations which both enable what is valuable
to others and establish a shared basis for evaluation. Hermeneutics shows
us that to be open to mutual learning I must treat another as having a
potential insight which itself arises independently of my will. To treat the
other as a partner to a dialogue, I must treat the other as an end in itself.64
I must approach the other with a pre-understanding of what is necessary
for an identity which can be understood, of what limit situations of
understanding must be avoided. However, I must assume that I can learn
from another, and that I can learn about the subject matter of identity.
Therefore, I must assume that through this dialogue our initial pre-
understandings of the requirements for a valid identity can be revised.
Such a revision can be neither a subjugation nor a transgression, but
must be a shared understanding determined by a mutual process of
reconceptualisation. The hermeneutic dimension enables this subject
matter of the requirements for rational capacity to appear to both
perspectives, as it also enables each to overcome their initial
presuppositions concerning it and to learn.65
Gadamer argues that relations of learning are an open-ended dialectic. A
dialogue of question and answer in dialectical relations enables us to
learn about a subject matter, to move beyond our original
presuppositions to a new shared basis to understand that subject matter.66
Gadamer also argues that the priority of the question must be
emphasised, as this dialectic will not be reconciled in the final answer.
There will be no final Hegelian self-consciousness of spirit where the
other is no longer experienced as other, as that which requires this
reconceptualisation. This is because dialectic is not a Hegelian movement
of consciousness but of tradition.67 The experience of otherness will not
be overcome for the understanding that proceeds from presuppositions
embedded within the linguistically mediated dimension of tradition.
Understanding progresses dialectically when it mediates tradition in the
present, while this mediation is made necessary by the historical
64 Ibid., p. 383 ff.
65 Ibid., pp. 463-4
66 Ibid., p. 302.
67 Ibid., pp. 472-3.
experience which will disrupt a prejudicial awareness. The games of the
good life are not Foucault's irreconcilably different parodic transgressions.
Not only does the reconceptualisation of presuppositions of justification
require a shared understanding in relations of mutuality. Through this
we come to understand the diverse aspects of ourselves in terms of the
necessary traditional nature of our partly autonomous perspectives.
As the hermeneutic dimension is sustaining, it limits what the shared
presuppositions of a fusion of horizon could be. The prejudicial
perspectives it enables, although divergent, rely on a shared dimension of
meaning. It is only from such a prejudicial basis that we could come to an
understanding. Therefore, each perspective must acknowledge the
necessity of its traditional horizon in coming to understand its own good
life. Further, one must proceed from meanings which are shared with
others, but as a specific perspective one can only do so by interpreting
them.68 A hermeneutic critique can make us aware that an
understanding of the good life is dependent upon meanings which are
not only traditional but which are always appropriated by diverse
perspectives. It is the awareness that an authoritative self-understanding
of one's good life must also be open to the understanding of others
concerning one's presuppositions. For this reason, Freudian
psychoanalysis would have to be altered if it is to be a hermeneutic
practice itself or a model for everyday practices. Flermeneutic practice will
not claim to have an interpretative framework for understanding oneself
and others which is not itself open to reformulation. Such frameworks
must be open to reformulation through a traditionally based
understanding with others, if an authoritative self-understanding is to be
arrived at.
Gadamer argues that our prejudices ensure that all experience can be
meaningful, because they enable us to conceive of any experience, any
strangeness, as a question addressed to us. But its nature as a question is
determined by the potential it poses to problematise our presupposed
criteria of correct interpretation, the prejudicial basis on which we made
the assumption that the experience could be meaningful.69 An
68 Ibid., pp. 461-3.
69 Ibid., pp. 355-6.
interpretation of the meaning of this experience answers the question to
the extent that it responds to this challenge to our prejudices. In this
sense, the hoped-for recognition, or Utopia, projected into the future is a
question asked of our prejudices. It is neither a "transgression" nor an
anachronistic representation of our "moral sources." It provides the
potential to learn by making what we assume to be the necessary
requirements for our rational capacity questionable and, therefore, in
need of revision. However, as Marshall argued, the question directed to
our presuppositions by the ideal of social equality has a special
significance. The attempts to reformulate the ideal of social equality are
necessary for our self-understanding as citizens. Not only is it the shared
status within which the differentiated statuses of practical excellence can
be recognised. Practical excellence itself can only emerge in the continued
attempts to reconcile the ideal of social equality with the features of
inequality which make productive practices possible.
Gadamer argues that the linguistic nature of our experience ensures that
recognition has the "speculative" structure of a progressive but open-
ended dialectic. It determines that all experiencing subjects are finite, or
prejudiced, but that all such experience expresses what is infinite, the
infinite potential of meaning in language, the "many" in the "one."70
Therefore, what the radical presents as a transgression is in fact a
hermeneutic question posed for the presuppositions we must proceed
from, and about which we can come to an authoritative mutual
understanding. This is the mutual understanding which we are obliged
to pursue concerning the requirements for our rational capacity and the
goodness of a life. This open-ended potential for meaning also mediates
our reasoned-desire, as I argued in Chapter Three. Therefore, regimes of
the body will not establish bases for self-understanding which remove the
need for mutuality and shared understanding. In "finding the right
words" for physical experience we find the words that were already there
for them. This is not the retrieval of an originating meaning in a
Romantic moral source. It is an interpretative effort directed at these
words and their criteria of correct usage. The very strangeness of the
70 Gadamer, H.-G., (1960) "The Nature of Things and The Language of Things", in PH, pp.
80-1; (1989) Truth and Method, p. 461, p. 473.
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experience which is accounted for extends the potential of our language
to put such experiences into words in the future.71
For Gadamer, in recognition I become aware that a shared understanding
is necessary if the goals of my good life are to be enabled. From the partial
interest in this life can be generated the interest in attaining the mutual I-
Thou relations where recognition can be conferred. However, such
relations of recognition must also account for the struggle for recognition.
My struggle for recognition must presuppose the concept of the Thou
through which my recognition can be ensured. I must presuppose what
requirements for rational capacity must be met, so that intersubjective
relations of struggle can still have the structure of a question and answer
dialectic. For Gadamer, this requirement is met by mutual learning,
where a free and reasoned conferral of authority distinguishes a just
power structure from the arbitrary exercise of force.72 However, as
Marshall argues, relations of social equality are necessary to sustain the
mutual respect required to attain practical excellence. Gadamer argues
that the authority of practical excellence must be attained in relations of
justified power which are also conducive to attaining insight. In such
relations, the presuppositions on which authority itself is justified can be
the subject matter of learning. However, it is only with the limitation of
material inequality that, as Marshall argues, the area of common culture
can be extended in which the mutuality and struggle of recognition could
be compatible.
Gadamer's hermeneutic account of critique can also be directed to attain
what Marshall defined as a practically understood "public interest." The
understanding of the public interest in attaining social equality must
continue a learning process with regard to the requirements for our
rational capacity which social justice is to enable. New shared
understandings must be pursued regarding the nature of physical,
embodied need and the interrelations in which it can be satisfied.
Practical understanding must also concern itself with how partially
motivated struggles to be recognised can be incorporated within the
public interest. For instance, when parenting is recognised as a
71 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 383-9, pp. 431-2, p. 453.
72 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology", p. 285.
worthwhile activity, the physical needs of children and the means by
which they can be satisfied take on a new broader significance within the
public interest, which is itself shaped by the interests of parents. However,
Gadamer's discussion of art, satire, and festival celebrations can also show
how the public interest of social citizenship could emerge from these
activities. These practices have attained a peculiar degree of autonomy
from everyday activity in the presuppositions of justification which are
appropriate to them. However, their insights have significance, not as
transgressions, but in bringing to a practical awareness the necessary
hermeneutic nature of our rational capacity.
Gadamer argues that if I am to correctly "play" in such games as art, satire,
and festival celebration I must take the game seriously. I must know what
is expected of me in playing such a game. I must also take its playing of
me seriously as it is my self which comes to presentation in this game.
For Gadamer, these games do entail the suspension of instrumental goal-
oriented action of other kinds. However, they do not do so as a
transgression. Rather, art will be experienced only when the continuity of
the meaning of this work of art with its own tradition and my own life
are both ensured through a shared understanding.73 Further, just as jokes
will only be understood when a shared sense of community is established
between interlocutors,74 so too the satirical critique of our political
practice does not come to our understanding as a transgression.75 It is
experienced as a hermeneutic question which, in understanding it, offers
the potential for learning about the requirements for recognition.
Similarly, although the festival which is celebrated on any one occasion is
always something different from the original, it is not a form of
transgression of the everyday or of the tradition of that festival. Rather,
the festival still only has significance for me when my celebration is a
part both of its tradition and of the temporal nature of my own self.76
73 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 101-3, pp. 108-9.
74 Ibid., pp. 24-5.
75 Ibid., pp. 146-7.
76 Gadamer, H.-G., (1986) "The Relevance of the Beautiful", pp. 40-2; (1989) Truth and
Method, pp. 122-3.
To take part in such games we must agree to step out of the practices of
strategic action in which we pursue other communal goals.77 In this way
a unique critical insight into the requirements for our rational capacity is
possible. However, the practices of art, satire and festivity must still be
hermeneutically mediated. They must still be understood within our
hermeneutic understanding of ourselves as traditional beings. They are,
therefore, an instance of a broader potential for meaningful experience
and valuable insight which is shared with everyday practices where our
strategic interests are pursued. Such disruptions to everyday activity may
provide a valuable insight into our nature. However, such an insight
does not follow from a transgression and, therefore, does not entail the
violent rejection of the normative claims for recognition in everyday
interaction. Not only should we reject the nature of Foucault's
distinction between liberty and technical rationality, a distinction between
transgression and subjugation. We should also reject the implications
which follow from Foucault for the project of a socially equal recognition
and freedom from ideology. Rather, the pursuit of recognition freed from
ideology is the learning process which we cannot step out of. A social
equality of the good life can, therefore, be pursued both through practices
of the everyday and their transcendence.
§4. The open-ended dialectic of critique and recognition.
So far in this chapter I have argued that hermeneutic critique attempts to
account for the mutual dependence of each specific good life for the
recognition which ensures the material and interactive requirements of
solidarity for rational capacity. I also argued that the hermeneutic capacity
must be established in the mutual relations made possible by social
equality and its limitation of the forces of power and inequality. In this
section, I turn once more to Habermas' enlightenment critical theory.
Chapter Two looked at Habermas' argument that the legitimate collective
intervention must ensure equality in material resources and power
relations, and that this also provides the basis required to legitimate
intervention. In this chapter we will see that, for Habermas, this
intervention must be legitimated through mutual recognition, and must
enable the equal relations required for recognition. However, as I noted
77 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 123-4, p. 128.
briefly in Chapter Three, Habermas' egalitarian politics is to enable a good
life whose nature is formal, dual, and negative. For Habermas, this is also
the nature of the interrelational requirements for mutual recognition.
The considerations of recognition must be restricted to an impartial
account of the general interest. Only then can the normalised imposition
of an identity on subordinate groups be prevented. Further, for
Habermas, it is only in attaining the transparency made possible through
reflective distanciation that we can specify the formal, dual, and negative
structural requirements for freedom from ideology.
For Habermas, recognition cannot be pursued by, so as to enable,
prejudicial identities in practical relations of authority. Rather, with the
necessary social requirements, our rational capacity of recognition can
make the motives for, and forces of, action increasingly transparent. We
can then see through ideological systemic compulsions. But the necessity
of attaining this transparency also entails that there can be no justification
for relations of recognition pursued by an authoritative insight which
proceeds from concealed prejudicial commitments. For Habermas,
mutuality and a non-distorted understanding both require relations
which justify norms impartially, with principles available to any identity,
so as to recognise only the characteristics shared by all. I argue instead that
freedom from ideology is not an ideal only of ever-greater transparency,
realised in relations dualistically distinct from systems, and where norms
are justified by a fundamental principle of impartiality. Rather, the
reflection of recognition and critique must be substantive,
comprehensive, and positive as it remains practically derived from
partial interests in specific good lives. It is this which enables a dialectical
progress in freedom from ideology, while a social equality of practical
excellence must be the goal of recognition if this capacity is to be enabled.
4.1. Critical theory: the recognition of communicative
competence.
Habermas argues that humans are reliant on each other for a recognition
which is mutual in nature. The rational capacity of each individual can
only be developed as an identity when intersubjective relations also
enable the mutual conferral of recognition between identities.78 This
mutual reliance in recognition has the form of a dialogue and is situated
within dialogue. The goal of recognition is attained in relations where we
can understand the perspective of the other as a partner to a dialogue, and
so the interaction of recognition must enable an exchange of views.
Habermas agrees with Gadamer that natural language is the medium in
which the perspective of another on substantive issues can be
understood, because the shared beliefs of tradition are already mediated
through it. However, as we saw in Chapter Two Section 3., Habermas
goes on to argue that all communication makes use of the same
presuppositions regarding the requirements for understanding. These
presuppositions already provide a formal structure for understanding
within the linguistic mediation of tradition, which is dualistically distinct
from the material reproduction of systems.79 Therefore, the universal
requirements for all recognition can be identified in every specific
dialogue pursued in natural language.
Habermas defines the universal nature of recognition as the potential for
"communicative action." Habermas' "ideal speech situation" is to enable
communicative action by excluding all those features of practice which
would undermine it. It thereby also ensures that it is the self of
communicative action alone which interacts with others. It is the self
freed not only from the systemic considerations of power and control, but
also from partial interests in a positively valued good life. Habermas
argues that this is the necessary requirement for the recognition which
consensually determines the norms of interaction. He claims that
rational potential can be freed from conditions which would prevent
agreement so that, in turn, individuals can genuinely exchange views in
interaction where the only determining factor is the unforced force of the
better argument.80 Not only can individuals make their motivations
increasingly transparent, so as not to compulsively perpetuate systemic
relations of power and control. They can also abstract from their interests
in a positive conception of the good life, so as not to normalise the
identities of others in recognition. In acting as the self of communicative
78 Habermas, J., (1994) "Struggles for Recognition", pp. 131-2.
79 Habermas, J., (1990) "Discourse Ethics", pp. 94-5.
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action, the legitimate consensus attained will justify impartial norms
which ensure the social requirements both for the attainment of the good
life and for the participation in recognition in the ideal speech
situation.81
Habermas argues that we must abstract from practical presuppositions
both in critique and recognition. As we saw in Chapter Two, critical
theory is to take the external observer's perspective on the universal
structure of communicative action. At the same time, the ideal speech
situation is to enable us to abstract both from the effects of unnoticed
forces and from our partial interests in a positively valued life. For
Habermas, this is the requirement of recognition, as it realises the
potential of our communicative competence to adopt the
hermeneutically non-distortive perspective of the general interest. It is
this characteristic which is then to be conferred with recognition, a formal
moral and dialogical ability which is shared regardless of our historically
specific identity.82 Habermas, therefore, rejects Taylor's and Gadamer's
conservatism, and argues that the external perspective of critical theory
must be adopted so as to identify the universal requirements for
recognition. Only this will prevent criteria of critique and recognition
from altering arbitrarily within everyday practice, as a result either of
non-linguistic forces or of the non-discursive capacity of the dominant.
As conservatives cannot adopt this critical perspective, they will
perpetuate the ideological conditions of compulsion and normalisation.83
For Habermas, critique and recognition are a potential of the
communicative competence of modern subjects and, therefore, of the
dual nature of its constitutive environment. As critical theory is a
potential of the life-world, it must neither be distorted by, nor itself
perpetuate, a systemic colonization. In turn, it is to identify the universal
requirements for recognition. For Habermas, recognition must rely on,
but remain separate from, systemic integration and the objective sciences.
Habermas argues that all discourse must respect this duality. Even
81 Ibid., p. 99.
82 Habermas, J., (1990) "Discourse Ethics", pp. 62-3; (1994) "Struggles for Recognition", p.
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Foucault must assume that the unforced force of the better argument is
the only basis for accepting his claims. Habermas, therefore, finds
Foucault guilty of a "performative contradiction" in denying that truths
are accepted independently of the instrumental exertion of force. It is for
this reason that radical reflection does not accomplish its claimed
transgression.84 Habermas would therefore reject my argument in
Section 3., that the radical must admit that reflection remains
traditionally embedded. Instead, for Habermas, the reflection of critique
and recognition must abstract from its hermeneutic situation so as to
make its motivating forces transparent and, thus, exclude the continued
colonizing effects within it of relations of power and control.85
I noted in Chapter Two that, for Habermas, the requirements for rational
capacity have been determined by a universal rationalization process.
This process has also reconciled the dialectical development of
modernity. All development now in recognition and critique proceeds
from a formal, dual, and negative basis. However, this is not a Hegelian
dialectical synthesis, a pure self-consciousness attained in reconciliation
with a communal spirit. For Habermas, criteria of critique and
recognition are now equally available to all, but on the basis of their
formal communicative competence alone. At the same time,
communicative competence is a potential of finite beings, who will never
make all presuppositions and motivations transparent.86 However, as the
requirements for critique are equally available, we can increasingly make
transparent, so as to reject, those presuppositions which are antithetical to
the universalizable requirements for recognition. It is only on this basis,
Habermas argues, that we can identify where relations are neither mutual
nor impartial but impose a normalised identity. We can also identify the
domination which obstructs our communicative competence, the
objectification which reduces interaction to strategic considerations, and
84 Habermas, J., (1990) "Discourse Ethics", p. 77, p. 97; (1994) "An Alternative way out of
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the cultural impoverishment which fragments our ability to be
consciously aware of these processes.87
Habermas also argues that the reconciliation of the dialectic of modernity
is dualistic. Critical reflection must therefore account both for the
conditions of possibility for recognition in the life-world and for the
systemic conditions on which it relies, but from which it must be kept
separate.88 In Chapter Two I noted that, for Habermas, rationalization is
not a class-determined process, and so its crises cannot be resolved with
class-specific considerations. In recognition, relations of power and
control can play only a restricted role in bringing about the required
mutual relations. They cannot be the outcome of a Marxist violent
dialectical reversal of the economic dependence of the middle class on
exploited workers.89 Further, Habermas' account of the rational capacity
of recognition is also distinct from Marx's "species being" realised in
work relations freed from commodified alienation. Habermas argues that
work relations continue to be determined by systemic considerations of
the media of money and power. The rights and duties legitimated
through the ideal speech situation must ensure that the relations of work
provide material requirements for rational capacity. However, the
communicative action of recognition itself is attained only by abstracting
from the considerations appropriate to systems so that the unforced force
of the better argument alone can justify neutral norms of interaction.90
For Habermas, the reconciliation of modernity's dialectic establishes the
formal, dual, and negative nature of the requirements for rational
capacity. It is the basis from which to continue to critically identify these
requirements and pursue relations of recognition. As it is the
requirements for communicative competence which must be specified,
then the limit situations of recognition will be identified in disruptions
to language itself. Therefore, in critique of ideology we must abstract from
87 Habermas, J., (1970) "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality", p. 305.
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the concealed commitments of historical languages if the social sciences
are to be reconstructed in the interest of the recognition of all. In contrast,
for Habermas, hermeneutic analysis is limited both by its concealed
commitments to specific identities and by its sole concern with distorted
language-use. Habermas' reconstructed sciences are to analyse the pre-
linguistic structure of meaningful action, and identify where an
increasing freedom of reflection from the disruptions caused to language
itself is possible.91 Causal explanations are to make transparent both the
forces which we may be unaware of and the dissimulating
presuppositions which obscure them. Psychoanalysis must also make our
unconscious compulsions transparent, so that action can then be pursued
with a greater awareness of motivations. Critical theory can, Habermas
argues, enable conditions in which communicative action can be fostered
as a capacity and accepted socially as the source of all authority.92
The mutuality required for Habermas' communicative action is to ensure
that the power relations of domination and normalisation are avoided.
He argues that the interest of critical theory in emancipation and
enlightenment ensures that it can identify these requirements. It does not
presume that identities can be constituted by the power of the State, and
nor does it specify what the substantive agreement on the norms of
interaction ought to be. It seeks merely to enable conditions where the
communicative capacity to identify valid norms is realised and, therefore,
where social norms do not dissimulate.93 In Chapter Two I noted that, for
Habermas, the State's collective intervention to ensure social equality
will lead to reification. Reification will be an ideological condition, as it
both distorts the communicative competence required for recognition
and imposes a normalised identity based on the Utopia of an employment
society.94 For Habermas, critical theory can identify the requirements for
recognition because it abstracts from the hermeneutic dimension. In
contrast, hermeneutic recognition proceeds prejudicially, from concealed
interests in specific good lives which only the "authoritative" can assess.
91 Habermas, J., (1970) "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality", 314-5; (1970) On the
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It will therefore justify collective interventions with reasons which can
never be made fully transparent. In contrast, for Habermas, recognition is
ensured only when the reasons for action can be made transparent by all
and shown to be in the equal interests of all.
The open-ended formal, dual, and negative development is, Habermas
argues, enabled by the critical deployment of causal knowledge. For
Habermas, only critical theory can deploy such knowledge and attain this
end due to its motivating interest in emancipation and enlightenment.
Outside the uses it is put to here, the instrumental rationality of our
capacity to control the world will objectify humans and human relations.
He therefore excludes it from the sphere in which norms are legitimated.
In contrast to Marshall, the practical excellence which is derived from
practices and their technical conditions must be excluded from
recognition. For Habermas, not only do those who determine the "public
interest" for welfare State intervention colonise the life-world, but their
own elite status also perpetuates a fragmented consciousness which
conceals this process. Habermas also claims that his critique of ideology
respects these limits to be placed on our knowledge of control, since its
analysis of the pre-linguistic structure of all meaningful action abstracts
from all language and language-use.95 In contrast, he argues,
hermeneutic critique will not be able to abstract from the way in which
the instrumental knowledge it deploys is implicated in relations of
control. It will therefore unknowingly perpetuate systemic colonisation,
this time in its critique of ideological conditions.
4.2. The recognition of hermeneutic perspectives
through social equality.
Habermas assumes that the dialectic of critique and recognition can only
be open-ended and yet non-arbitrary if it is formal, dual, and negative.
What hermeneutics shows instead is that it is detrimental to the
attainment of understanding either to separate the form of rational
capacity from its substantive and positive content, or to divide
linguistically-mediated norm-governed relations from relations of power
and control. Dialectical relations must instead proceed from the
95 Habermas, J., (1970) On the Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 173.
practically derived content of identity, but without reducing rational
capacity to a contextualist horizon. This dialectic must also be
comprehensive, but without reducing our rational capacity to the
immediacy of relations freed from domination and objectification.
Finally, our rational capacity must proceed from its necessary prejudicial
interests in a good life, but, again, without reducing capacity to a final
convergence in a monistic evaluative commitment. However, I argue
that it is the shared standard of living of social equality which Gadamer's
conception of recognition and critique requires. As social equality is a
status which is derived from, yet limits, inequality, technical
considerations, and partial interests, it provides the shared basis
hermeneutics requires so that recognition and critique can remain
substantive, comprehensive, and positive without also being reductive.
Gadamer argues that the reflection of recognition and critique must
remain practically derived. For that reason, Gadamer's open-ended but
non-arbitrary dialectic is comprehensive, as communicative
understanding and evaluation cannot be distinguished from a sphere of
power and control. However, nor can they be reduced to the immediacy
of power and control and to the Marxist class dialectic. In Hegel's dialectic
of the master and servant, the potential of a true self-consciousness is
realised through the ability of the servant. Unlike the Marxist
interpretation, for Gadamer, this potential is not brought about solely
through the reversal of the contradictory power relation of the master's
dependence on the servant he dominates. It is most importantly a
reversal of the self-consciousness of the master, who realises that the
servant's ability brings him closer to freedom.96 However, Gadamer
argues that this self-understanding of the valued capacity and its just
relations cannot be grounded in a Hegelian pure self-consciousness. The
comprehensive basis for the valued capacity is also the substantive
hermeneutic dimension which continues to unfold, the dimension of
historically-derived ethical commitment. It is here alone that the capacity
of practical excellence, phronesis, has the resources to pursue relations of
learning which are also just relations of power.
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This comprehensive dialectic does not reduce rational capacity to the
immediacy of justified power relations, and so domination continues to
be a danger. This comprehensive dialectic also incorporates the technical
conditions and knowledge of practice. However, it will not reduce
rational capacity to the immediacy of technical conditions: specifically, to
the immediacy of liberated Marxist relations of work. Gadamer argues
that, for Hegel, freedom is not a potential of the specific productive
activity in which the servant's capacity to shape the world is confirmed. It
is rather the potential of the form of this ability to shape as such. This
potential is realised in the liberation from our dependence on the
material world which this ability enables. Again, Gadamer argues that
this ability cannot be grounded in pure self-consciousness. It is the ability
made possible by our finiteness, our historically-derived prejudicial
understanding. It is, therefore, the practically-derived perspective of
phronesis which can develop this potential. This ability is also made
necessary by this finiteness. It is only in response to disruptive historical
experiences that our prejudicial understanding is compelled to develop.97
The potential to overcome the immediacy of the material world is never
completed, and it can also be disrupted by the practical technical
conditions from which this potential is derived.
A comprehensive and substantive capacity is therefore also the positive
capacity of practical excellence. It is the capacity derived from a partial
interest in a specific good life. Gadamer argues that it is also only this
finite perspective which can ask the "real questions" necessary for
dialectical advance.98 A real question must have a background of
presuppositions which express the hermeneutic interest in the subject-
matter under discussion. These presuppositions cannot be made
completely transparent by either the questioner or the addressee.
However, to answer the question one must still come to some
understanding of where it is coming from, and so one must come to
some understanding of the validity of the presuppositions motivating it.
The question will not be understood if we abstract from the hermeneutic
97 Ibid. pp. 70-2.
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dimension so as to proceed from presuppositions which, when
appropriate, are appropriate for any and all perspectives. Rather, it will
only be understood through the fusion of horizons of a practical learning
process. As an addressee, I will only understand the question when I am
aware that the specificity of my own perspective determines the direction
I anticipate the question to have. This is the awareness that the question
will only be understood when the perspective behind it is assessed and,
therefore, when the presuppositions of the addressee and questioner are
put at risk."
As with the subject, so also the subject matter of real questions must be
open to alteration. Reflection begins from anticipations of the truth or
logic of the subject matter which we advance on only through a question
and answer process which attempts to follow this logic. The logic of the
subject matter is always anticipated, however, and so it can only be
followed through an understanding directed towards the presuppositions
motivating the questions and answers. Therefore, a real question has
meaning if it problematises our accepted answers and, therefore, makes
the subject matter appear in a new light to the questioner and
addressee.100 Therefore, we can never finally determine the appropriate
presuppositions of questions, nor finally limit what their subject matter
can be. However, we must always attempt to limit the subject and subject
matter of recognition and critique and, I argue, it is the goal of social
equality which should motivate us here. The perspective which can ask
real questions is only enabled in the mutual relations which free each self
from the forces which obstructs capacity, whether of domination,
objectification, or normalisation. Recognition and critique will proceed
through enabling this perspective, and, therefore, through the awareness
created of the mutual dependence of each perspective on this specific
form of substantive, comprehensive, and positive dialectic.
As Gadamer argues, the criteria with which we measure progress must
themselves be open to advance. In contrast, the requirements for
Habermas' freedom from ideology are universalizable, and so can not
themselves be made the subject matter of dialogue. For Habermas, the
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norms of the general interest will vary between communities, but the
principle of impartiality itself must be an unquestioned basis for
justification. His external observer's perspective of critique also presumes
the universalizability of these requirements, as it is itself a
"methodological objectification of the life-world" concept.101 However, in
its attempt to establish a foundation for progress, Habermas' position can
be criticised as providing no way for understanding to progress. In
abstracting from the hermeneutic dimension, by presupposing that
rational action is dual, and by pursuing a negative recognition, it excludes
the real subjects and subject matter of reflection. For Gadamer, an
advance must be measured by hermeneutic presuppositions applied
through a mutual learning process. In the reformulation of social
citizenship, this learning process will be established only when the
relative autonomy of relations of social equality has been secured. To
ensure that it is a progression, the identities recognised must now include
the practices of parenting and cultural minorities which have been
marginalised.
Habermas argues that our conscious awareness will always be finite.
However, he posits as an ideal a state where the motives for, and causes
of, action are transparent to consciousness. It is only to the extent that
transparency is approximated that an advance in understanding has
occurred. However, as Gadamer argues, it is only because prejudice is a
productive necessity for understanding that consciousness can be finite.
Even in psychoanalysis, the re-interpretation of motives must proceed
from, and extend, the presuppositions of everyday language. The patient
will only be freed from disruptive compulsions through an
understanding which applies psychoanalytic presuppositions in a fusion
of horizons with the prejudices of the patient's life.102 For hermeneutics,
"concealment" is a productive necessity of understanding. To give
reasons for any belief, it is necessary not to have to give a reason for every
belief. Further, Habermas assumes that the success or failure of the
treatment does not influence the validity of the psychoanalytic
interpretative framework itself.103 This assumption, that the bases for
101 Habermas, J., (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2., p. 374.
102 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology", p. 290.
103 Habermas, J., (1970) On the Logic of the Social Sciences, p. 184.
justification of a science can only be comprehended from its own
discursive horizon, is undermined by the necessity of prejudice for the
understanding attained in treatment. It is the necessity of applying the
presuppositions of the science in a broader horizon.104
Hermeneutic understanding cannot be excluded either from the self-
understanding attained in psychoanalytic treatment or from the
theoretical analysis of phenomena such as repressed compulsions. The
prejudicial reflection of practical excellence cannot be excluded from a
sphere whose mediation is supposedly non-linguistic. At the same time,
action resulting from hidden forces must itself be hermeneutically
understood.105 A situation still has meaning independently of whether
we can ascribe it to the motives of individuals. As Gadamer argues, we
can comprehend the significance of an historical event independently of
our understanding of the intentions behind that event.106 This is a
significance reason has access to through the presuppositions of a
prejudiced perspective concerning what can be learned from. The
understanding individuals have of their own place within historical
events can be judged to be ideologically-free, but this cannot be
established solely by the extent to which they have made their motivating
forces and intentions transparent. The concerns of ideological analysis
cannot therefore be restricted to the analysis of how, and to what extent,
transparency can be ensured. When this is acknowledged, the prejudicial
commitments which ideological critique must itself proceed from can
then play a positive role in coming to an understanding of the
historically specific and prejudicial aspects of the capacity freed from
ideology.
A hermeneutic account must replace Habermas' reduction of freedom
from ideology to the approximation of transparency. For hermeneutics,
greater freedom from ideology extends the capacity to utilise the
productive potential of one's hermeneutic situation, whether or not to
see through dissimulation. This is a capacity which, as Gadamer argues,
relies on mutual relations which, as Marshall argues, must attain the
104 Gadamer, H.-G., (1967) "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology", p. 290.
105 Gadamer, H.-G., (1989) Truth and Method, pp. 373-4.
106 Ibid., pp. 371-2.
ideal of social equality. The criteria of advance in freedom can also not
claim to be universalizable. The practical insight realised in a substantive,
comprehensive, and positive dialectic must apply our theoretical criteria
in an ongoing learning process.107 For social citizenship, what must be
determined is how relations of inequality can be overcome, and an
advance in the mutual recognition of social equality secured over and
again. Further, the legitimacy of power relations also will not be
determined solely by the extent to which they are based on transparent
and equally available justifying principles. The prejudicial application of
these principles already relies on relations justified through an
authoritative insight, just as the critical assessment of power itself seeks
to attain an ideal of learning within existing authoritative relations.
Social equality requires not only the attainment of learning in all
practices, but the equal recognition of all valued practices in the status of
social equality and the conception of the fair wage.
Hermeneutics shows us both that only an authoritative perspective can
be learned from and that only certain conditions enable the emergence of
this perspective. The hermeneutically reformulated social citizenship can
be justified as a process of recognition when it seeks to enable such a
capacity, and when it itself proceeds from this practical insight. It must
proceed with an insight into the public interest, an insight only
legitimated in the mutual relations of social equality it is to enable.
Flabermas' fundamental and negative principle of the general interest
must be replaced by the prejudicially motivated public interest. This
insight into the public interest must be derived from our partial interests
in, and presuppositions of justification of, the good life. The legitimate
intervention of citizenship must be guided by the public interest,
established in relations of mutuality, so as to ensure the requirements for
mutuality in social interaction. For social citizenship to be legitimated,
critique must establish an awareness that social equality is necessary for
107 As Ricoeur argues, the critique of ideology is like the disruption of our everyday
activity in art. However, this does not entail that his "hermeneutics of suspicion" can
claim to be distinct from the mediation of tradition. As we saw, the activity of art will
only enable significant insights when it is also hermeneutically applied: Ricoeur, P.,
(1973) "The Hermeneutic Function of Distanciation", p. 131, pp. 142-4, (1974) "Science and
Ideology", pp. 239-46. Both texts printed in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essays
on Language, Action and Interpretation, ed., trans. J. Thompson (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1981).
mutual recognition. It must bring to awareness the fact that finite
individuals, who cannot finally overcome the dangers of ideological
conditions, can, however, continue to attempt to safeguard the
requirements for practical excellence through social equality.
Conclusion.
Hermeneutic recognition and critique of ideology must be pursued as
mutual learning processes, and it is the prejudicial motivations of
practice which ensure that this circular learning process is also
progressive. I argued that the direction in which the mutual learning of
hermeneutic recognition must be taken is to establish relations of social
equality, as here alone the capacities realised in productive practices can
be secured. A mutual learning process is to distinguish recognition and
critique from ideological conditions. It also distinguishes hermeneutics
from a cultural conservatism, as I argued in Chapter One, and from
Taylor's Romantic communitarian account of recognition. Hermeneutics
"applies" presuppositions of justification in dialogical interaction in the
present situation. It can therefore account both for the constitution of
identities and the critical assessment of the presuppositions of
recognition. As a critique of ideology, hermeneutics proceeds with a
presupposed conception of recognition which can be distinguished from
ideological conditions. The mutual learning process of hermeneutic
understanding can be distinguished from the dominative relations of
non-reflective obedience and the normalised imposition of identities on
the subordinate. A hermeneutic critique is also itself distinct from such
ideological conditions in its own pursuit of a shared understanding.
I have rejected the radical interpretation of social citizenship as a
teleological concept, and I have argued that the radical meta-theoretical
awareness of transgression cannot be realised in a conception of
citizenship. However, nor do the qualities of "humanistic" recognition
and critique call for a radical response of transgression in games of liberty.
The progress of mutual learning will be prejudicially embedded within
relations of power and control and in games that are partly autonomous.
However, the necessity of power, control, and prejudice does not entail
that we should respond to practice with radical suspicion and acts of
transgression. The hermeneutic dimension remains authoritative for
understanding, and so also it is one's true self which comes to
understanding in a practically-derived recognition and critique. Nor is
the partly autonomous status of games of the good life, and of distinctive
games such as art, established by transgression and suspicion. The arrival
at understanding is an event, a disruption to our horizon, but one which
brings to presentation the necessary hermeneutic dimension of potential
mutual learning. The rational capacity of recognition is reliant on
relations of mutuality which presuppose the authority of the shared
dimension built back up through mutual learning. From this
hermeneutic conception of rationality and freedom an advance in
relations of recognition can be assessed.
I have argued that the rational capacity to be enabled, and to legitimate
citizenship intervention, is not an enlightenment account of the power
of reason. The valued capacity is not enabled in Esping-Andersen's equal
power relations of de-commodification, and nor can the capabilities of the
good life be enabled for the individual capacity which, for Nussbaum,
remains prior to practice. In this chapter I have argued that the mutuality
required for the enablement of rational capacity does not, as Habermas
argues, have a formal, dual, and negative nature. Rather, it is the capacity
of practical excellence which is to be enabled and, I argued, can only be
enabled in social equality. Mutual recognition must therefore be
substantive, comprehensive, and positive. It must be a recognition which
is hermeneutically embedded, and so pursued in all spheres, and pursued
from the partial interest of identities in the good life. The presuppositions
of justification of recognition and critique cannot therefore be kept from
problematization. They are not unquestioned bases for justification, but
must be applied. Further, the advance in understanding to be sought is
not simply a greater transparency of motivations to consciousness, but is
the concealment which enables insight. It is an advance for the finite
capacity which must continue to overcome the dangers posed to this
capacity. Through social equality, the insight required for recognition and
critique can be safeguarded, so that the threats to the good life and
recognition can be confronted and overcome.
Conclusion: Social Democratic Citizenship.
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1. Social citizenship and conservative meta-theory.
In this conclusion I consider how the arguments of the previous chapters
bear on Anthony Giddens' rejection of Marshall's social citizenship. I
noted in the Introduction that, unlike the New Right, Giddens argues
that egalitarian policies of social democracy are necessary for the freedom
secured through both social justice and economic efficiency. However, he
argues that social democracy can only be defended by rejecting Marshall's
third, social, stage and conception of citizenship. Giddens argues that the
State can no longer guarantee social equality in the services citizens
enjoy, in their working experiences, and in their income and security.
Rather, the State must only guarantee the civil and political rights for
individuals to secure services, employment, and income for themselves,
while it must confront the unemployed with duties to enter economic
activity. For Giddens, social citizenship is now an obstacle to freedom due
to the changed nature of the world and the way in which it must be
understood. However, I argued that this can be seen as a meta-theoretical
claim concerning the nature of justification. Further, in the chapters
following on from the Introduction, I argued that Marshall's position can
be defended, both because it presupposes the correct account of the nature
of justification, and because this itself enables us to overcome the
shortcomings in Marshall's proposals while remaining committed to the
third, social, stage of citizenship.
I noted in the Introduction that meta-theoretical reflection cannot itself
deliver the substance of a legitimate conception of citizenship. Rather, the
reason for turning to meta-theory is to specify what the nature of a
legitimate conception of citizenship is, the nature of the goals which
collective intervention should have and the requirements which must be
met for its legitimation. I argued that the application of Gadamer's
hermeneutic meta-theory to the concerns of the citizenship debate shows
that Marshall, in his conception of social citizenship, presupposes the
correct nature of legitimate collective interventions of citizenship. As
Marshall argued, the status of social equality, attained through the rights
and duties of social citizenship, is the necessary requirement for the
capacity to both legitimate collective interventions and pursue the good
life in relations of recognition. I also argued that, as Marshall presupposes
a meta-theory which corresponds to Gadamer's hermeneutics, he also
saw the necessity for the continuous reformulation of the social
conception of citizenship. Further, hermeneutic meta-theory can show
how this reformulation can occur and also what of Marshall's
commitments must be reformulated to be consistent with the meta-
theoretical position he presupposes.
I have argued that hermeneutics can be defended, and not only as an
account of the nature of justification which shows how social citizenship
can be legitimated. I have also defended hermeneutics as it is realised in
the reformulation of social citizenship. For hermeneutics, rational
capacity is made possible by a practical horizon which we extend through
interaction in the present situation. In the reformulation of social
citizenship, hermeneutic capacity can be conceived as reliant on the
interactive relations of social equality, and on the collective intervention
which limits inequality so as to create the cultural space for necessary
valued practices. I have also defended hermeneutics against opposing
meta-theories, and in doing so I focused primarily on the way
enlightenment and radical positions will be realised in projects of
citizenship. I have argued that enlightenment conceptions of capacity, as
the power of reason in itself, do not acknowledge that practical
requirements for capacity are mediated through a shared hermeneutic
dimension, and so will not see the sharing of social status as necessary for
capacity. I have also argued that radical conceptions of the capacity for
transgression will only offer local resistance to citizenship, and so cannot
account for the necessity of collective interventions whose goal is a
substantive, comprehensive, and positive conception of rational capacity.
I have argued that the project of social democracy needs to be continually
reformulated from within the commitment to social equality, and so our
concern should be with the legitimation of the substantive policies of
social citizenship. In the Introduction I said that I would return and
defend social citizenship against Giddens' critique. I will attempt to do
that now by assessing the implications which the arguments of my main
chapters have for Giddens' position. I will reject Giddens' argument that
the project of social democracy must abandon its commitment to social
citizenship. I will argue that Giddens derives his position from a mis¬
interpretation of the meta-theory realised in Marshall's conception of
social citizenship. I will also argue that Giddens himself presupposes an
enlightenment meta-theory which cannot account for the nature of
justification. I also show how Giddens takes up the concerns of radical
and conservative positions from within the enlightenment. The way in
which he does so ensures, I will argue, that he cannot account for the
learning process required either for the reformulation of social
citizenship or for the enablement of rational capacity through collective
intervention.
2. Giddens1 rejection of social citizenship.
I turn now to briefly review the account I gave in the Introduction of
Giddens' rejection of social citizenship. For Giddens, Marshall's social
citizenship must be rejected as it necessarily presupposes unacceptable
assumptions about the nature of the world and reflection. According to
Giddens' interpretation, Marshall assumes that the social world is made
up of national cultures and economies, and productivist and
traditionalist practices. Marshall is also held to reduce our understanding
of the social world to an account of our material needs, mutual
dependency, and shared values. For Giddens, these are the assumptions
which are appropriate only to a world where rational capacity has a
"traditionalist" and "productivist" nature. In such a world, social equality
can be pursued by predicting and controlling interaction in largely fixed
and materialistic practices. This intervention is also legitimated by shared
interests in the predictable reproduction of practice according to
traditional and productivist requirements. However, Giddens argues that
our world now is more "reflexive" due to the processes of "globalisation"
and "post-traditionalism", and can be understood only with criteria
which are primarily "psychic", individually determined, and
irreconcilable.1 The conditions of rational capacity which, Giddens claims,
are necessary for social citizenship have now been displaced.
1 Giddens, A., (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, p. 51 ff.; (1994) Beyond Left and
Right, p. 192 ff.; (1994) "Living in a Post-Traditional Society", pp. 56-7; (1998) The Third
Way, pp. 62-4.
Giddens argues that the processes of globalisation and post-traditionalism
have created the conditions for an alternative conception of social
democratic citizenship. He argues that conditions of reflexivity invalidate
Marshall's assumption that the State could intervene in the market to
ensure valued outcomes, specifically a life-long working experience.
Rather, the nature of interaction now has a global interdependency, and
so cannot be controlled by the State, while relations and means of
production must be flexibly adaptable, rather than rigidly controlled as a
right of citizenship. Giddens also argues that Marshall's position is
incompatible with post-traditionalism, that it implies an ethnocentric
commitment to a national culture and an authoritarian commitment to
deferential relations of authority. For Giddens, as cultural diversity now
problematizes the nature of such basic goods as education and health, the
State can no longer attempt to satisfy a culturally substantive conception
of human needs. Further, not only do worker's representatives no longer
have the authority for corporately based politics, due to the demise of
large-scale industrial production, but their authority has also been
undermined by the replacement of employment with the sphere of life¬
style as a locus of human fulfilment.
For Giddens, the basic assumptions entailed in social citizenship are only
appropriate in a materialistic, predictable, and closely interdependent
productivist community. Giddens argues that our post-productivist
society is, instead, a world of post-materialist rather than materialist
orientations, an environment of reflexivity rather than of predictably
rigid and deferential roles, and an environment of increasing self-
determination rather than of mutual communal reliance. On the one
hand, reflexivity is a phenomenon of a period where employment is no
longer the primary source of valued experiences. Yet, it is also only with
post-productivist employment relations that gender equality can be
ensured as the equal potential for reflexivity. On the other hand, the
attainment of gender equality through employment also shows up the
exclusionary assumptions Marshall's thesis relies on. Giddens'
interpretation is in agreement with the radical commentators discussed
in Chapter Two Section 1.2., to the extent that he also argues that
Marshall's concept of social citizenship necessarily presupposes the active
exclusion of certain groups from equality. Giddens argues that Marshall
conceives of interaction solely in terms of a male working experience,
while the potential for reflexivity now makes this employment- and
male-centred exclusionary social citizenship untenable.2
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For Giddens, the "autotelic self" is the capacity of primarily psychic needs
which does not rely on pre-given forms of rationality and power
relations. It is the capacity for individuals to constitute their own
environment of risk and to do so with commitments which are
irreducible. Giddens claims that Marshall's social citizenship would,
instead, assume that the valued experience can be assessed with
materialist criteria of need and its occurrence predicted and then
controlled by the nation State's regulation of production. For Giddens,
social citizenship is necessarily a materialistic, authoritarian, and
ethnocentric intervention. Further, Giddens argues that Marshall
attempts to justify this intervention with an unacceptable conception of
rights. He is in agreement with Esping-Andersen's interpretation which,
as we saw in Chapter Two Section 1.3., characterises Marshall's social
citizenship as a de-commodified sphere of unconditional rights.
However, for Giddens, de-commodification is antithetical to the freedom
secured through civil and political rights, and also generates a passive
reliance on benefits derived from the State. The legitimacy of de-
commodification also cannot be secured, as it creates an irresolvable
conflict of interests and principles between, on the one hand, market
interaction and civil and political citizenship and, on the other, the Statist
bureaucracy of social citizenship.3
For Giddens, rational capacity is, increasingly, realised as freedom over
and against the pre-given considerations of one's environment generally
and the sphere of employment specifically. However, Giddens argues that
the legitimate collective intervention should enforce a work obligation
on the unemployed, and should legitimate this duty by appealing to the
traditions and customs of a community.4 The goal of this intervention,
however, is to foster a disposition to enter market activity where, in turn,
the normative and social context of work fosters the dispositions required
2 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, p. 177.
3 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, pp. 70-77; (1998) The Third Way, pp. 100-7.
4 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, pp. 47-50; (1998) The Third Way, pp. 65-8.
by the autotelic self for self-determination.5 Giddens claims that this does
not rely on the productivist assumption that employment is the
autonomous and sovereign sphere of human fulfilment. Rather, he
argues, employment must itself be made a site where the autotelic self is
realised, in its freedom over and against the pre-given forms of
rationality and power structures of materialistic practice. To ensure this
end, individuals can be granted "civil" rights, such as those guaranteeing
basic employment conditions, which do not pre-judge and predict the
substance of valued roles. The individual must also have the "political"
right to determine the nature of such roles. Through the individual
political participation of employees, occupational power relations can be
justified.
3. Marshall, meta-theory, and the reformulation of social
citizenship.
In Chapters Three and Four, I argued that the legitimate collective
intervention is to enable the capacity of practical excellence in relations of
social equality, which remains practically dependent upon mutual
recognition. Further, the basis on which to legitimate this intervention
must be derived from the mutual learning made possible by relations of
social equality. I argued that this position proceeds from a conservative
meta-theory where rational capacity remains dependent upon its practical
horizon which, in turn, it actively mediates and reformulates in its
interaction in new situations. I also argued that this is the meta-theory
presupposed by Marshall. As I argued in Chapter One, this position is
distinct from the traditionalism and productivism ascribed to Marshall by
Giddens. Therefore, I argue that Giddens' rejection of social citizenship is
based on a mis-interpretation of Marshall's position. Admittedly, there
are certain shortcomings in Marshall's substantive proposals. But these
do not indicate that social citizenship is tied to productivism and
traditionalism. Rather, the meta-theory which is presupposed by
Marshall indicates how his account can be revised while retaining the
commitment to social equality.
5 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, pp. 13-18; (1998) The Third Way, pp. 109-
111.
The misinterpretation of Marshall can be seen in regard to the three
hypothetical situations of social justice I have discussed which, for
Giddens' position, would show that social citizenship is now
inappropriate: the single unemployed parent in poverty; the individual
who derives valuable experiences from a life of art; and the diverse
demands for essential services arising from cultural difference. For
Giddens, social citizenship cannot account for gender relations of a post-
traditionalist society. It will not therefore seek to enable the characteristics
of the autotelic self for the unemployed single mother, and so it will not
ensure, through welfare duties, her equal opportunity in employment.
Giddens also argues that Marshall's citizenship cannot account for the
meaningful experiences of a post-productivist society. He would argue
that it cannot account for the potential value of the life of the artist,
whether art is a life-style choice or a practice outside the productivist
employment structure. Giddens also argues that Marshall's social services
would only seek to meet those needs defined within a homogeneous
national culture. For Giddens' position, universal common social
services will not respond to the diverse cultural requirements of
individuals.
I argued in Chapter Two that, for Marshall, the development of
citizenship is not teleological, but is an open-ended learning process. He
does not reduce this development to the features characterising a
normative advance but, indeed, highlights how groups were excluded
from citizenship equality. However, Marshall shows how the exclusions
from equality in the civil and political stages has a normative significance
due to the absence here of social equality. What these stages show, for
Marshall, is that the equal freedom promised by civil and political
citizenship can be attained only with the social equality secured in the
social stage,6 but Marshall does not assume that the attainment of social
equality overcomes the ideological opposition to it arising from interests
in gender and class inequality. Again, this opposition could only be
resolved by establishing the necessity of social equality for freedom.7
Marshall assumed that we must continue to revise our understanding of
the requirements for a normative advance and for the legitimation of
6 Marshall, T. H., (1949) "Citizenship and Social Class", pp. 90-91 pp. 114-5.
7 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
intervention. Therefore, Marshall's account of social equality as a
national culture which excludes parenting from recognition and which is
compatible with a "semi-professional" status can, I argued, be revised.
However, unlike Giddens' rejection of social citizenship itself, as
Marshall argues, this revision must proceed from social equality so as to
determine again how to attain this goal.
Giddens' interpretation and critique can be rejected for the further reason
that, as I argued in Chapter Two, Marshall's social citizenship does not
pursue de-commodification. Rather, social rights create a conceptual
horizon in which civil and political rights can be ensured for all. They do
not displace negative liberties and the positive freedoms of participation.
Further, social citizenship must also create a sphere which contains,
rather than excludes, the freedoms and interests of the market and of
politics. The shared interest in attaining social citizenship must be
established with the considerations appropriate to these diverse activities
and dimensions of citizenship. However, Marshall also assumed that the
legitimation of this shared interest must be re-established in new
situations. Therefore, the reformulation of social citizenship must show
again that we have normative obligations and a self interest to attain a
society where mutual dependency is regulated through the rights and
duties of social equality. This brings us to the arguments of Chapters
Three and Four. A shared interest in social equality will be generated only
with an account of the good life which emphasises the reliance of rational
capacity on material resources enjoyed through mutual relations. What
must be determined again is the nature of social equality which is
necessary to sustain the shared interest in policies which enable rational
capacity through mutual reliance.8
For Marshall, social citizenship is to enable the good life which, I argued,
he conceives as a mutual learning process, and not as an ethnocentric,
authoritarian, and atavistic conception of capacity. Personal freedom can
only be attained where the authority of one's horizon is acknowledged.
Freedom cannot be sought instead over and against practice, whether in
life-style choices free from work or in reflexive freedom in work. What
8 Marshall, T. H., (1939) "The Recent History of Professionalism", p. 169.
must be determined again is how relations marked by status
differentiations can still be those of mutual learning. Further, we must
also be more consistent than Marshall in our conceptualisation of the
good life as a mutual learning process. That is, we must continue to
pursue the commitment to ensure these conditions equally for all.
Marshall also argues that, while acknowledging the authority of tradition,
citizenship could only advance through the reinterpretation of its
principles in the light of the diverse demands of the present situation.
Marshall's social citizenship is already open to diversity in the pursuit of
the good life. This is because Marshall acknowledges that traditionally-
derived commitments of the good life are necessary for capacity, and so
must motivate our interaction. To enable diverse good lives, the
considerations of citizenship cannot, pace Giddens, be those of civil and
political rights alone.
I argued in Chapter Three that Marshall does not reduce the good life to
materialist considerations, but shows the significance which the
satisfaction of material needs has for the good life which it makes
possible. Nor does Marshall justify citizenship intervention solely
according to a materialist understanding of the requirements for
production and distribution. Rather, he demonstrates how conceptions of
social efficiency, derived from the insight attained in the relatively
autonomous status of social equality, can and must guide State and
market interaction to attain social equality. As I argued in Chapter Four,
for Marshall, social equality ensures both the recognition and the
material requirements each embodied capacity is mutually dependent on.
In arguing that identity has material requirements, Marshall does not
reduce the self to an object of prediction and control. Nor, in arguing that
each identity is mutually responsible for the recognition of others, does
Marshall reduce the self to a dependence on others for the satisfaction of
needs and the confirmation of evaluative commitments. Rather, for
Marshall, freedom is secured through, not over and against, the
interactive and material requirements for practical capacity. What must
be determined is how mutuality can be ensured now, how it can be
compatible with both the functioning of systems and with diversity and
individuality.
4. Enlightenment meta-theory and the autotelic self.
As I argued in Chapter One, Marshall's position is neither productivist
nor traditionalist. That is, it does not presuppose a materialist,
authoritarian, ethnocentric, or atavistic conception of capacity. As I
argued in Chapter Two, Marshall's position also does not assume that
citizenship unfolds teleologically into a de-commodified sphere
antithetical to competing considerations and interests. Therefore, I reject
Giddens' interpretation of Marshall's position. I have argued instead that
Marshall presupposes an account of capacity and legitimation which
corresponds to Gadamer's conception of mutual learning. For that
reason, Marshall's social citizenship can be reformulated. However, I will
also argue here that Giddens' critique proceeds from an enlightenment
meta-theoretical position which should be rejected. Giddens
conceptualises the enlightenment power of reason as the reflexivity of
the autotelic self. For this reason, Giddens explains and evaluates the
development of post-productivism solely in terms of the enablement of a
power of reason, a capacity which itself is only realised to the extent that it
is free from practice. I have argued that the enlightenment cannot
account for the shared basis required for capacity. However, I argue here
that Giddens' enlightenment duty-led social justice is especially
problematic in the way it adopts radical and conservative concerns.
From my discussion of the enlightenment position, I suggest that
Giddens also gives an enlightenment account of how social democracy
can only be secured in civil and political citizenship. For Giddens, civil
and political rights can safeguard and ensure capacity in itself, over and
against the practice in which it may find its realisation. He normatively
justifies specific civil and political rights alone according to the extent to
which they do enable the independently realised features of reflexivity.
These are the features ensured by an equal opportunity which, for
Giddens, is the freedom the individual can attain over and against the
inegalitarian structure of practice.9 Giddens argues that, in contrast, social
rights confer normative significance on the practice over and against the
individual, whether the valued occupation or its productive relations.
Giddens also argues that the legitimation of collective intervention must
9 Giddens, A., (1994) Beyond Left and Right, pp. 144-5.
be derived from the insight of the autotelic self. In contrast, he argues,
social citizenship cannot be legitimated, as it only allows individuals to
participate on the terms ascribed to them by their roles. Giddens argues
that, just as corporate politics reduces participants to their class and
occupation role, so also it excludes individuals whose practices are not
valued, such as women in the "shadow economy" of domestic labour.10
I have criticised an enlightenment account of capacity as the power of
reason which is prior to, and realised over and against, practice. I have
argued that, as the enlightenment position claims to abstract from
prejudice, it remains unaware of the continued effects of concealed
presuppositions on its reflection. It therefore also misses the opportunity
to utilise prejudice through a process of mutual learning. This is so even
where Nussbaum conceives of capacity as having an embodied,
practically embedded, and mutually reliant nature. By conceiving of the
individual as prior to practice, she is unable to account for the mutual
learning required to intervene in, and pursue, the good life and
recognition. Instead, Gadamer's account of mutual learning as a fusion of
horizons can be secured for the reformulation of social citizenship in the
shared status of social equality. Giddens' conception of rational capacity is,
however, distinct from the enlightenment positions I have discussed. For
Giddens, the autotelic self is largely psychic, rather than materially
embodied; it is not reliant on practices, but sees them strategically as risk
environments; and is not mutually dependent, but increasingly self-
reliant. I argue here that these commitments express the way Giddens
takes up radical and conservative concerns to account for the
enlightenment capacity of the autotelic self.
Giddens, along with the radical commentators discussed in Chapter Two
Section 1.2., rejects the claims made on behalf of reformist projects that a
shared conception of the material requirements for human well-being
and the value of its enablement has been identified. Rather, he argues,
evaluative commitments have become increasingly irreconcilable, while
human fulfilment is neither necessarily secured by, nor even reliant
upon, the satisfaction of what are held to be essential needs. Thus, even
10 Ibid., pp. 139-40.
in the material deprivation of the socially stigmatised condition of
homelessness, human fulfilment is possible.11 However, unlike a
consistently radical position, Giddens argues that an increasing
independence from traditionalist and productivist conditions can be
identified and judged as a normative advance. Our self-realisation and
social interaction can only be ensured now in an environment which
increasingly resembles a radical conception of self-reliance and self-
determined certainty. But this merely reflects the extent to which the
universal power of reason has been freed and made responsible for its
own capacity.
Giddens also argues that tradition and custom must be appealed to in the
legitimation of citizenship intervention, specifically to justify a work
obligation. Where a cultural separation threatens to open up between the
non-poor and the poor, it is legitimate to appeal to traditional and
customary beliefs: for instance, that the parents of a family have a social
duty to ensure that their own needs and those of their dependants are
secured independently and, therefore, through market employment.12
However, just as the autotelic self must respond to the environment as
an opportunity to be turned to one's advantage, so too Giddens' appeal to
tradition is merely strategic. Unlike the consistently conservative
position, Giddens' goal is not to ensure the shared horizon of tradition as
that which is necessary for freedom. Rather, work obligations are justified
because the environment of work re-connects the individual with the
social and normative requirements for reflexivity. These are the
requirements which ensure one's freedom over and against one's
environment, one's ability to respond to the demands of an
environment without relying on the accepted solutions to such
problems. The cultural separation to be overcome is, therefore, the
absence of this disposition and capacity of the autotelic self.
11 Ibid., p. 181.
12 Ibid., pp. 147-8.
5. The ongoing learning process of hermeneutics and social
citizenship.
There are some apparent areas of correspondence between the
hermeneutic reformulation of citizenship and Giddens' Third Way.
Giddens also rejects the de-commodification thesis. He argues that the
valued capacity is realised in all aspects of practice and that the
legitimation of collective intervention does not rely on activities and
considerations which are antithetical to the market. Further, Giddens
claims both that his collective interventions proceed from a
"philosophical conservatism" and that relations of social justice must
enable a "learning" process between social classes. However, for Giddens,
the appeal to tradition is only valid when it enables an enlightenment
conception of capacity, and so Giddens' collective intervention must also
reject social rights, rather than just their de-commodified version.
Further, Giddens argues that the learning process required is to make us
aware of the reflexive nature of capacity: where the non-poor can learn
from the potential for fulfilment in poverty so as, themselves, to no
longer be "compulsively" dependent on employment; and, where the
poor must come to see the necessity of work as a means to ensure their
own reflexive self-reliance.13 The learning process of legitimation
Giddens calls for is to usher in the life-style changes of post-productivism.
Giddens argues that a learning process will confirm the largely psychic
nature of well-being. However, to arrive at this conclusion, Giddens must
already have excluded an embodied rational capacity from the subject of
dialogue, its subject matter, and the goal of subsequent intervention.
Giddens also argues that the learning process of poor and non-poor will
justify a duty-led welfare relation. However, to do so, Giddens excludes
the shared, embedded nature of capacity which, instead, would call for a
fusion of prejudicial horizons. The traditional beliefs which are to help
justify Giddens' welfare duties only have an instrumental significance.
No shared understanding is required of them, and so they can be kept
from being assessed. Therefore, a single standpoint is to justify the
conditional distribution of the resources required for capacity. Not only is
this antithetical to the dialogical model of hermeneutic understanding; it
13 Ibid., pp. 194-5.
is also antithetical to the hermeneutic moral demand, that to understand
the other, I must treat her as an end in herself. Thus, as Marshall argued
and as Gadamer will help reformulate, unconditional rights to mutually
ensured resources are necessary both for a rational advance in interaction
and for morally justified power relations.
From the discussions of Chapter Three and Chapter Four, we can see that
the enlightenment positions of Rawls, Nussbaum, and Habermas would
be in agreement with Marshall, and opposed to Giddens, in their support
of unconditional rights of social justice. They agree that certain resources
have a significance for our rational capacity which justifies their status as
unconditional rights. For each author, the satisfaction of fundamental
needs is a necessity for capacity which others are duty bound to enable
due to the mutual dependence of our capacity. Not only are social
resources needed to ensure capacity, but their distribution can be
normatively governed by collective interventions. However, although
these enlightenment positions agree that capacity is mutually dependent,
they each argue, if for different reasons, that capacity can only be
identified and enabled through a reflective distanciation from the
substance of this mutual dependence. Instead, for the hermeneutic
reformulation of social citizenship, the basis from which to identify
unconditional rights to needed resources remains derived from the
productive practices in which, in turn, capacity can be enabled.
The reformulation of social citizenship must also reconceive Gadamer's
hermeneutic conception of capacity as dependent upon the material and
interactive substance of the status of social equality. On that basis, a
hermeneutic justification can be pursued again of the unconditional
rights to necessary social material resources. This can be conceived as a
right to take part in the mutual learning of the good life and recognition.
Mutual learning is antithetical to the power relation and to the claimed
authoritative insight of a duty-led social justice which is legitimated with
criteria which are kept from assessment. However, a learning process
must proceed prejudicially. The understanding of the requirements for
capacity will be derived from a standpoint taken from within our mutual,
material dependence in a community, a standpoint taken on the
potential for capacity within that mutuality. Unlike Nussbaum, I have
argued that the characteristic which has significance for evaluation and
explanation of capability is not that which is an expression of the
individual over and against, or independently of, practice. Rather, the
relations of learning and of just power which are necessary for capacity,
and which must be the object of concern for collective intervention, are
not derived from the individual in her independence.
The enlightenment distributes resources to enable capacity in its
independence from practice. However, this entails that it cannot take as
its subject matter the way in which resources are used. I argue instead that
the resources which enable capacity can only be known as they are used.
We must proceed with a commitment to the practices where resources
are used in a valuable way, where capacity is enabled. But we must also
proceed with the commitment to learning. For Gadamer, in dialogue, one
must proceed by strengthening the argument of the other, but so as to
also overcome the specificity of the horizons with which the dialogue
was begun. For the hermeneutic reformulation of social citizenship, the
prejudicial enablement of the good life must be an investment in
potential. For the hermeneutic position, and unlike cultural
conservatism, the goal of intervention is not to recreate life-patterns.
Rather, the valued capacity can only be enabled in a practice by also
opening that practice to the force of the authoritative insight which is
enabled here. Similarly, with the enablement of any one practice, the
nature of the mutual dependence between practices for learning is also
opened to advance. The fact that a community recognises the value of
parenting as a practice, and intervenes to ensure its requirements, alters
the ethical and social context in which all practices emerge.
The reformulation of social citizenship must determine again the way in
which mutual learning is the requirement for a valued practice.
However, in doing so, the hermeneutic conception of capacity will have
to be reconceived from within the different relations in which it can be
attained. For social citizenship, educational practices will not be
conceived simply as resources which could be enjoyed, but as activities
which can already enable capability. Its primary concern must therefore be
with relations of learning. It must determine how they can be socially just
and foster understanding, and how they can be established in relations of
unequal power and insight, such as that between the teacher and student.
However, the good life of mutual learning is not only a concern of
education. For instance, if an artistic activity is also to be a good life it
must be materially and socially valued within a community as a
productive practice. Of particular concern here is how such valuable
practices can be enabled in market relations. What must be attained is an
awareness of the changing nature of mutuality and of our mutual
dependence on a practice such as art, in the market and elsewhere. It is
this awareness alone which can motivate the normative obligation to
intervene, just as it alone can provide an understanding of the potential
for capacity which can be enabled in valued practices.
The policies called for in a hermeneutic social citizenship reflect, I
suggest, many of the commitments of the Swedish model of a universal
and comprehensive welfare State. On this model, citizenship
intervention is to ensure an equal quality of the essential services needed
by all citizens, while such intervention is to be legitimated through
corporate participation. This again raises the distinctions I have made
between a hermeneutic social citizenship and the positions of both
Nussbaum and Esping-Andersen. I disagree with Nussbaum's argument
that the Swedish model shows how the separateness which is prior to
practice can be enabled by resources which foster the full scope of each
individual's potential, such as their artistic abilities.14 Rather,
individually ensured resources cannot by themselves enable the valued
capabilities of artistic life, as they are only attained in practices. Even
when the artist works alone, it is as part of a tradition of art, within a
broader social and political context, that this artistic capacity is realised as
in a practice. Collective intervention must, therefore, focus on the
conditions of valued practices, and it is this which Swedish legislation
governing the quality of working experience has attempted to do.15 An
artistic practice can be worthwhile only where features that cannot be
reduced to the individual enable learning, while such valued practices
14 Nussbaum, M., (1990) "Aristotelian Social Democracy", pp. 240-242.
1^ For a discussion of this model and recent criticisms of it from within Sweden, see: Tilton,
T., (1991) The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy. Through the Welfare State
to Socialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 235-40.
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can only be enabled by policies which also focus on the interrelations
between practices, in the market and elsewhere.
I also disagree with Esping-Andersen's argument that the Swedish model
shows that citizenship equality can only be attained in de-commodified
relations, and that, in altered market and class conditions, it can be
attained now only by socialising the costs of reproduction for the
individual.16 Rather, corporate-based policies were not abandoned from
Swedish policy in the 1980s, but were reconceived for a situation where
industrial mass production had less significance in the division of
labour.17 As Durkheim argues, it is in the growing complexity of the
division of labour that individual freedom is enabled, and so it is in these
changing conditions that social rights must intervene and enable valued
practices. Social citizenship must be able to respond to new forms of
productive practice. For example, it must reconceive the nature of
relations of authority so as to account for relations within artistic practices
and between such practices and the broader community. This mediation
of the division of labour itself necessitates a commitment to social
equality which, in turn, is continually re-applied in this process. As
Marshall argues, the fair wage, which ensures market rewards for valued
practices, requires a cross-class commitment to egalitarian measures
within mutual dependency whose goal is to actively enable valued
practices. It is this which has distinguished the Swedish model, making it
an exemplar for the reformulation of social citizenship.
Gadamer argues that the choice of areas in which to pursue hermeneutic
study necessarily affects the nature of the understanding attained there. In
attempting to give a hermeneutic defence of social citizenship I have
argued that the hermeneutic conception of rational capacity must be
reconceived from within the necessity of the collective interventions of
social justice. Further, Marshall also argued that his substantive
commitments to social justice had to be revised. Although hermeneutic
meta-theory does not deliver the substance of a conception of social
16 Esping-Andersen (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, pp. 187-188.
17 For a discussion of these developments, see: Nielsen, K., & Pedersen, O., (1991) "From
the mixed economy to the negotiated economy: The Scandinavian countries", pp. 145-160,
in Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency. New Perspectives on Socio-Economics, ed.
Richard M. Coughlin (New York: M. E. Sharpe).
citizenship, it does show how it can be reformulated. I have argued that it
should be reformulated, that social equality is necessary for the
legitimation of collective intervention and for the enablement of rational
capacity. The reformulation of social citizenship must take as its subject
matter the enablement of valued practices as a goal now of citizenship. It
must not only assess the valued practices which can be enabled. It must
also determine how the collective intervention of the State can be
directed by a hermeneutically formulated public interest, and how that
public interest can be realised in the market, and elsewhere, in the
attainment of the good functioning of valued practices. In the
enablement of practical excellence, the potential for hermeneutic
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